FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MAY/JUNE 1995

The Islamic Cauldron

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Milton Viorst on Sudan's dismal experiment
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Democratization and War

EDWARD MANSFIELD AND JACK SNYDER

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MAY/JUNE 1995
VOLUME 74, NUMBER 3

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The Cold War culture of military restraint has given way to increasing atrocities. By remaining a passive witness in the former Yugoslavia, Central Asia, and Chechnya, the United States damages its moral economy. Yet none of these conflicts sufficiently threatens U.S. interests to rouse the nation to arms. The United States should therefore return to the calculating siege craft common before Napoleon, which stressed minimal casualties, partial results, and patience. Every war need not be a heroic national crusade.

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

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U.S. troops leaving Somalia, March 1995.

Somalia may not be a peaceful or hopeful place. But U.S. forces left it better off than they found it.

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The Lessons of Somalia

Not Everything Went Wrong

Chester A. Crocker

Under the protection of a U.S. military umbrella, the United Nations extricated itself from Somalia in early March 1995. The exit went well and may serve as a model for pulling U.N. peacekeepers out of the former Yugoslavia and other places where they run into trouble. But what lessons is the United States drawing from the "failed" Somalia enterprise? Is "failure" the right term to describe the U.S. and U.N. military intervention? If so, what is it that failed?

Appraisals of the Somalia operation vary widely. Some disparage it as a media-driven spectacle of misguided internationalism that ignored the pitfalls of intervention in alien places lacking civil order and legitimate political institutions. Some see Somalia as an almost welcome inoculation against the temptation to intervene in places such as Rwanda, while others blame the Somalia operation for sapping U.S. political will and global standing and for inhibiting Americans from doing the right thing in "more important" places like Bosnia. The lesson, in this view, is to refrain from applying global standards and to disengage from the world's strategic slums. Another school views Somalia as an epitaph for multilateralism and an object lesson on the United Nations' inadequacies and the need to limit the U.S. role in U.N. peacekeeping. Still others view Somalia as a laudable step toward a new era in American exceptionalism and humanitarian leadership, which turned sour because the United States became entangled in local politics. The actual lessons, however, are more subtle and more interesting than these one-liners suggest.

THE STANDARD OF SUCCESS

The intervention in Somalia was not a failure as measured by the standards first set by President Bush. Much has been accomplished in humanitarian terms, and a larger tragedy has been averted. How

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U.S. Marines leaving Mogadishu

large a tragedy it is impossible to know, but, judging by the Somali death toll of 1992, one could reasonably estimate that upwards of a quarter of a million Somali lives were saved. Some failure.

The Somali political landscape, moreover, has been changed forever. The apparent rejection of outside political initiatives by local parties should not obscure the fact that foreign intervention knocked a hideously costly, stalemated clan war off dead center and opened the field for local initiatives. This is a classic, if sometimes perverse, function of foreign intervention. Today large parts of the country are free of conflict and widespread human suffering. This is not to say that Somalia is a peaceful or hopeful place, but we left it better off than we found it.

Somalia had the ill fortune to experience firsthand the full effects of a U.S. political transition: the steep learning curve of an inexperienced administration in Washington, an idiosyncratic U.N. leadership bent on using leverage borrowed from member states to fix Somalia, and a prolonged, unresolved debate between New York and Washington over basic purposes in the field.

These tensions and disruptions were manifest in the various phases of the Somalia enterprise:

—U.N. Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I), April–December 1992, which tried to reconcile warring Somali factions but collapsed from bureaucratic

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infighting and an inability to provide safety for relief operations;

—United Task Force (UNITAF), December 1992–April 1993, a multinational force led by the United States and approved by the United Nations, which quickly provided that safety, started a low-key political process, and maintained working relationships with all Somali factions and groups;

—U.N. Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), May 1993–March 1995, the U.N.-led operation that comprised an overreaching, "nation-building" phase (May–October 1993) and a scaled-back, accommodative phase (November 1993–March 1995) triggered by the October 3, 1993, firefight in Mogadishu.

As the initial intervention unfolded, Somalia was transformed from a famine-stricken backwater where heartless warlords and hopped-up teenage gangs reigned over helpless innocents into a laboratory for new theories of U.N. peacekeeping. Perhaps, ironically, the impressive leadership, coherence, and dramatic success of the U.S.-led UNITAF phase made it look too easy, facilitating the "mission creep" that produced UNOSOM II's vast nation-building mandate. The sheer ease of intervention, combined with the mastery with which it was initially conducted in Washington and in the field, helped produce the slide toward a modern version of trusteeship over an ex-colonial territory, triggering a violent backlash mounted by a powerful Somali faction.

BAD BREAKS

Look more closely at what happened. The UNITAF mission was successful during its too-brief deployment through April 1993. Establishing safety for relief workers while keeping the warlords somewhat placated and off balance; maintaining and demonstrating military primacy without making a permanent adversary or national hero of any local actor; pushing the military factions toward a locally led political process while opening up that process to civilian elites and eschewing precise formulas; removing heavy weapons from areas of conflict while fostering the restoration of police and government functions—these were undertakings of the highest order of delicacy in a militarized and fragmented society like Somalia's. UNITAF's accomplishments far exceeded the simple, publicly discussed goal of creating a "secure environment for humanitarian relief." They required strong leadership and a well-oiled, quick-response military-civilian bureaucracy.

But the coordinated and politically astute operating strategy of U.S. Ambassador Robert B. Oakley and U.S. Marine General Robert Johnston (who both had outstanding access to Washington) would be interrupted, first by the U.S. presidential transition, and again during the handoff from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, the entire field leadership of the U.S.-led intervention was replaced by a less united and coherent operation reporting to U.N. headquarters. Another discontinuity was the quick departure—before the new UNOSOM II management was even in place in Mogadishu—of not only the previous UNITAF management but many vital U.S. combat units.

Is it any wonder that things turned sour? Why expect a seamless transition to U.N.-led peacekeeping to flow from a

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rancorous argument between Washington and U.N. headquarters about whether the transfer should even take place and whether the United States had completed its initial task? Such changes of leadership, tradition, doctrine, personal chemistry, operating procedures, policy instincts, and bureaucratic systems were bound to disrupt the effectiveness and credibility of the military presence.

Another major discontinuity was, of course, the adoption of a sweepingly ambitious new "nation-building" resolution by the Security Council (Resolution 814), which authorized UNOSOM II at the very moment existing management, reporting channels, and capabilities were being transformed. The nation-building resolution aimed explicitly at reestablishing Somalia's political institutions and rehabilitating its economy as well as assuring security throughout the country, not merely in the famine-afflicted south and central zones. The changes raised Somali doubts about the operation's objectives while creating opportunities to test its will. Between May 1993, when the United Nations took over, and the October 3, 1993, debacle when U.S. forces, under U.S. command, suffered 18 dead in a Mogadishu firefight, many of UNITAF's accomplishments were lost. Also lost was the shallow and fragile U.S. consensus on U.N. peace operations.

WHAT SOMALIA PROVED

Somalia, having experienced several types of intervention and peacekeeping, is hardly an ideal test case for judging U.N. peace operations. Like a barometer, it has both shaped and reflected shifting U.S. and international opinion about them.

Arguably, Somalia does not offer an ideal test of either the Bush concept of limited humanitarian intervention or the evolving concepts of expanded peacekeeping and peace enforcement based on the use-of-force authority provided in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. The Somalia "failure" was less a failure of either humanitarian intervention or muscular peacekeeping than a failure to apply them steadily and wisely. The failure was of another order: strategic confusion followed by a collapse of political will when the confusion led to combat casualties.

In Cambodia, Central America, Namibia, and now Mozambique, U.N. operations have unquestionably given war-torn lands a chance to get on their feet. These were complex operations conducted successfully under wide-ranging mandates. But the United Nations' attempt at a militarily challenging "peace enforcement" operation shows that it cannot manage complex political-military operations when its own structure is an undisciplined and often chaotic set of rival fiefdoms that resist unified command and control in the field at both the civilian and military levels. Basic change is needed on the issues of delegation to the field, unity of command in the field, and professional military backstopping and oversight from U.N. headquarters. We already knew these things about U.N. reform. After Somalia, we know them even better.

Equally important, Somalia underscores the need for improvement in the way the United States—the United Nations' leading member—defines missions, reviews and approves peacekeeping mandates, and approves U.N. force levels and budgets. The United States and the

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United Nations overreached in Somalia when they expanded the initial mandate without providing the means to carry it out. They failed to resolve a raging debate over whether and how to disarm the Somali factions. In the end, of course, the United States refused to take on that task before handing it off to the U.N. command. UNITAF probably could have done much more to demilitarize and disarm Somalia if the United States had been prepared to make the necessary forces available for a longer period and had maintained effective working relationships with the Somalis.

But realizing the more open-ended time frame, the additional resources required to disarm the Somali factions, and the possible negative fallout on the home front, both U.S. administrations strongly opposed it. The ball was simply dropped by Washington, the U.N. secretary general, and the Security Council in New York. As a result, the United Nations received a bolder mandate than the one Bush had given UNITAF (and which Oakley and Johnston later expanded on the ground) but was given woefully inadequate means for carrying it out. These things should never have been permitted to happen. Either the nation-building mandate should have been drastically scaled down or the means to implement it should have been mobilized.

THE LESSONS

The Somalia episode suggests several lessons. It is obvious that the United States and other leading nations (within or outside the United Nations) should act through diplomacy (whether preventive, coercive, or mediatory) before states fail and societies implode. Once men with guns seize the initiative, it becomes more complex to accommodate the interests of their peculiar hierarchies in addition to those of the broader society and political system, and it becomes more costly for external peacemakers to apply their will.

Somalia reinforces the point that the linkage between U.N. peacekeeping mandates and the resources made available by member states must be better understood by Security Council members so that they do not approve missions that will expose U.N. peacekeepers to severe risk and the United Nations itself to ridicule. At the same time, there is no excuse for underfunding and undermanning missions that warrant U.S. support. We must remember that the Security Council is a mirror of the actions, inactions, fudges, and fantasies of its leading members, who can veto anything they do not like.

The clear shortcomings in the United Nations' capacity to manage peacekeeping and especially peace enforcement argue strongly for several approaches: U.N. institutional reform to end bureaucratic fiefdoms in the field, create genuine unity of command, and beef up U.N. headquarters' ability to manage and control military operations; restraint and selectivity in undertaking missions that cross the line between traditional, consensual peacekeeping and enforcement; and creativity in supporting their management. Historically, U.N. operations have prospered when they enjoyed the dedicated, attentive backing of one or more major powers. This was the case with the far-reaching but successful Congo operation of the 1960s and the

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intricate, multipurpose U.N. operations in Namibia, Cambodia, and Mozambique more recently. By contrast, UNOSOM II demonstrates how a U.N. operation can fail if it is orphaned by leading members.

Responsibility for making these operations succeed must be given to the most experienced and imaginative people available. It is equally imperative to conduct basic reviews if operations turn sour. Peacekeeping initiatives should not be launched without some assurances of stability of leadership in the field, some hope for continuity of backstopping in key capitals and New York, and a clear hierarchy of accountability for the whole business. Changes in either resources made available, including key combat components, or leadership relationships and reporting channels between the field and key capitals must be minimized.

IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST

At the strategic level, the Somalia case raises the question of limits to and criteria for U.S. and U.N. involvement in humanitarian operations, political transitions from protracted civil conflicts, and efforts to restore failed states. Can and should the United States insist on a carefully worded "national interest" standard for support of and participation in such operations? Can humanitarian action be sealed off from the politics of peacemaking and the military implications of peace enforcement? Somalia cannot answer these questions, but it highlights the need for debate.

By overreaching as dramatically as it did, the Security Council's March 1993 nation-building resolution caused a backlash at two levels. The sweep of the mandate and the way it was implemented changed the Somali political posture from humiliated acceptance of a helping hand to polarization and nationalist martyrdom. In the United States, support for an initially popular undertaking collapsed amid confusion about American purposes. Was this a humanitarian mission, a manhunt for a wily warlord, or a nation-building program? After Somalia, it is getting harder for Western leaders to rally their constituents to go to war for a new world order.

That said, President Bush was right—politically, strategically, and ethically—to launch Operation Restore Hope, and President Clinton was right to support his decision. The judgment that U.S. forces could and should stop humanitarian disaster in Somalia was a proper assertion of global leadership, as evidenced by the long list of nations who pressed to join during the initial phase of UNITAF. As the end of the century nears, it is surely wise that we and others broaden our understanding of national interest to include consideration of interests related to global order (sanctity of borders, extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) and global standards (avoiding genocide, mass humanitarian catastrophe).

Operation Restore Hope was an act of human solidarity without regard to race, religion, or region. That is why the Congress and the American people supported it—just as they supported the 1991 effort to protect Iraqi Kurds. And that is why no one is especially proud of the U.S. role in inhibiting U.N. action in Rwanda, the first victim of the post-Somalia backlash. Just as it cannot be U.S. policy to protect oil supplies but

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ignore genocide, it cannot be U.S. policy to protect Kurds but ignore Tutsis.

THE TEST FOR INTERVENTION

If the criteria for initiating U.N. peace operations and humanitarian intervention are not primarily geographic, then what are they? Some say that the United States should not have intervened (or encouraged the United Nations to do so) in Somalia unless it was also prepared to do so in Sudan, Tibet, and Tajikistan. But we cannot view all disorders as equally threatening to our global interests. The quest for consistency leads to a false choice between doing nothing and indiscriminate interventionism.

No one realistically expects or wants the United States to act in every scenario where action is possible. Americans are relative newcomers to U.N. peace operations; many other nations play responsible, leading roles in them and will continue to provide the bulk of the financing and manpower that make them possible. Somalia was an exception both in the prominence of the roles the United States played and in its dramatic impact on events. The question is whether Americans will learn from Somalia or recoil from the experience—and from peace operations generally.

The basic criterion that the United States should apply in essentially humanitarian cases is not obscure: Is a proposed operation likely to be effective at an acceptable cost to those who will bear the burden of intervention? Clearly, a wide range of factors must be examined: logistics, terrain, the likelihood and nature of armed opposition to the intervention, the role of humanitarian aid organizations, and the impact of intervention on their operations.

The final lesson of Somalia may be the most humbling. Just as humanitarian relief may disrupt a local economy, changing the stakes of conflict and even, perversely, fueling it, military intervention may alter the local balance of power. Operation Restore Hope was no exception. It temporarily strengthened Somalia's vestigial civil society and challenged the warlords' political monopoly. By freezing in place the factional strife, it also checked the stronger factions and protected the weaker ones. But what is there to replace this new status quo so that the old one does not return?

Somalia, in other words, suggests that there is no such thing as a purely humanitarian operation. It calls attention to the question of how intervention can translate into peacemaking so that something emerges to replace the temporary status quo created by intervention. The Bush and Clinton administrations insisted on a quick handoff to the United Nations, effectively begging the question. (For a brief period, the UNITAF leaders improvised a political settlement strategy that appeared promising, but it collapsed when UNOSOM II soured.) It is hard to escape the conclusion that an appeal for outside force must be accompanied by a political strategy for leashing the dogs—while healing the wounds—of war.

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Preserving the New Peace

The Case Against NATO Expansion

Michael Mandelbaum

Proponents of extending NATO membership to the Visegrad countries—Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia—can be divided into two camps. Those in the first camp assert that the purpose is solely to promote democracy and free markets in central Europe and has nothing to do with the military power and political aspirations of any other country. For the second group, NATO expansion has everything to do with the threat from Russia.

On their point of disagreement, the second group has the stronger argument. NATO expansion *is* about Russia. But on the policy they commonly advocate, both are unpersuasive. NATO expansion, under present circumstances and as currently envisioned, is at best premature, at worst counterproductive, and in any case largely irrelevant to the problems confronting the countries situated between Germany and Russia.

If NATO is to be a vehicle for the promotion of democracy in the post-Cold War world, and, judging from Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke's recent article ("America, a European Power," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1995), this is the position of the Clinton administration, there is no reason that all the formerly communist countries of Eurasia should not join. Certainly, if the promotion of democracy is NATO's new mission, then the expansion under consideration does not reach far enough to the east. For the countries under active consideration are precisely those best placed to make a successful transition to democracy and free markets *without* NATO membership. It is in Russia and Ukraine that the development of Western political and economic systems will be most difficult, where failure would be most costly for Europe, and where, therefore, success would have the greatest benefit.

In fact, however, NATO is not an effective instrument for promoting either free markets or democracy. In the second half of the 1940s, when the fate of democracy and free markets in Western Europe was the preeminent international

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issue, the principal response—and an extremely successful one—was the Marshall Plan. The plan provided capital, market access, and incentives for economic cooperation, all of which central Europe currently needs. The logical source for all three is not NATO; it is the European Union, membership in which is a matter of the highest priority for each of the Visegrad countries.

ANXIETY ABOUT RUSSIA

NATO is not only not the most effective instrument for promoting democracy, it is not in *essence* an organization for doing so. Rather, it is a military alliance, an association of some sovereign states directed against others. The "other" in this case is Russia.

Anxiety about Russia makes NATO membership attractive to central Europeans. In the words of Bronislaw Geremek, a prominent democratic politician in Poland speaking in the September 6, 1993, *Washington Post,* "At the moment Russia is weak. But we know that this is a transitional period. The Soviet empire could be succeeded by the Russian empire. In some years, Russia will become a superpower again—and the memory of this period of weakness will have an important psychological impact on a new generation of Russian leaders." Poles have been dominated and oppressed by Russia for most of the last two centuries. It is hardly surprising that they should want some insurance against the revival of Russian imperial behavior, which is what NATO membership offers them.

Americans who favor expanding NATO for reasons having to do with Russia rather than the promotion of democracy agree. In the post–Cold War era, they say, NATO should be more or less what it was during the Cold War: a mechanism for containing a smaller, no longer communist, but still aggressive Russia. Peter W. Rodman, a senior foreign policy official in the last four Republican administrations, has made the point with admirable clarity in the December 13, 1994, *Washington Post:* "Some will lament that [in expanding NATO to central Europe] we have drawn a new line dividing the European continent. Nonsense. Russia is already getting back on its feet geopolitically, even before it gets back on its feet economically. The only potential great-power security problem in central Europe is the lengthening shadow of Russian strength, and NATO still has the job of counter-balancing it. Russia is a force of nature; all this is inevitable."

As with the argument that NATO will promote democracy, however, even if the premise of this "neo-containment" rationale for NATO expansion is correct, even if Russian imperialism is bound to revive, the proposed extension of the Atlantic alliance does not go sufficiently far eastward. Poland, after all, is not directly threatened by Russia. The country most important to the West that is immediately vulnerable to a renewal of aggressive Russian behavior is Ukraine. Yet no one is suggesting that Ukraine join NATO. Indeed, discussions of NATO tend to treat Ukraine as marginal.

Ukraine, however, is the opposite of marginal: it is central. So long as it remains independent it is a buffer between Russia and the rest of Europe. More important, an independent Ukraine is the best guarantee that Russia will

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remain a peaceful nation-state. Conflict between the two would have adverse repercussions to the west. And if Moscow absorbed Ukraine or attempted to do so, Russia would again become a multinational empire harboring a large, resentful subject nation, with poor prospects for the construction of a stable democratic system. It is not an exaggeration to say that NATO expansion will be good or bad depending on its effect on the peaceful coexistence of Ukraine and Russia.

Ukrainians, at least, do not seem to believe that expanding the Atlantic alliance will benefit them. On the contrary, they appear to feel that the extension of NATO membership to central Europe would relegate Ukraine to the dangerous side of a new dividing line. The Ukrainian government, unlike its Polish counterpart, has not advocated eastward NATO expansion. Leaving Ukraine feeling isolated would in all likelihood weaken its commitment to relinquishing to Russia all the nuclear weapons it inherited from the Soviet Union, a major goal of the last two American administrations.

Still, the logic of extending the alliance for reasons of neo-containment is far from implausible. If Russia is bound to resume its traditionally imperial foreign policy; if, when it does so, the requirements of American security will demand the eastward expansion of NATO; and if taking this inevitable step is better now when Russia is weak rather than later when it has grown strong, then it follows that alliance membership should be promptly extended, although to include Ukraine and perhaps the Baltic states rather than simply the Visegrad four. But is all this correct?

It is not *necessarily* correct. Russia may again seek to disturb the peace of Europe but is not destined to do so. There is no Russian national equivalent of a genetic predisposition to aggression. Neither Russia in general nor Russian foreign policy in particular is an impersonal, inevitable force of nature. "Nations are not constants," as the distinguished historian of Russia Martin Malia has written, arguing democracy and free markets can take root in Russia, although not instantly or easily. "It is pseudowisdom to deduce future prospects mechanically from past precedents."[1]

Moreover, acting as if the neo-containment premise were correct runs two risks. The first is the risk of weakening the democrats in Russian politics, who are struggling against powerful undemocratic political forces and whom the Russian public identifies with the West. No Russian with any semblance of democratic credentials, starting with President Boris Yeltsin, has endorsed the extension of NATO to central Europe. Many emphatically oppose it. To be sure, the struggle for Russia's political future will not depend principally on what NATO does: it is possible that democracy will triumph even if the Visegrad countries were to join NATO. It is also possible—perhaps, alas, even likely—that the cause

[1] "Tradition, Ideology and Pragmatism in the Formation of Russian Foreign Policy," in *The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy*, ed. Leon Aron and Kenneth M. Jensen, Washington: The United States Institute of Peace, 1994, p. 47.

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of democracy will fail even if NATO expansion does not take place. But expanding the alliance will certainly not *assist* Russia's democrats.

There is a second risk: that Russia would regard the new configuration of European security that an expanded NATO would produce as illegitimate because it had been imposed over Russian opposition, even as Germany considered the post–World War I settlement an illegitimate "dictated" peace. According to Sergei A. Karaganov, deputy director of the Institute of Europe in Moscow and a Yeltsin adviser, if "NATO expands eastward, Russia under any government will become a revisionist power striving to undermine the already fragile European order."[2] It is significant that *all* the modifications in Europe's security arrangements from 1987 to the present, the net effect of which has been dramatically to reduce Russian power, have occurred with Russian consent. NATO expansion would mark a departure from that pattern.

THE POST-COLD WAR SETTLEMENT

The new post–Cold War security arrangements in Europe to which Russia has agreed are, in turn, the most important reason that NATO expansion is not only unwise but unnecessary. Proponents of expansion assert that a security vacuum in Europe must be filled by "new security architecture," of which a NATO encompassing central Europe ought to be an important part.

In fact, there is no such vacuum. The foundation of a new and radically different security order is in place. It consists of the remarkable series of arms control accords, covering nuclear and conventional weapons, negotiated in the five years between the December 1987 treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe and the January 1993 START II accord covering long-range nuclear weapons.

Together these agreements form an arrangement that Europe has never had, a common security order based not on the age-old balance of power but rather on consensus and cooperation. It has three main features.

First, it is the product of negotiations. For the first time, the distribution of armed forces in Europe has been fixed by treaties into which the countries of Europe and North America have freely entered. In this sense, each country's forces have the approval of all the others.

Second, Europe's military forces have been reshaped so that they are more suitable for defense than attack. This shift is partly by design and partly a matter of numbers: the treaties both reduce and equalize the numbers of weapons in Europe, and equality favors the defense because a successful attack ordinarily requires numerical superiority.

Third, as a result of the verification provisions of the arms treaties and a supplementary series of confidence-building measures, military forces in Europe are transparent: each country

[2] Quoted in Charles A. Kupchan, "Expand NATO—and Split Europe," *The New York Times*, November 27, 1994, p. 11.

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can see not only what forces all the others have but also what the others are doing with their forces.

The terms of these treaties make virtually impossible what, during the Cold War, it was NATO's mission to prevent: a successful westward attack by a Russian army.

THE PEACE MAY NOT ENDURE

This does *not* mean that NATO is now superfluous and should be dissolved. The alliance is necessary to ensure the United States remains involved in Europe's political and military affairs. An ongoing American role will reassure Germany that it need not arm itself more heavily to remain secure, something that would make Germany's neighbors feel less secure. Keeping NATO in being will also assure the Europeans that, if Russia does resume an imperial foreign policy, the United States will be committed to taking part in an anti-Russian coalition. Both these tasks, however, can be carried out without the eastward expansion of the alliance. Depending on the course of events in Russia, it may ultimately be possible to carry them out by returning to the alliance's original form, as a guarantee pact rather than an integrated multinational army on the European continent.

On the other hand, Europe's new common security order may not endure. It will survive only so long as all parties voluntarily observe its rules. If one country abandons them, the order will collapse. The European power likeliest to abandon the rules is Russia.

Three developments would signal the end of the effort to transcend balance-of-power politics in Europe. The first is Russian violation of the political or territorial integrity of its western neighbors, Ukraine and the Baltic states. Such violations are already occurring to Russia's south, in the Caucasus, but they do not threaten Western security as would comparable behavior to the west. A second damaging development would be a serious violation of the major European arms control treaties. The third deathblow would be the advent of a xenophobic, hypernationalist, or neofascist government in Moscow. While in theory even such a regime might conduct a peaceful foreign policy, in practice none of Russia's neighbors will wish to wait to see whether it does. They will want to join NATO, and in these circumstances they should be admitted.

While the new common security order can fail rapidly, it can only succeed slowly. If Russia seeks to overturn the post–Cold War settlement, failure will be obvious in short order; but its neighbors will not be confident of Russia's commitment to the rules of common security unless and until Moscow has followed them for a long time.

Because Russia is so weak, chaotic, and preoccupied with its internal affairs, the West *has* a long time. During the Cold War, the qualities it was important to bring to bear in dealing with the Soviet Union were constant vigilance, firm determination, and the capacity to respond instantaneously. Of comparable importance today is a quality that is in some ways their opposite and is often in short supply: patience.

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Alchemy for a New World Order

Overselling 'Preventive Diplomacy'

Stephen John Stedman

A defining characteristic of the post–Cold War era has been the disjuncture between its complex, horrifying events—anarchy in Somalia, civil war in the former Yugoslavia, genocide in Rwanda—and the presumption among some foreign policy elites that easy solutions to such disasters can be found. These analysts first asserted that international intervention in civil wars could bring peace and reconstruct states and civil societies, a claim that vanished in the streets of Mogadishu and Monrovia. Now, in a rear-guard battle, they contend that if action had come early enough in Somalia, Rwanda, and the Balkans, these humanitarian tragedies could have been averted with little cost or risk.

The idea that early intervention can prevent civil war, state collapse, and attendant humanitarian tragedies has proven potent. Major foundations are investing scarce resources and staking reputations to study preventive diplomacy. The Carnegie Corporation of New York has established a Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict; the United States Institute of Peace has founded a study group on preventive diplomacy; and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has proposed the creation of a global crisis team, which would be responsible for providing early warnings of crises to the United Nations. The Council on Foreign Relations has a Center for Preventive Action to study and test conflict prevention.

Preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention are now common slogans among policymakers. The Clinton administration claims them as pillars of its foreign policy. Even Congress has jumped on the bandwagon: the African Conflict Resolution Act of 1994 funds the Organization of African Unity's new early warning system "for conflict prevention, management and resolution."

Preventive diplomacy—that is, concerted action designed to resolve, manage, or contain disputes before they become violent—is not a new idea. The need to monitor, predict, and prevent

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potential violent confrontations has always been an integral aspect of international relations. Two aspects of the contemporary fascination with preventive diplomacy, however, are novel: the amount of attention that foreign policy elites are now devoting to the concept and the expansion of private organizations into what was once viewed as the realm of states.

There is little downside to private foundations devoting money and time to the study of preventive diplomacy in the hope of improving its practice by governments, but there are dangers and limitations to private attempts to practice preventive diplomacy. Nongovernmental organizations lack accountability; private involvement in prevention may be hostage to grant agencies that in a couple of years will likely find some hot, new, trendy topic to fund; private diplomacy may run afoul of governmental attempts at peacemaking; and, most importantly, private groups are unable to make or deliver on the promises and threats necessary to create peace. Ultimately, these private initiatives have the burden of proof; they will have to convince governments that their engagement is necessary.

Policymakers have turned to preventive diplomacy believing that it may provide an inexpensive, relatively riskless alternative to the proliferation of deadly post–Cold War conflicts. As such, they are victims of oversell by some of the academic proponents of the concept.[1] To be successful, preventive diplomacy requires

[1] See, for example, Michael Lund, *Preventive Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy*, draft manuscript, United States Institute of Peace, 1994, pp. 5 and 46 and Appendix A.

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prescience, prescription, and mobilization. The kind of conflict endemic to the post–Cold War era poses intractable problems for all those ingredients. To prevent the Bosnias of tomorrow demands major resources in situations where risks are high and success is in doubt.

NO CRYSTAL BALL

There is little basis for optimism in the ability of social science to precisely forecast the outbreak of violent domestic conflicts. There is even less basis for optimism regarding our knowledge of appropriate responses to incipient violence. The striking aspect of the performance of foreign policy experts over the last ten years has been their inability to predict the most important political changes. Few scholars foretold the collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and no one forecast accurately when such events would take place.

Social science has made strides toward identifying societies and states at risk from violent conflict. Structural factors such as economic decline, ethnic cleavages, environmental degradation, government repression, and corruption contribute to state collapse and civil war. Nevertheless, some states muddle through for decades before imploding, and others manage to defy predictions of doom altogether. There is a surfeit of countries that fit the profile of societies at risk. To predict impending doom for all runs the risk that policymakers will stop listening. Violent conflict of the type found in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda is a combination of the predictable fault lines in societies and the unpredictable world of individual and group decisions. The former adheres to the mechanical world of clocks; the latter, the complex world of clouds.[2]

EFFECTIVE RESPONSE

Effective response in preventive diplomacy requires judgment. Even when one has early warning of impending cataclysm, there is rarely one answer for avoiding it. In the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda, for example, human rights activists warned that neighboring Burundi faced a similar danger. Some Burundi experts argued forcefully that the only way of defusing the crisis was to pressure the Burundi government to punish the various militias and army personnel responsible for previous atrocities. Yet that approach seemed fraught with danger: the very act proposed to prevent genocide could trigger it. Instead, the United Nations, the Organization for African Unity, and prominent African political leaders chose quiet diplomacy, urged all sides to de-escalate the situation, and sent human rights monitors. Was this the correct response to fend off genocide? No one knows. If genocide occurs in Burundi in the near future, then it will be shown that such quiet diplomacy was woefully inadequate.

A miscalculation of appropriate action may prove costly. The collapse of Yugoslavia shows that actions designed to prevent violence may trigger it. In June

[2] Stephen Genco and Gabriel Almond, "Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics," *World Politics*, June 1977, pp. 489-522.

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1991, when Yugoslavia's national crisis was coming to a head, Secretary of State James Baker said that the United States preferred a unified Yugoslavia, which many in Belgrade interpreted as tacit approval for the Yugoslav army to use violence to stop regional secession. Toward the end of 1991, two measures to deter further Serbian aggression in Yugoslavia—European Community acceptance of popular referendums as a criterion for self-determination and German pressure for recognition of Croatia and Slovenia—perhaps insured the violent dismemberment of Bosnia. The urge to take preventive action—to do something, anything—can lead to ill-considered policies that lack strategic sense. The placement of thousands of peacekeepers in Bosnia under a vague mandate to protect civilians was supposed to reduce violence. But that decision was not linked to a strategy for ending the war through either mediation or force, and the violence continued.

In Rwanda in May 1994, after hundreds of thousands of Tutsis and moderate Hutus had been murdered, the United Nations felt compelled to do something to stop the genocide. After quick debate, the U.N. Security Council decided to drop 5,500 troops into the capital, Kigali, to protect aid workers and civilians. The United States drew harsh criticism for opposing the decision. Yet critics of the administration ignored the fact that no strategy buttressed the plan. The only political solution the United Nations put forth was a cease-fire and return to negotiations. Seen in this light, putting U.N. troops into the fighting in May would have likely turned a fluid battlefield into a protracted war and would have left unpunished the Rwandan officers and politicians responsible for the genocide.

CHEAP AND RISK-FREE?

After every humanitarian disaster of the post–Cold War era, critics have proclaimed that early action could have prevented the tragedy. Mohamed Sahnoun, former head of the U.N. mission in Somalia, argued that there were several opportunities for international intervention to prevent the anarchy and civil war that engulfed Somalia in 1992 and 1993. "A preventive approach," he stated, would have had "a fairly good chance of success without great expense, and without the need for a large military presence." Similarly, Alain Destexhe, secretary-general of Médecins Sans Frontières, wrote that early action could have averted genocide in Rwanda: "Deploying an intervention force early in a crisis can save not only lives but also money." According to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, even the Bosnian crisis was avoidable: "The West has missed repeated opportunities to engage in early and effective ways that might have prevented the conflict from deepening. . . . An early and forceful signal might well have deterred much of the aggression, bloodshed, and ethnic cleansing."[3]

[3] Mohamed Sahnoun, *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1994, p. 5; Alain Destexhe, "The Third Genocide," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1994-95, p. 16; Warren Christopher, quoted by Reuters News Service, February 10, 1993.

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On the contrary, the prevention of war in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda would have involved substantial risk and great cost. The cheapness of intervention depends on what actions will be necessary to deter the parties in a conflict from using violence (or more violence) to resolve it. Where antagonists are willing to respond to reasoned appeals for nonviolence, preventive diplomacy means nothing more than talking; diplomats will be amused to discover they practice preventive diplomacy every day. The humanitarian tragedies of today were caused mainly by leaders who were interested in neither reaching nonviolent resolutions to conflicts nor making concessions. Individuals such as Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid, Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić, and Angolan rebel leader Jonas Savimbi and genocidal factions such as the presidential guard in Rwanda decided on civil war because they thought they could prevail militarily and that the international community was powerless to stop them. If they had faced an early international willingness to use massive force, then their calculations might have been different. Such willingness need not be costly, if the threat is enough to make leaders like Milošević back down. But if threats prove ineffective, then only the use of force with the risk of prolonged involvement in a civil war will work.

Lastly, effective preventive diplomacy requires mobilization. Early warning and prescription require action. If such action is costless, then there is no difficulty in acting. But if the prescription calls for the use of force and expenditure of major resources, one should ask whether it is possible for Western leaders to mobilize public support before the pictures of violence show up on television.

CONFLICT PREVENTION

While preventive diplomacy attempts to stop conflicts from becoming violent, conflict prevention aims at the supposed roots of such conflicts: poverty, environmental degradation, overpopulation, resource competition, and lack of legitimate political institutions. Brian Atwood, administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), has been a leading advocate of conflict prevention. He recently testified before Congress that directing more attention, resources, and money to the underlying causes of conflict would prevent future Rwandas and Somalias. The problems for Atwood's vision are the scarcity of resources devoted to foreign aid, their scattered application, and the lack of a direct relationship between foreign aid and conflict prevention.

By international standards, American expenditure on foreign aid is shockingly low; the United States devotes a smaller proportion of gross national product to foreign developmental assistance than every other industrialized donor country. Total U.S. developmental assistance for Africa hovers around $800 million—a minuscule amount for a continent of 53 countries and more than 650 million people. Given that such limited aid—if dispersed equally among Africa's countries—would be ineffectual, USAID puts resources into those countries that show commitment to economic reform, development of market economies, and good governance.

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In a world of limited resources and competing goods, the strategy of targeting scarce aid dollars to the probable winners among nations makes sense. But one should be forthright about the consequences. The policy does nothing to prevent future Rwandas, Somalias, and Liberias for the simple reason that aid will go to the few countries that are already committed to helping themselves and have an excellent chance of doing so. Aid will not go to the environmentally ravaged, economically defunct, and badly governed nations, which are the most likely candidates for state collapse and societal breakdown.

Ultimately, this is a moral policy. It is unclear how limited American dollars can save a Zaire, a Nigeria, or a Cameroon if their leaders are bent on self-enrichment at the price of state collapse. Better to use the resources to help a Zambia or a Benin.

The resource gap is worsened by the competing and often contradictory goals of agencies such as USAID. Even when aid targets deserving cases, it is often so dispersed among various policy goals—population control, environmental protection, small business development, agricultural productivity, safety nets for the urban poor, women's empowerment—that it is unproductive.

Finally, one has to scrutinize the underlying assumption that foreign aid per se is conflict prevention. Proponents of conflict prevention suffer from an economic and ecological determinism; a shortage of resources causes violent conflict, therefore the solution is to increase aid. Human decision-making conveniently falls out of the equation. Moreover, there is the tacit belief that while underdevelopment induces conflict, development is somehow conflict-free. But this is not the case. Transitions to political democracy and market economies are fraught with conflict.

USAID's own recent experience in Rwanda testifies to the glaring gap in the conflict prevention paradigm. Between 1992 and 1994 the United States provided aid to Rwanda to improve governance, strengthen democratic organizations, train market entrepreneurs, and increase agricultural productivity. Genocide did not happen because of lack of aid; it was chosen, planned, and directed by individuals who did not want to cede power.

If the proponents of preventive diplomacy err by attributing too much efficacy to third parties who seek to convince internal leaders to forswear violence, proponents of conflict prevention err by assuming that internal leaders are superfluous to deadly conflict.

VALUE JUDGMENTS

The tasks of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention are neither self-evident nor value-neutral, as some of their proponents seem to believe. Diplomacy that aims to resolve long-standing conflicts may have to take sides and coerce powerful parties into concessions. Diplomacy that aims to manage conflict so that it does not become violent may have to sacrifice a quest for justice in deference to the powerful. Prevention might conflict with important national and even global interests. If, as President Clinton has suggested many times, the primary American interest in Bosnia is thwarting the spread of the war, then the arms embargo has

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been an unqualified success. If, however, the primary American and global interest has been denying Serbian aggression and upholding the principle of Bosnian sovereignty, then the embargo has failed.

A focus on prevention ignores the role that conflict plays in driving political change in societies. For grievances to be redressed, they must be vocalized. If they are vocalized, those with a stake in the status quo will attempt to suppress them. Often the balance of change depends on the ability of the grieved to amplify the conflict to increase their support. If we have learned anything from the disparate cases of conflict resolution in recent decades—the civil rights movement in the United States, the fight for human rights in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the fight for national self-determination in the Middle East, the fight against apartheid in South Africa—it is that some conflicts must be intensified before they are resolved.

Preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention do not lessen the difficulty of choices for leaders, nor do they really lessen costs. For either to succeed, policymakers must still spell out their interests, set priorities among cases, and balance goals with resources. The president will still need to educate the American people about the rationale behind a policy and convince them of the need for action. Absent well-defined interests, clear goals, and prudent judgment about acceptable costs and risks, policies of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention simply mean that one founders early in a crisis instead of later.

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Selecting the World's CEO

Remembering the Secretaries-General

Brian Urquhart

During periods of international disaster, a troubled world feels the need for an outstanding full-time supervisor. At first, with the horrors of World War I still fresh in their minds, the founders of the League of Nations considered calling the head of their organization "chancellor." When World War II was at its height, the title "moderator" was suggested for the head of the future United Nations. In both cases, the wartime mood passed, and the more bureaucratic title of "secretary-general" was chosen.

From the outset, the U.N. secretary-general has been an important part of the institution, not only as its chief executive, but as both symbol and guardian of the original vision of the organization. There, however, specific agreement has ended. The United Nations, like any important organization, needs strong and independent leadership, but it is an intergovernmental organization, and governments have no intention of giving up control of it. While the secretary-general can be extraordinarily useful in times of crisis, the office inevitably embodies something more than international cooperation—sometimes even an unwelcome hint of supranationalism. Thus, the attitude of governments toward the United Nations' chief and only elected official is and has been necessarily ambivalent.

THE ROLE

Fifty-one years ago at Dumbarton Oaks, when the Allied powers met to discuss some of the details of a future international organization, their ambivalence about the secretary-general's role was already evident. They strongly opposed a secretary-general directly elected by the General Assembly, and they defended the veto held by the Security Council's permanent members—Britain, China, France, the Soviet Union (now Russia), and the United States—over the selection process. In fact, the permanent members have always controlled the appointment of the secretary-general, a responsibility that they have often failed to live up to.

The founders of the United Nations were purposely ambiguous about the secretary-general's responsibilities. Despite President Roosevelt's vision of the job as a moderator, the primary function of the

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secretary-general as outlined in the U.N. Charter is to act as the chief administrative officer of the organization. Secondarily, he is obligated to carry out the decisions of the main organs of the United Nations. Only Article 99 of the charter opens the door to independent political action, and then not very wide. Under Article 99, the secretary-general "may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security." If the secretary-general has any independent political role, this article provides the mandate for it.

When the time came to appoint the first secretary-general, governments were extraordinarily vague regarding the position's qualifications. In September 1945, for example, the U.S. representative on the preparatory commission, Adlai Stevenson, told Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, "We favor the choice of an outstandingly qualified individual, preferably a figure who has attained some international position and preferably a national of a small or middle power"—not exactly an overwhelming job description. (The idea of a female secretary-general was never even considered.)

After some eminent names—Dwight Eisenhower, Anthony Eden, Lester Pearson—had been bandied about and turned down by the Soviets, it became clear that the secretary-general's appointment would be a purely political decision, determined by what the United States and the Soviet Union could agree on—a lowest common denominator if ever there was one. Qualifications, stature, and leadership qualities would all be secondary considerations. This depressing reality dawned on me in January 1946, when the General Assembly was considering nominations for the first secretary-general. At that time, among other duties, I ran the speakers' list in the General Assembly. Stettinius came up to my table and asked me to identify Trygve Lie, who was then foreign minister of Norway. I pointed out Lie's ample figure to Stettinius, who then proceeded to the rostrum to nominate Lie as "a statesman well known to all." Even then, a sincere search for the best possible candidate was obviously not in the cards.

The job descriptions given by its various incumbents also show some ambivalence, born, no doubt, of bitter experience. Lie referred to it as "the most impossible job on this earth." Dag Hammarskjöld said that the secretary-general was "a sort of secular pope, and, for much of the time, a pope without a church." U Thant, a courageous and modest man, said that the secretary-generalship was "the most varied, most interesting, and most challenging political job on earth." To Kurt Waldheim it was "at the same time one of the most fascinating and one of the most frustrating jobs in the world, encompassing as it does the height of human aspiration and the depth of human frailty."

The secretary-generalship, at least on paper, is indeed an impossible job. Quite apart from unrealistic public expectations, large responsibilities without significant power or resources, and the contrary attitudes of governments, the job comprises an unmanageable number of major functions. These include managing a worldwide secretariat and a global organization on a shoestring budget, a sizable part of which is usually overdue (the United Nations is not allowed to borrow); imple-

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menting the decisions of the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations; running peacekeeping and other highly sensitive field operations; being the world's mediator in an endless series of "good offices" missions involving quiet diplomacy all over the world; providing good offices in human rights and humanitarian situations; coordinating the so-called U.N. system of specialized agencies and major economic and social programs; representing the United Nations worldwide at conferences and regional meetings, and to the media and public; maintaining a watch on major developments of all kinds and alerting governments to them; generating ideas and strategies on global problems; and being the world's number one fig leaf and scapegoat.

The secretary-general is an international civil servant with 185 masters who is also periodically expected, especially when everyone else has failed, to be a leader. As U Thant put it, "The secretary-general's activity will usually seem to some governments too much, and to others too little. He must thread his way through the jungle of conflicting national policies with the U.N. Charter as his compass, and, if he is lucky, with a directive from one of the main deliberative organs as his guide." When crises arise, the secretary-general may be the world's last hope. He must be prepared to act without regard to political reputation.

THE ACTIVIST TRADITION

The main factors in the development of the office of the secretary-general have been the incumbents' personalities and the political climate in which they worked. The secretary-general is now recognized as the world's foremost honest broker, but this was not originally the case. In 1946, governments were extremely reluctant to delegate political responsibilities to the secretary-general. When discussing the ideal secretary-general, the British reverently invoked the almost obsessive discretion of Sir Eric Drummond, the British secretary-general of the League of Nations, who never made a public statement or addressed a public meeting of the league in his entire time as secretary-general.

The sad history of the League of Nations indicated to the U.N. founders the potential importance of a strong chief executive for the new world organization, and the paralysis of the Cold War soon made a more active political role necessary. It was difficult, however, for the secretary-general to avoid confrontation with the Soviets or Americans when they disagreed on the appropriate course of action in an international crisis. Lie's break with the Soviets over the U.N. operation in Korea and Hammarskjöld's problems over the Congo attest to that. But the Cold War also made a nonpartisan third party indispensable to avoiding total paralysis in the Security Council during a crisis. Consequently, and with the genius of Hammarskjöld, the activist role of the secretary-general evolved.

After failing to agree on a score of other candidates, the Security Council in early 1953 appointed Hammarskjöld to succeed Lie under the delightful misapprehension that Hammarskjöld was a nonpolitical technocrat. Hammarskjöld soon showed his mettle. In his first triumph, during one of the Cold War's more dangerous moments, he secured the

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release from China of 17 U.S. airmen who were prisoners of the Korean War. He subsequently developed the secretary-general's negotiating role, as well as the concept of fielding U.N. peacekeeping forces, first deployed on a large scale in the Suez crisis in 1956. Thus Hammarskjöld pioneered a new role for the secretary-general as negotiator, crisis manager, and director of active peace operations.

Hammarskjöld paid a heavy price for his activism. He fell out of favor with the United States over Guatemala in 1954, and with the French and the British over the Suez operation in 1956. In the Congo, he infuriated both the Soviets and the French, alienating President Charles de Gaulle for good by his actions when the French clashed with newly independent Tunisia over Bizerte. Hammarskjöld believed that the independence, integrity, and activism of the secretary-general and the international secretariat were vital to the future of the United Nations. In fighting to preserve and develop those attributes, he suffered many setbacks in his final years in office.

Hammarskjöld was a practical visionary who regarded his task at the United Nations as "working on the edge of human society" to promote the "creative evolution" of human institutions. His aim was the gradual construction of a reliable and just world order through the establishment of international legal precedents and case law, especially in emergency situations. The United Nations would thus be gradually transformed from an institutional and diplomatic mechanism into a constitutional and operational system better equipped to deal with the world's problems. In the daily frustrations of the post–Cold War world, it is worth reassessing our progress toward this ambitious goal.

AFTER HAMMARSKJÖLD

Hammarskjöld's death in Africa in September 1961 left the United Nations split on Cold War lines. His successor, U Thant, picked up the pieces and reunited the organization. Of all the secretaries-general, he has been the most unjustly judged. This is perhaps not too surprising. In U Thant's view, moral issues overrode political ones. He was a person of great honesty and courage, and he was not always appreciated in the cynical world of international politics. He brought the U.N. involvement in the Congo to an end. He played an important role in resolving the Cuban missile crisis. He was also instrumental in securing a cease-fire in the ominous war between India and Pakistan in 1965. On his own initiative, he made a prolonged and spirited effort to bring the Vietnam War to an end. But the collapse of the U.N. peacekeeping force in the Middle East in 1967 and the ensuing Six Day War overshadowed all the positive achievements of his stewardship. He served as a convenient scapegoat on that occasion, although he was the only world leader to go to Cairo to try to persuade Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser to reconsider his fatal demand for the withdrawal of the U.N. peacekeepers. Despite a Security Council hopelessly divided along Cold War lines, he made valiant efforts to stave off catastrophe.

U Thant's successor, Kurt Waldheim, and his rival, Max Jakobsen of Finland,

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were the first candidates to campaign actively for the office, setting a disastrous precedent that has been followed ever since. Since that time, self-appointed candidates have lobbied for the post, confusing and monopolizing the already feeble efforts of the Security Council to recommend a suitable candidate to the General Assembly. Waldheim was neither an inspiring leader nor an original thinker, but he maintained stability throughout the tumultuous 1970s. He reestablished peacekeeping as an indispensable diplomatic tool of the United Nations after the 1973 Middle East war. After Waldheim left the United Nations it was discovered that he had misrepresented his war record, and he became the subject of universal opprobrium in the West. It would have been perfectly possible to verify Waldheim's war record *before* he was appointed secretary-general, but nobody bothered. Indeed, but for China's veto, Waldheim would have been elected to a third term with the active support of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. The whole Waldheim episode speaks volumes about the quality and spirit of the appointment process—no open search procedure, no vetting of candidates, and a list virtually restricted to those who have declared themselves. In such circumstances, it is something of a miracle that the United Nations has been as well served as it has.

Waldheim's successor, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, was a quiet and experienced diplomat who presided skillfully over the transition into the uncertainties of the post–Cold War era. He kept on good terms with all governments and was a well-liked but not striking international figure. His strongest suit was quiet diplomacy, which by definition does not gain public acclaim or recognition for its practitioners. After years of frustration, he enjoyed considerable success in the short-lived and illusory renaissance of the United Nations in the early 1990s.

The present secretary-general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, has inherited the morning-after hangover from that false renaissance and the difficult problems of policing the tumult of the post-Cold War world. Like his predecessors, he is criticized for being both too activist and too passive. Compounding his difficulties, he has also been obliged to reorganize the secretariat when the organization is more heavily involved than ever in field operations. In a discouraging political climate, he is courageously fighting to keep the organization on course and enhance its effectiveness.

In the post–Cold War world, the secretary-general is perhaps less essential as a political intermediary than before. As the operational director of the United Nations, however, he (or in the future, let us hope, she) will undoubtedly have a huge and expanding task, with inadequate resources and often with inappropriate mandates. In an age when the media have a commanding position in international life, the secretary-general is also increasingly in demand as a spokesman for the United Nations and the emergent "international community."

In a period of resurgent nationalism and ethnic strife, growing distrust of international institutions, and diminishing support from governments, the secretary-general is busier—and perhaps lonelier—than ever. The original spirit of

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international solidarity embodied in the U.N. Charter has weakened in recent years. The essential institutions of an effective world community, based increasingly on law, are urgently needed. However, the inclination of U.N. members appears to be a continuation of ad hoc crisis management, which is often too late and sometimes inappropriate, ineffective, and expensive. A crisis of credibility has resulted. For this failure to adapt, the secretary-general will continue, unjustly, to be held accountable.

The United Nations now deals less with conflicts between states, for which it was established, than with civil and ethnic conflicts, for which it was not designed. Most of the critical situations in which the United Nations is now involved do not impinge on the national security concerns of the major powers. They concern, in the main, humanitarian issues. Altruism is a far weaker catalyst for international action than the threats to international peace and security that demanded U.N. action during the Cold War. This does not mean that the United Nations will not continue to be in demand when governments need a dumping ground for an urgent yet unwelcome problem, but it makes the secretary-general's capacity for effective action more uncertain.

GETTING THE BEST

It remains to be seen whether U.N. members have any interest in improving the selection process for the secretary-general. Miraculously, the process thus far has produced no outright disasters, but it would be rejected as a bad joke by any serious institution in the private sector. It requires neither a search procedure nor an interview with the appointee. At a minimum, the Security Council and the General Assembly should define the essential qualifications necessary in determining the best person for the job. Ability, authority, and leadership capacity, rather than political convenience, must take priority if the United Nations is to shoulder its increasingly vital responsibilities and make the necessary transition to a very different world in the 21st century.

A few obvious changes would substantially improve the selection process. Besides initiating a more thorough search procedure, individual campaigning should be barred. The veto should not apply to the Security Council's recommendation of a candidate, and the ban on candidates from the five permanent members of the Security Council should be lifted. The temptation to run for a second five-year term can only disrupt the performance of an incumbent secretary-general. A single seven-year term would allow plenty of time to carry through serious policies without the pressure and distraction of a time-consuming reelection campaign. It should become the rule.

For all the burdens and difficulties of the position, the secretary-general, as the executive head of a world organization representing all governments, has a unique responsibility to foster the "creative evolution" of human institutions of which Dag Hammarskjöld spoke. The office and its incumbent will continue to be a central element in what is our only long-term hope, and probably our only alternative to a decline into chaos: the development of a global society based on the rule of law.

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Essays



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Fundamentalism in Power

Is Iran's Present Algeria's Future?

Edward G. Shirley

CAN ONE negotiate with Muslim fundamentalists? The United States is in the process of testing this crucial question, on which may hang the future of Western relations with the Muslim world. Late in 1993, U.S. diplomats began discreet discussions with Anwar Haddam, the Washington, D.C.-based representative of Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front, commonly known by its French initials, FIS. In contacting Haddam and other FIS militants, the Clinton administration began a new experiment with potentially wide-ranging implications: preemptive U.S. diplomatic contact with fundamentalists who have grassroots strength and, potentially, the power to topple regimes.

It is too soon to tell whether the experiment will evolve into policy. The Clinton administration may lose interest in Algeria, a country with few historical ties to the United States. More importantly, the policy may be too cerebral to withstand the vicissitudes of war. The daily clashes between the Algerian military and militants are bloody. Though less culpable than the army, the FIS unquestionably has had a hand in the killing. The gruesome, indiscriminate, and intensifying violence could at any point derail an attempt at dialogue.

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But there are reasons to believe Washington will stay interested. Most of those who study Algeria, including (in private) U.S. officials, echo the prediction of *The Economist:* Algeria's ruling regime will probably fall sooner rather than later. Islamic radicalism will then have gained its second Arab state—Sudan was the first in 1989—and its most important victory since Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini unseated the shah of Iran in 1979. Unengaged, Algerian extremism could promote mischief throughout the Middle East.

If the Algerian regime is doomed, then the logic of encouraging cooperation between moderate Muslims, fundamentalist and otherwise, seems compelling. If U.S. officials can talk to the FIS, perhaps they can improve America's reputation among fundamentalists, diminishing the chances of the United States being portrayed again as the implacable enemy of Islam, the preferred target for martyr-driven truck bombs. Indeed, according to some observers, the United States in Algeria could experiment in dealing with fundamentalism, thereby fine-tuning a long-term approach and revamping our image in the militant Islamic world without jeopardizing much—and certainly not a strategic partner, as was the risk in prerevolutionary Iran. But is such a policy practicable and wise? Is there really sufficient common ground? In opening a dialogue with fundamentalists in Algeria, might the United States conversely aid and abet what it is trying to quarantine in Iran?

ARE THERE MODERATES?

IT IS DOUBTFUL that Paris and Washington appreciate the irony in their current approach to Islamic fundamentalism. Toward the Algerian version, the United States argues for contact with "moderate" fundamentalists who promise a more democratic Algeria. Though not rejecting the idea of dialogue, the French complain that such moderates have so far been very hard to find. Toward the Iranian version, the United States takes a hard-line position, arguing in favor of containment, belittling the existence of moderates and the achievements of Iran's Islamic democracy. The French, on the other hand, advocate continuing dialogue with clerical Iran, support its "pragmatists," and praise its nascent though troubled democracy.

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Nobody is quite certain about what to do with Islamic activism except to suggest that dialogue must somehow be possible with someone. Many faithful Muslims surely share U.S. concerns about democracy and human rights. But what French Interior Minister Charles Pasqua says about Algeria and Secretary of State Warren Christopher about Iran is essentially correct: there are no moderate fundamentalists. The idea of talking to tepid Middle Eastern true believers is a comforting and typically secularized illusion.

We should have little misunderstanding about fundamentalist doctrine, particularly in Algeria. Long before the FIS was outlawed and denied its triumph at the polls, the organization had made its theology clear: you cannot subordinate God to democracy or nullify his law through parliamentary debate and legislation.

The notion of moderate fundamentalism falls apart quickly whenever women and the holy law come into view. Always side by side, the two issues form Islamic fundamentalism's core. Point 11 in the FIS platform commands the chief of state to enforce the *sharia,* or Muslim religious law; point 12 enjoins the protection of feminine dignity, morals, and honor as guaranteed by Islam. Some Western observers of Islamic activism stress that the *sharia,* like any body of law, must be interpreted and applied, raising the possibility of gradual innovation and adaptation to the modern world. But Sunni fundamentalists are, as a general rule, strict constructionists. They believe in God's sole legislative authority. They are not impressed by Islamic modernists—Muslim Episcopalians, as it were—who want to use *ijtihad,* the practiced but unacknowledged right of a religious jurist to interpret the holy law, and *ijma,* a historical understanding that Muslims as a community can modify Islamic practice, as traditional devices to delete medieval legalism from modern-day life.

Today's Arab fundamentalists are more adroit than their predecessors: they have, like everybody else in the Middle East, imbibed Western culture. They have learned the vocabulary of modern nation-states. They have become nationalists without abandoning in their hearts Islam's borderless appeal. The FIS' popularity derives in no small part from its success in stealing the nationalist mantle from its former archrival, the National Liberation Front (FLN), the victor in the campaign

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against colonial France. But the FIS' political acumen, nationalist adaptability, and use of Western political vocabulary have not made it more amenable to the West. The FLN and the FIS have always shared an anti-Western faith. The FLN opposed the West both because of its left-wing, anti-imperial ideology and because its members were Muslim, however calcified. The Islamic sensibilities within the FLN have become the FIS' ideology. The FIS' war with France is not primarily political, as was that of the FLN, which wanted French settlers out of "l'Algérie française." It is cultural. The FIS wants Christian France, with its American television shows dubbed into French, out of the Algerian mind.

The military's suppressive actions in 1992 enraged the FIS but in no way altered the group's understanding of right and wrong. What the FIS thinks today about women, freedom of thought, crime and punishment, Jews, westernized Muslims, France, Israel, and America is no different from the views it held before the military crackdown.

HOW MODERATES LOSE

EVEN IF there really are moderate fundamentalists, Washington should not want to talk to them. They can do little for us. More important, we would most likely do them harm.

President Clinton has stated that he hopes the United States could have a dialogue with Muslims "who want to follow the rules of civilized people"—in other words, fundamentalists who do not take hostages. But what good did it do Mehdi Bazargan, the first prime minister of the Provisional Islamic Republic of Iran and an exquisitely civilized moderate, to meet with President Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, in Algiers in 1979? Weakened by the American contact, Bazargan soon fell victim to Iran's hard core. Bazargan and Iran's other prominent but powerless moderates would have lost control in any case, but Brzezinski's contact tarnished their "Islamic" credentials and hastened their fall. The Iranian Revolution did not go sour because the United States failed to maintain a dialogue with Islamic moderates; the revolution turned Jacobin because Islamic moderates with whom the United States was in contact failed to anticipate the strength and determination of their hard-core partners.

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Thus if we are going to talk to "moderates" in Algeria, we must find them within the FIS. It seems pointless to waste our time trying to build a bridge with such moderate fringe groups as the Democratic Movement for Algerian Renewal, a powerless though pleasant party of secularized Muslims. As the Clinton administration correctly deduced, we have to talk to fundamentalists who have both ballot box and street power.

The FIS has published a great deal since its inception in March 1989. Rarely does one find in its newspapers, manifestoes, or pamphlets a strong affirmation of democracy or individual liberty. But let us, for the sake of argument, find our moderates in the faction behind Abassi Madani, the FIS' main spokesman and leader. Jailed or under house arrest since June 1991, Madani is the premier Islamic technocrat, a sophisticated pragmatist with a Ph.D. who gave the FIS its name and tried to keep the group's holy warriors in check. If we really believe Madani is a moderate—and he and his followers are unquestionably milder than some of their Koran-screaming colleagues—why do to him what we did to Bazargan? When Iraqi President Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, Madani was severely criticized by Ali Belhadj, the FIS' fiery number two, for not being sufficiently pro-Iraqi and anti-Western. Madani, who had been trying to protect the FIS' Saudi backing by his defense of Kuwait, quickly changed his tune when he saw the street appeal of Belhadj's pro-Saddam and anti-Western line.

Why would a "moderate" like Madani, a highly educated and clever man, be so stupid as to risk a similar compromise with us? First, U.S. contact could deliver to him the power he has so far failed to obtain through elections and guerrilla war. Even in the fervid, conspiracy-mad world of the Middle East (where the CIA is poisoning every oasis well), the FIS probably does not believe the United States has such power in Algeria. Nevertheless, it gives Washington the conspiratorial benefit of the doubt, which probably explains why no American citizen has been among the around 90 foreigners so far murdered by Islamic militants. Second, if the United States cannot help the FIS win in Algeria, it also cannot deny them power—another reason for Madani to negotiate.

In any dialogue with the United States, however, the FIS will be at an advantage. Its objectives are concrete and easy: nourish Washington's fears of militant Islam and emphasize the inevitability of an FIS

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victory, the need for compromise, and the misguided stubbornness of the French. By comparison, U.S. policy toward the FIS is psychoanalytic quicksand: find and encourage fundamentalists who do not believe that God's word is law and that Washington is the cultural font of evil. Given this disadvantage, the United States should keep its distance from parties that promise salvation at the polls.

THE FIRST BATTLEGROUND

MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALISM is a diplomatic challenge that Americans are particularly ill-equipped to handle. Many Americans do not really comprehend how others can unify church and state because they themselves no longer believe in communication between God and man. Under traditional Islam, Muslims can disagree on what God's will is, but not about the truth that God's will exists, must be ascertained, and must be followed. No right-believing Muslim would obey a man-made edict before one of God's.

In addition, both the West and Islam still conceive of themselves as universal civilizations. Both Western human rights and Islamic *sharia* are inalienable. How do you compromise when the two collide? How do you oppose Islam's extremists without offending or enraging more moderate practitioners of the faith? Muslims' moral reflexes differ in degree, not in kind. The Muslim division of the world into the *Dar al-Islam* ("House of Islam") and the *Dar al-Harb* ("House of War") is traditional *sharia,* not radical doctrine. King Fahd of Saudi Arabia—an ally—and Iran's supreme religious leader, Ali Khamenei—an enemy—would agree on this divide. So would Algeria's former ruling Arab nationalist party, the FLN, and the FIS.

Fundamentalism's greatest strength lies in the failure of secularized Muslims to create a solid, historically secure, and competitive identity. Even though Ayatollah Khomeini's death sentence on the British novelist Salman Rushdie contradicted Islamic legal theory and practice, few religious moderates or secularized Muslims defended Rushdie. When fundamentalists charge collaboration, moderates invariably wince or head directly to a mosque to deny the charge. Having ceded theology and history to the militants, the moderates had to master economics to

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

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
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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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stay alive. Given the age-old poverty of the Middle East and westernized Muslims' love affair with socialism, the militants obviously made the better choice. Poverty is a common denominator in the Middle East. So is profound faith, a sense of inferiority vis-à-vis the West, and a historical understanding that once upon a time, the positions were reversed. Millions of half-educated, unemployed young men who dream of wealth and women are targeted by militants who promise a new, more prosperous, egalitarian order. U.S. diplomacy must cope with the consequences of unsuccessful secular Muslim choices. Western political and economic theories in the Middle East have been debased by decades of nationalist, socialist, and "democratic" despotisms.

Today's Arab fundamentalists, who watched their spiritual fathers fall in murderous frontal assaults against powerful secular regimes, such as Egypt's in the 1950s and Syria's in the 1980s, now aim at constructing an Islamic society independent from the state. Culture, not politics, is the first battleground. The primary target of "neofundamentalism" is individual Muslims, their consciences, and their environments—hence the FIS' preachy manner, its explicit and long-winded discussions about Islamic ethics and behavior, and its secondary interest in the mechanics of government.



In the Middle East's dilapidated universities, better-educated students in science, philosophy, and engineering zealously embrace Islam. With passion and discipline, they dream of the future by engaging a glorious past that is both real and imagined. Western culture will retreat before resurgent Islam. Westernizing Muslims, the most despised enemy, will fall from power. The female temptation—the oldest and most dangerous challenge to a Muslim's fidelity to God—will be countered just in time by the traditional veil.

The suppression of the FIS as a legal political party worsened the violence in Algeria. But one should not overestimate the crackdown's

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damage to the Islamic movement's moderation. As the French scholar Olivier Roy points out, the modus operandi, if not the nature, of Islamic radicalism has changed significantly in the last 30 years. Radical Islam in most countries, including Algeria, has moved away from its more explicit political dreams: building Islamic states by confrontation, coup d'état, and assassination.

The FIS is everywhere in Algeria: in the schools, hospitals, unions, mosques, and neighborhood grocery stores. The FIS' political triumph at the polls would not be—as it was in Iran—the beginning of society's re-Islamization; it would be the final step, eliminating an irreligious leadership that no longer lawfully commanded a faithful community. But what would happen once it took power? That brings us to the case of Iran.

THE IRANIAN FAILURE

TO UNDERSTAND the likely course of fundamentalism in power, we can do no better than look at Iran, the first and most important state to be overwhelmed by militant Islam. Fifteen years after the new regime's jubilant beginnings, the verdict is clear. Iran's revolution has failed, dismaying its people and bankrupting its coffers. As a result, good and evil have been reversed in Iranian life. America—an undefined but vivid, almost mystical concept of a better life—has filled the void left by the 1979 revolution's failure. "West-toxification," the worship of things Western that was Khomeini's great fear, has become a common refuge from the clergy's junking of Islamic life. By depicting the Islamic revival as a rejection of Western culture, the leaders of Islamic militancy have set themselves up for an awful fall. They may have quite unintentionally helped trigger a post-fundamentalist tidal wave of American culture throughout the Middle East.

For every vision an Iranian Revolutionary Guardsman may have about a martyr's rendezvous with the Prophet Muhammad's nephew Ali, the spiritual father of Shiism, he has an equally vivid Western fantasy. Young FIS radicals are at least equally impregnated with Western desires. Often portrayed as a rejection of Western materialism, for most radical young men the Islamic revolution is just the opposite: a promise that the omnipresent images of Western civiliza-

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tion—wealth, military power, technology, sexual fulfillment—can be had without violating a Muslim's faith. Iranians now know that the promise has vanished. Iranian revolutionaries are at a loss to judge their revolution except by Western standards of material progress. The "perfect Muslim man," that special creature waiting to be born in 1979, is now 16 years old. He does not feel particularly more moral or blessed than a 16-year-old felt during the shah's regime. Despite Iran's Islamic education system, he dreams the same adolescent dreams as did his prerevolutionary older brother. Unlike his brother, he also dreams nostalgically about better times under the shah.

The decomposition of Iran's Islamic revolution is striking even among the revolutionary hard core: the politicized clerics and the faithful, unshaven young men—the Hezbollahis—who form the backbone of the Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Basij, the paramilitary mobilization force. Even politicized mullahs, who spew the party line in public, can privately damn their own kind for destroying the revolution and the public's historical faith in the clergy.

In July 1994, Ayatollah Muhammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani, the secretary-general of Tehran's preeminent political clerical fraternity, warned that the next president of Iran should not be a mullah. His statement, a rejection of revolutionary clerical political philosophy, is a confession from Iran's most honest and farsighted ayatollah that the revolution is in serious trouble. The excesses of marrying religious principle to power have exhausted and impoverished the nation. Political clerics and Islamic militancy must both start to retreat.

The August 1994 riot in Qazvin was a telling event in the Islamic Republic's meltdown. When the Iranian parliament refused to allow Qazvin, a predominantly Persian-speaking city, to separate from predominantly Turkish-speaking Zanjan province and become a new province in order to gain more federal aid, Qazvin's principal cleric organized street demonstrations. The mullah lost control of his flock, and a riot ensued. Young men attacked government buildings, overturned cars, and screamed, "Death to the mullahs." After two days of violence, a special anti-riot force from Tehran restored order.

The Islamic Republic had known riots before. The squatter riots in 1992 in Mashhad and other cities shocked the regime, as did a soc-

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cer-related riot in Tehran in 1990. After Mashhad, anti-riot urban security forces were expanded and revamped. In particular, the regime enlarged the Basij, creating an urban-control force commanded by the interior ministry, and developed a rapid-reaction, anti-riot Revolutionary Guards Corps (RGC) unit, the Ashura Brigade.

The Qazvin riot haunts the regime. The mullahs live in fear that unexpected demonstrations could start a chain reaction that could show they are no longer in command. Two subsequent riots in Tabriz in August and September, both squelched, reinforced that fear. And the army has made its position clear: it will not shoot Iranians in the streets. Qazvin underscored the clergy's complete dependence on the Basij and the RGC. But the Basij is neither strong nor predictable, and the RGC, though stronger, is not necessarily more reliable. The poor young men who rioted, like their compatriots in Mashhad and Tehran, are little different in background and frustration from those in the guards and no different from those in the Basij. One moment they might be loyal, the next not.

Iran's revolution has failed, dismaying its people and bankrupting its coffers.

Clerical-military relations are also worsening. Inspired in part by the example of the Qazvin commander who refused to shoot demonstrators, retired Brigadier General Azizollah Amir Rahimi in September called for the resignation of Iranian President Hojatolislam Hashemi Rafsanjani, the end of clerical rule, and a national salvation government. Although Rahimi, a former commander of Iran's military police, is a firebrand with a history of trouble with both the shah and the mullahs, the army widely shares his views about the inability of the clerics to govern competently and justly.

Qazvinis, Tabrizis, and soldiers are not the only ones becoming more publicly disgruntled. Last October, 134 intellectuals, some of them quite prominent, signed an open letter protesting the regime's suppression of free speech and violation of human rights. Though individual intellectuals had taken swipes at the regime before, this was the first time since the early years of the revolution that so many banded together to attack the government. The regime has been

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clever in countering such criticism: coercion for the hard core but greater freedom for the rest to criticize—so long as the Islamic revolution, Khomeini, and the Koran are not directly impugned. But the intellectuals have pressed the attack. With increasing seriousness, they have sought to distance Islam from corrupting clerical power, which means eliminating the regime's *raison d'être.*

The ruling mullahs in Tehran cannot escape from Ayatollah Khomeini's legacy. Khamenei, Khomeini's successor, leads the country as both revolutionary guide *(rahbar)* and supreme religious jurist *(faqih).* The two functions are in principle inseparable: to be a *rahbar* alone is to be a dictator; to be a *faqih* alone is to abandon the revolution. Though Khomeini had encountered considerable clerical opposition to his one-man theocratic rule—the traditional clergy is a consensual, not an autocratic, community—his system worked because the traditional clergy buckled before Khomeini's awe-inspiring political achievement, the overthrowing of the shah.

But the two functions have proven increasingly contradictory as the revolution has rapidly aged. Khamenei, unlike Khomeini, became an ayatollah, a *faqih,* in name alone, elevated to office for his revolutionary commitment rather than his scholastic achievement. No mullah or religious student in any of Iran's seminaries, nor any ordinary Iranian in need of religious counsel, would seek a judgment, a *fatwa,* from Khamenei. Iranians who still care about what clerics think—and they are ever fewer—now give their allegiance elsewhere, most often to senior ayatollahs not active in the government. Regardless of Khamenei's actions, the erosion of his Islamic legitimacy—and with it clerical rule and prestige in general—irreversibly continues.

As *rahbar,* Khamenei still has power: many in the clerical community, particularly younger, less accomplished religious students and mullahs who have chosen government service over study and teaching, have embraced his rule. Those who have not are guarded in their criticisms. The clergy, traditionalists and radicals alike, are haunted by memories of shahs and westernized Iranian liberals splitting and diminishing the clergy during the twentieth century. To some extent, the disgruntled mullahs are pinned by their fears that clerical criticism might ignite wider protests that could lead to the chaotic collapse of

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

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

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

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the clerical order. Most traditional mullahs want a dignified partial retreat from power, not a reversal.

But the clergy is not blind to the people's loss of faith in it and in revolutionary Islam. The contradictions of the regime—wealthy mullah-bureaucrats preaching virtue to the poor—have engendered rampant anger and cynicism. Khamenei and other politicized clerics continue to talk about the revolutionary power of Islam. Many of them probably still believe what they say, but many do not. Religion has become a cover for greed and political corruption. The clerics and their Hezbollahi cohorts divide in their support for privatization over a state-run economy. Support for privatization grows among those who know that Iran is almost bankrupt and have figured out how to enrich themselves through selling state assets. Support for renewed centralization grows among those who fear the unsettling and possibly riot-producing effects of freer enterprise and envy their clerical and Hezbollahi peers who have more successfully cashed in on "free market" connections. Short on history and irony, the statist clerics have apparently forgotten the shah's mistake of dictating prices to the bazaar. Publicly, Iran still condemns America; privately, many Iranians would happily trade with the United States, an alluring power they no longer have the ideological purity to loathe. And the poor, for whom the clergy historically fought, grow poorer, enduring evermore-severe shortages and longer lines. Or they riot. They have only one receding dream: to afford a family. In their hearts, the revolution and its utopian hopes are dead. For them, Islam has again become a means to survive quietly the awfulness of daily life.

ALGERIA'S TURN

A SIMILAR degeneration will surely happen in Algeria if the FIS comes to power. Indeed, the agony of fundamentalist decline will probably be worse in Algeria than in Iran. Less isolated than the Persians, less cohesive in culture and revolutionary spirit, Algerians will offer more resistance to universal "Islamic ideals." At the height of its popularity in June 1990, the FIS garnered only 54 percent of the vote in communal and district elections. By December 1991, in the general

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election's first round, the FIS' winning share had dropped by over a million votes. Forty-one percent of registered Algerians had abstained. Hostile regional and ethnic voting patterns further complicate the returns and the FIS' likely future.

France, of course, will still be just across the Mediterranean, with millions of expatriate Algerians communicating back home by telephone and fax. The slow but real progress of Muslims in French society will attract and reproach the stillborn Algerian Islamic order. French television, regardless of any FIS laws against satellite dishes, will continue to penetrate millions of Algerian homes, undermining Islamic rectitude in relentless color.

As the dream collapses, Algeria's Sunni radicals will remain tenaciously faithful to their past, certain that the Koran and the *sunna*—the traditions established by the prophet and his companions—will answer all their contemporary needs. Like their Iranian brethren, Algerian fundamentalists will quickly be frustrated and intellectually at a loss over how to generate attractive, durable dreams for a new Islamic community.

Moreover, the struggle between radicalism and the Algerian status quo may endure beyond 1995. Sunni governments, even rickety ones like those in Algeria or Egypt, are not easily toppled. Especially in Egypt, age-old reflexes and loyalties between the rulers and the ruled—the traditional Islamic disposition to view de facto government as de jure—will continue to offer stiff competition to militants feeding off street despair. And Arab security services can be diligent, clever, and very tough. Rather than seeing Sunni regimes fall, we are more likely to witness what Roy has aptly called a permanent militant coup d'état, a stalemate between two forces that cannot decisively outflank each other.

If this happens, the FIS might be lucky. If fundamentalism fails to seize power or force a ruling Arab regime to effectively transform itself into a more hard-core Islamic state, Sunni militancy may postpone its own inevitable demise. In opposition, fundamentalism can remain on the offensive, highlighting the undeniable injustices, weaknesses, and failures of the Arab world. Unless today's Arab rulers can create a new, competitive identity, seductively fusing Islam and the West, fundamentalists will only need to cite the Koran to survive.

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But modern militancy can also weaken in opposition. According to Princeton historian Bernard Lewis, radical Islamic movements' rage and indignation have usually withered amid the traditional conventions and conservatism of the Muslim community. We should remember that economic despair, the oft-cited source of political Islam's power, is familiar to the Middle East. Myth-building, envy-inducing television is new, but ruling regimes that are stingy in the hope they dispense can often survive. Like Jordan's King Hussein, they may also intelligently and cautiously liberalize, attempting to build a society that allows fundamentalists a forum yet forces them to compromise.

A fundamentalist triumph in Algeria probably will not upend the Middle East.

The common Sunni faithful are not blind to the outside world. The continuing meltdown of Iran may have repercussions throughout the Muslim world. No doubt the Sunni hard core will do their best to ignore the Shiite crackup. Revolutionary Iran's missionary zeal and hubris have heightened, not lessened, the differences between the two great branches of Islam. Fundamentalist Sunnis will depict their fallen Shiite brethren as hard-core Sunni theologians always have, as flawed and destined to fail their faith. But the average Sunni may think differently. If Iran implodes, Muslims in Algeria and throughout the Middle East may come to appreciate that Lord Acton's famous dictum about power corrupting applies to mullahs as well.

Even if the fundamentalists succeed in Algiers, their cause may not efficaciously inspire others. Western officials worry about a domino effect whereby a militantly Islamic Algeria might advance struggling radical causes in such U.S. allies as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Morocco. Since Algeria is both Sunni (the majority branch within Islam) and predominantly Arab, an Algerian revolution might jolt the Arab Sunni world more forcefully than did Khomeini's Shiite revolution in non-Arab Iran. If Egypt alone were to follow Algeria into fundamentalist revolution or coup d'état, the Arab-Israeli peace process would end. The demilitarization of the Sinai, the key to Israeli national security, would once again be in question.

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But the universalist aspirations of militant Islam can founder on Middle Eastern differences. Algeria is neither Tunisia, nor Morocco, nor Saudi Arabia, nor Egypt. The international networks of Islamic militancy cause considerable concern, but they do not easily overcome the limitations imposed by geography, nationalism, ethnicity, cultural peculiarity, and religious factionalism. Algerian militants can distrust Egypt's Muslim Brothers, who can loathe Shiite Iranian revolutionaries. This is hardly new. The Crusaders lasted so long in the Middle East because Muslims displayed more animosity toward each other than toward European infidels. United, Muslims should have made quick work of the Jewish state when Israel declared its independence in 1948. Algerian Islamic revolutionaries will no doubt try, as good revolutionaries should, to spread their faith and undermine their neighbors. But a fundamentalist triumph in Algiers, like the triumph 15 years ago in Tehran, will probably not upend the Arab Middle East.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

WITH THE end of the Cold War, the United States can distance itself somewhat from the Middle East. The Soviet Union is no longer offering guns and butter at minimal charge to Syrians, Libyans, Iraqis, Algerians, Yemenites, and Palestinians. Washington still must pay attention—the Persian Gulf War shows clearly what can happen when the U.S. government goes to sleep at the wheel—but there are now few instances where the United States should intervene or demonstrably take sides in internal Middle Eastern debates.

Commendably, the United States has tried to downplay the confrontation of Islam with the West and to tone down the religious content in the quarrel. This is all for the best, even if the other side does not reciprocate. We have, however, an obvious interest in the outcome of today's Islamic civil wars between militants, traditionalists, and secularists. Though there is much to dislike about the ruling regimes in Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, they all possess one quality that should incline us strongly in their favor: they can evolve. It is easier to imagine the Algerian generals or Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak one day liberalizing their governments, how-

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ever reluctantly and slowly, than it is to imagine similar reforms from Iran's Khamenei or Sudanese ruler Hassan al-Turabi. Though the Saudi rulers may be guilty of ugly authoritarian behavior at home and consistent stupidity in foreign affairs, including godfathering Islamic fundamentalism throughout the world in the naive hope of controlling and "deradicalizing" it, they are at least fervent hypocrites. A good deal of humanity exists in their outrageous personal foibles and split personalities, which combine American educations and Wahhabi puritanism. In Middle Eastern affairs, a fervent hypocrite is always safer than a fervent puritan.

As a general rule, if Washington likes someone who is engaged in a life-and-death struggle with Islamic fundamentalists, it should not dote on him, at least publicly. The United States should send covert support if necessary, forgive his country's public indebtedness, and state clearly and with confidence our cherished principles of free expression, liberal democracy, and the separation of church and state. Our allies should be identified with measured words, not in the bombastic way we described the shah and now describe the Saudi royal family. Washington should not ostentatiously embrace its favorites. Even the most secularized Muslims, who may adore the United States privately, grow uneasy when U.S. officials linger too long in their company. The Middle East's love-hate relationship with the United States can alternate unexpectedly. The West—or, as it is still understood reflexively even in the secular Muslim mind, Christendom—remains unalterably "other." Association even in the friendliest settings can be seen as betrayal.

The United States should not help fundamentalists achieve what they have so far been unable to gain themselves. Although U.S. influence in Algeria is far less than the paranoid French believe, U.S. diplomatic contacts with fundamentalists can suggest approval. And U.S. disapproval can be exceptionally dispiriting to domestically besieged Middle Eastern rulers. Since the end of the Persian Gulf War and the collapse of the U.S.S.R., the illusion of U.S. power in the Middle East has never been higher.

The ruling Algerian regime, distasteful as it may be, should be allowed to fight or compromise on its own terms without wondering whether the

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United States is encouraging a deal behind its back. If the United States wants the FIS and the army to reach a "democratic" compromise, it should do nothing to undermine the military. The FIS, which currently has the upper hand, will be more likely to seriously compromise if it and the generals both believe fundamentalism will not unconditionally win.

If the motivating spirit of the Clinton administration's Algerian policy were more Machiavellian and less irenic, its present policy of beginning a dialogue with "moderate" fundamentalists would make more sense. For if the FIS wins the war, the decomposition of Algerian Islamic radicalism will begin for real. However, the U.S. government is not that devious. It is just hopeful that the fundamentalists will stop believing so aggressively. This may happen, but in the short term we need to understand that fundamentalism is a war fought primarily in Muslim imaginations. Private and collective dreams are not amenable to negotiation.

In fact, when looking at Algeria's likely future—exploding population growth, an awful economy, ethnic strife, and political mayhem—an earlier debut for Algeria's militants has a certain appeal. It might be better to sweat out the fundamentalist fever sooner rather than later. Algeria's horrendous problems will have no chance of amelioration until Algerians stop taking refuge in imagined Koranic cures. Given time, the lessons of the costs of the Algerian and Iranian revolutions could spread. Algerians might live in hell for several years, but others of greater strategic interest to us might learn and survive.

Conceivably, fundamentalism could even help the democratic movement in the Middle East. Burned by firsthand experience or terrified by the fundamentalist alternative, Middle Eastern Muslims may finally set aside the literalist interpretation of the Koran and Islam's traditions just enough to allow the foundations of a viable democracy to form. In general, the United States and its Muslim allies would be better off if the United States distanced itself from Muslim civil conflicts and developed a quieter, more patient policy against anti-Western radicalism in the Middle East. The United States should allow time, the oft-cited ally of fundamentalism, to work against Islamic activism. Neither dialogue nor containment is likely to work as well.

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Fundamentalism in Power

Sudan's Islamic Experiment

Milton Viorst

WITHIN THE Arab world, Sudan is unique. Other Arab countries appear to be slipping inexorably into fundamentalism. Sudan, by contrast, is the only state in our age that has formally opted for Islam as its system of government. By its own admission, it has not yet crafted the institutions needed to realize an Islamic regime. But its rulers, having made the choice, have left no doubt that Islam will not be disestablished, whatever the opposition and consequences, including civil war.

Sudan, it has been said, is a nation-state but not a nation. Its twenty-six million inhabitants speak one hundred different languages. They are divided into a multiplicity of ethnic groups, none more than a fraction of the total population. They are separated by regional and tribal loyalties. Most divisive of all, the population in the north of the country, where the majority resides, is culturally Arab, while the south shares the civilization of black Africa. Faced with this diversity, the majority has decided—or at least those who speak for the majority have decided—that the only unifying element in Sudan is Islam. And so, to create a nation, Sudan has embarked on a course of Islamization.

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The architect of this course is Hassan al-Turabi, a man of brilliant intellect and ineffable charm. Turabi is admired by many, and even more feared by some. He is at ease in both tie and turban, articulate in English and Arabic, and highly educated, with law degrees from universities in Khartoum, London, and Paris. As a lecturer at the University of Khartoum in the mid-1960s, he founded the Sudanese chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood, currently known as the National Islamic Front. Since then he has used the NIF single-mindedly in a quest to establish an Islamic state in Sudan.

In a coup d'état by middle-rank military officers in 1989, Islam rode to power, leaving Turabi, though holding no official post, in charge of Sudan's redesign. He says he turned to Islam because without it, "Sudan has no identity, no direction." He calls his regime an "Islamic experiment" and says it is leading toward a new national consensus. But in many ways it is a traditionally repressive military dictatorship. The U.S. State Department has placed Sudan on its list of countries abetting terrorism, which has provoked Turabi's indignation. Still, by the standards of other Arab societies, Turabi's concept of Islam is open-minded and tolerant. Though he sees no reason to emulate Western liberalism, few would contradict his assertion that "we do not advocate a very strict form of Islam." For Turabi, there is no contradiction in pursuing a policy of lenient Islam with unmitigated zealotry.

The signs are plentiful, in a visit to Sudan, that the Islam practiced there is less strict than that of Egypt, to say nothing of Saudi Arabia. One scarcely sees the *hijab*, the head-covering that makes many women in Egypt appear so forbidding, much less the Saudi veil. Sudanese women are more likely to render homage to Islamic modesty in a "taupe," a brightly colored gown with a filmy wrap that partially covers the hair and is actually quite alluring. Granted, the nightlife and the drinking that I recalled from a visit a decade or so ago are gone; the coup has imposed a grim nighttime silence on the streets of Khartoum and its more religious sister city, Omdurman. But the Sudanese seem more relaxed than other Arabs, and when they talk they do not seem much inhibited by the muscular piety of the military regime.

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Some Sudanese, of course, dislike the clement Islam preached by Turabi. Sheikh el-Hibr Youssef el-Daim, a traditionalist who heads the Muslim Brothers, told me Turabi is mistaken in claiming the right to reinterpret Islamic scriptures. "Sudan is not his preserve to do what he likes about Islam," el-Hibr said. Sheikh Muhammad Hashem el-Hadiya, leader of the strict, Saudi-oriented Ansar Sunna sect, told me he objected to Turabi's heterodox line on democracy and the status of women, and particularly on the limits Turabi would impose on the powers of the ulama, the body of jurists and clerics who traditionally interpret Islamic law. Yet their words proved the exception among those I met. Most Sudanese reflected Turabi's preference for a genial, non-rigorous Islam, more in keeping with Sudan's special experience within the flow of Islamic history.

FRONTIER ARABS

THE KEY to this history is that the Sudanese are not ethnically Arab, even though the country is within the realm of Arab civilization. As their dark skin attests, the Sudanese are Africans of diverse ethnic stock. Many Egyptians make a similar disclaimer of Arabism, insisting they are Africans of Pharaonic descent, a distinction that the eye confirms. But the Arab conquest of Egypt, which was then Christian, took place less than a decade after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, meaning that Egyptian society has been Arabized for more than thirteen hundred years. Sudan's fate was quite different. On reaching the Nile, the commanders of the prophet's armies turned westward rather than upriver to spread Islam across Africa's northern rim and then into Spain. Sudan was apparently too inaccessible or too poor to justify a major campaign.

In the centuries after Egypt's Islamization, Sudan was ignored by Arab forces, save for occasional raids, none of which achieved decisive results. Sudan succumbed to the Arabs a thousand years after Egypt, an interval that left it psychologically as well as geographically at the margin of Islam. Turabi himself calls his people "frontier Arabs." The power that finally won the victory for Arab civilization, moreover, was not Arab soldiers but Arab merchants and particularly

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Arab holy men who infiltrated the region, displacing the native Christianity and disrupting the established tribal order.

The holy men were missionaries who brought with them the Koran and the *sharia*, Islam's legal code, along with the Arabic language, the key to understanding the sacred scriptures. They came not just from Egypt but from Baghdad, Arabia, and North Africa. Some set up schools that taught both religion and literacy, the pillars of Arabic culture. A few acquired considerable political influence and were rewarded by tribal leaders with great wealth in livestock and land. It was these holy men who planted the seeds that, over several generations, Arabized Sudan—though Islam is still the religion of only two-thirds of the people and Arabic the mother tongue of only half. Overwhelmingly, these men transmitted the version of Islam known as Sufism, a dissidence dating back to Islam's earliest days. The more charismatic of them bonded with their followers into societies called *tariqas*, which are the heart of Sufi religious practice.

The Sufis converted the Sudanese to a faith that was more personal, more emotional, and more attached to the love than the fear of God than the orthodoxy that was practiced in most of the Arab world. They imparted to Sudan a highly popular faith that retained the richness of pre-Islamic folk customs. Today, Sufi dancers who whirl themselves into a dizzying personal communion with God on Friday afternoons in a field in Omdurman are a major tourist attraction. Late in the eighteenth century, which was a revivalist era throughout Islam, a fresh wave of holy men descended upon Sudan and fanned out from the banks of the Nile deep into the countryside to proselytize. Several founded Sufi dynasties, two of which, the Ansar and the Khatmiyyah, have become the hub of the country's principal political parties. To this day, Sufism exercises a strong influence not just on the religious spirit but on the politics of Sudan.

NORTH VS. SOUTH

SUDAN ACQUIRED its present configuration—it is the largest nation in Africa, nearly a third the size of the continental United States—during the 60 years of Egypt's occupation, which was ended by the

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uprising of the Mahdi in 1885. In taking over Sudan, Egypt's interest had been in the provinces adjacent to its borders, where the culture, like its own, was Arab, Islamic, and shaped by the Nile and the desert. Sudan's south, to which Egypt was politically indifferent, had none of those characteristics. Its culture was that of black Africa, its terrain savanna, and its climate rainy. It practiced African religions and spoke African languages. Egypt had only one objective in taking over Sudan's south: slaves.

Slave traders, mostly Muslims, had for centuries operated out of the land that is now Sudan, conducting raids into the African heartland, transporting thousands of captives annually to buyers throughout the Arab world. The Koran, though critical of slavery, does not ban it. The slave trade plagued the south even after slavery was outlawed in the 1860s; reports of its resurgence, vigorously denied by the government, periodically recur. True or not, the horrors of slavery remain ineradicably fixed in the historical memory of the southern Sudanese.

As colonial administrators, at the turn of the century, the British established a special status for Sudan's three southern provinces, with a view to attaching them to their own east African colonies. Known as the Closed Door policy, it replaced Arab officials with blacks and barred virtually all northerners from entering the region. Britain turned over authority for education and social services to Christian missionaries and left the day-to-day operation of government to tribal chiefs. While doing little to promote economic development, it encouraged the use of English and a revitalization of African tribal culture. Northern Sudanese rightly decried the policy as divisive, discriminatory, and anti-Islamic; indeed, a fourth of all southerners were converted from their native religions to Christianity. But when the British empire began to disintegrate after World War II, it was to the more powerful northerners that Britain turned in the negotiations over decolonization.

The Sudanese are not ethnically Arab but are Africans of diverse ethnic stock.

The northerners readily persuaded Britain to renege on its promise to protect the special character of the south. Rejecting a federal constitution, northerners designated Arabic as the state's official language

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and sent Arabs to seize administrative posts in the south. By declaring themselves in favor of Islamic rule, the Ansar and the Khatmiyyah, the major Sufi political orders, brought back visions of the slave trade to the southerners. As southerners saw it, benevolent British colonialism was being replaced by Arab tyranny. By the time of independence in 1956, an insurgency was already under way, and within months it grew into full-scale civil war.

When Colonel Jaafar Nimeiri seized power from a weak parliamentary regime in 1969 with support from the communists, he negotiated the agreement for southern autonomy that gave regional relations a decade of peace. His secular despotism kept Turabi in detention for seven years. But with his secular support wavering in the early 1980s, Nimeiri turned to the Islamists and named Turabi attorney general. Reversing his earlier policy of tolerance, in 1983 he decreed the September laws, which reimposed the *sharia*, including the notorious *hudud*, the amputation of the hand for theft. By then, the discovery of oil in the south had raised the stakes for both sides. Southern army units mutinied over the decree, and the fighting, at a cost so far of more than a million lives, still continues.

CLASHING CULTURES

SUDANESE FROM the north say that the war is not between Islam and Christianity, and they are largely correct. It is a clash of incompatible cultures, which historical mischance has placed under the same flag. The south and north have totally different perceptions of the federal system administered by Sudan's present government. Northerners proclaim that the government's plan for the south, which on paper looks like a radical devolution of power, could scarcely be more benign, based as it is on an Islamic tradition of religious tolerance. Southerners are convinced that they have their backs to the wall and are defending their culture against forced Islamization. "The government is working for the Islamization and Arabization of the entire country," said Ezekiel Kutjok, president of the Sudan Council of Churches, which criticizes what Kutjok calls the government's calculated anti-Christian policies.

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Ghazi Salahuddin al-Atabani, who is considered Turabi's man in the presidential palace, dismisses Kutjok's contention as silly. "The charge of forcible Islamization is smear propaganda," he said. "Our government's constitutional decrees treat all citizens equally, without reference to religion, color, or ethnicity. *Sharia* is a source of our legislation because the majority Muslim population perceives it to be absolutely necessary. But certain *sharia* provisions are not applicable in non-Muslim areas, and we have also included 'custom' as another source of legislation to cater to non-Muslim legal precepts."



The statements of Kutjok and Atabani reflect the sharp—some say irreconcilable—differences that exist over the nature of the Sudanese state. The mainstream southern leadership accepts federalism in principle but holds that the north's political structure must be transformed to eliminate the virtual monopoly of Islamic parties. An influential minority in the south recently claimed to have given up on the prospect of political restructuring altogether, and it argues that only through secession can both regions have the freedom they seek. The Muslims of the north, who reject restructuring as secularism and secession as treason, are themselves locked in disagreement over the range of political and religious concessions to be made in the interests of regional peace.

Southerners remain unconvinced that much has changed under

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the new federal plan. They note that the government now calls the war a *jihad*, a holy war, which raises the ideological stakes. Perhaps most destructive is the level of mutual mistrust, the product of years of brutality and bloodshed, which impairs rational negotiation. The talks that have taken place have been marked by dissembling, posturing, and abrupt stops and starts. Neither side has made much effort to win the confidence of the other. Meanwhile, the war goes on.

The war in Sudan is not between Islam and Christianity; it is a clash of incompatible cultures.

In an interview, Colonel Umar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, leader of the 1989 coup and now head of state, contended that peace was the country's first priority. But he declined to say that Sudan under his leadership would achieve it. Although clearly more than a figurehead, he defers in many ways to Turabi. Bashir blamed Sudanese dissidents exiled in Cairo and supported by Arab and African countries for creating obstacles. He also stated that if the United States and Great Britain stopped meddling, the warring Sudanese would work out their differences on their own. Bashir gave no hint that he recognized his government's Islamic policies as an obstacle to peace. Known for his personal piety, he emphasized, furthermore, that whatever the complaints of his foes at home or abroad, Sudan would persevere in fulfilling its Islamic objectives.

"We're now in the process of writing a constitution for the country," Bashir said, "based on the bedrock principles of Islam. The fundamental characteristics are already beginning to show up in our constitutional decrees, and they will be completed into a political system that will be ratified by an elected body.

"Not all groups agree on how we are interpreting the *sharia*, but we believe there is wide latitude. We have chosen a moderate way, like the Koran itself, and so the *sharia* in Sudan will be moderate. The dispute over what it requires lies not in the area of private but of public affairs. Unfortunately, there is no model in history for Islamic government. Fourteen centuries have gone by since the prophet, and everyone now has his own image of an Islamic state. Some countries confuse traditions—like the suppression of

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women—with religion, but tradition is not Islam. We don't claim that we will implement Islam perfectly, but we're serious about rising to the challenge."

TURABI'S WAY

HASSAN AL-TURABI is a man of winning ways. Slim and small, he has handsome, dark features and delicate hands, which move gracefully when he speaks. His voice is soft, and he smiles easily. His presentation, though self-assured, is not pompous. Students of Turabi say that for foreign audiences he changes his tone, if not his arguments. Sudanese joke that there is a Turabi for domestic consumption and a "Turabi export." But the ideas he articulates are often daring and occasionally deep. If his statements are sometimes shocking in relation to known reality, it is surely by design. Turabi has the verbal skills of a snake-oil salesman. In his presence, it is hard not to find him likable.

"What would an Islamic government mean?" Turabi asks. "The model is very clear; the scope of government is limited. Law is not the only agency of social control. Moral norms, individual conscience, all these are very important, and they are autonomous. Intellectual attitudes toward Islam are not going to be regulated or codified at all. The presumption is that people are free. The religious freedom not just of non-Muslims, but even of Muslims who have different views, is going to be guaranteed. I personally have views that run against all the orthodox schools of law on the status of women, on the court testimony of non-Muslims, on the law of apostasy. Some people say that I have been influenced by the West and that I border on apostasy myself. But I don't accept the condemnation of Salman Rushdie. If a Muslim wakes up in the morning and says he doesn't believe any more, that's his business. There has never been any question of inhibiting people's freedom to express any understanding of Islam. The function of government is not total.

"Islamic government is not total because it is Islam that is a total way of life, and if you reduce it to government, then government would be omnipotent, and that is not Islamic. Government has no

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business interfering with one's worship, for example, or prayer or fasting; except, of course, someone's public challenge to fasting. We don't confuse what is moral with what is legal. The prophet himself used strong words against those who didn't come to the prayers but he did nothing about it. Things like dress, for example, there are moral injunctions of how women and men should dress, but that is not part of the law."

Though admitting that women had not yet achieved full parity, he insisted that in Sudan the principle of their equality was now a settled issue. Turabi also defended the principles that his government intends to use as the basis of a settlement with the non-Muslim south, particularly in the controversial area of criminal law. The government rejected a dual legal system, with different rules for Muslims and non-Muslims, he said, because it would require that the police, before bringing a charge, determine the religion of the accused. That, he said, would make a mockery of the law. Instead, it chose regionalization, waiving for the non-Muslim south not only laws against drinking alcohol but also the imposition of Islamic penalties, particularly maiming, for crimes. Under this system, he said, non-Muslims were guaranteed their rights, while Muslims were assured of the full practice of their religion.

When I pointed out to Turabi that the government's punitive practices hardly constituted minimalism, much less liberalism, and that Sudan's indifference to human rights has been widely publicized and condemned, he replied, with no sign of defensiveness, "In many respects, Sudan recognizes that it has not achieved the model it has set for itself. Sudan is going through a transition, and in times like these, of course, we haven't the capacity to observe normal procedures. How can you expect a complex country like ours, which is economically in very bad shape and politically in a state of civil war, to maintain a constitutional system without some limitations on liberty? We admit we've tipped too far toward government control; we need more freedom. But we haven't forgotten the model, and we are working actively to attain it.

"In other countries, nationalism might be the alternative to Islam. But the only nationalism that is available to us, if we want to assert

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indigenous values, originality, and independence of the West, is Islam. Islam is the only modernity. It is the only doctrine that can serve as the national doctrine of today."

Asked whether he thought the rest of the Islamic world would follow the lead set by Sudan, Turabi did not give the categorical response I expected. His tentativeness surprised me.

"I am quite sure," he said, "that every single Muslim country is now moving, slowly perhaps, swiftly perhaps, in that direction. But I don't believe in historical determinism, and this is not final history, because movements can be reversed. I know most of the Muslim countries. I know most of the Islamic movements. I've been every place and spoken to most government figures, as well as to many observers, not only Islamists but nationalists and leftists. It may be what I distill from all this wisdom is wishful thinking since, after all, I am committed to Islam. But I see the same process happening everywhere, and I believe that Islam will ultimately prevail. Still, I confess that I might be thinking wishfully."

REPRESSION AND ALIENATION

MOST SUDANESE I met agree that both Bashir's and Turabi's talk is moderate, but few categorize the government's practices as moderate. They generally conceded that the brutality with which dissent was suppressed in the regime's first year or two had softened. Now political life, it was said, was no harsher in Sudan than in other Arab countries, and certainly far less brutal than in Iraq.

Yet I often heard Sudan compared to Iraq. Both states had ruling parties—the religious NIF in Sudan, the secular Baath in Iraq—that had shrewdly calculated how to attain total power, had pursued it ruthlessly, and now stop at nothing to retain it. Observers said that, well before the coup, the NIF infiltrated both the state bureaucracy and civil institutions, thereby painlessly capturing the society's administrative levers. After the coup, the NIF replaced thousands of key jobholders with its own supporters, assuring its supremacy in the judiciary, security services, armed forces, trade unions, professional societies, and education and communications systems. It

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extended its dominion over the economy by taking control of banks, foreign trade, and much of farm and industrial production. Moreover, it has penetrated the entire culture with a program of Islamic indoctrination.

Sudanese have not forgotten that the regime, mercilessly suppressing dissent, executed 28 army officers after a failed countercoup in April 1990. It confiscated the property of the Sufi opposition, arrested the leaders of striking labor unions, and made pawns of the professional societies, including the Sudan Human Rights Organization. It put down protests at Khartoum University with armed riot police who shot and killed students. It also fired dozens of professors and instituted periodic police sweeps to arrest campus troublemakers.

Political science professor Adlan al-Hardallu called the university a bellwether of Sudanese politics. "Student elections are considered a major indicator of where the country is going," he said. "Since the mid-1970s, the student government has been under the control of the Muslim Brothers, but in the last few years students seem to be backing away from Islam. Part of the reason is the government's withdrawal of economic assistance; students are having a hard time staying in school. But there is also disillusion with Islamic rule, which is no better than the rule that it replaced.

"The new student opposition calls itself nonaligned, which means it is not Islamic but is not anything else either. It may even be a majority, but it is not yet a real alternative to Turabi's National Islamic Front. The generation seems to have lost faith, as its fathers did with communism and Nasserism, but parliamentary democracy and the old leaders have no attraction. The students talk of a new leadership, free of racism, tribalism, and sectarianism, but their ideas have not coalesced. These signs suggest that the NIF may be in trouble, but there is still no discernible alternative."

Among Turabi's most vocal critics is Sadiq al-Mahdi, who, as head of the Umma Party, which his grandfather founded during the fight for independence against Britain, is Sudan's second-most-influential political figure. Known to all Sudanese as Sadiq, he derives his influence from being the great-grandson of the Mahdi—

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the Sufi holy man Muhammad Ahmad al-Azhar, who liberated Sudan from Egyptian occupation. The Mahdi established a 13-year regime based on the *sharia*, which in practice was evangelical, puritanical, and autocratic. Sadiq, a self-proclaimed democrat who was twice prime minister, stands more for the family's political tradition, based on a liberal Sufism, than for the austere religious legacy that is also intrinsic to its history.

"The *Mahdiyya* [the Mahdi's regime] provided the missing link between Sufi Islam and the state," Sadiq said when I asked about the ongoing influence of his family on Sudan. "Sufism was for hundreds of years seen as 'Islam minus the state.' The Mahdi restored the presence of the state to it, assuring to Islam a permanent place in the body politic of Sudan. The British, always fearful of reigniting the *Mahdiyya*, never tampered with Islam during the occupation, and, on independence, the mass political parties, except for the communists, were all Islamic. Once Islam was in, it never came out. It is impossible to imagine Sudanese politics today without the Islamic component."

Sadiq spoke sharply of the critics of the *Mahdiyya* within Turabi's camp. They are the heirs, he said, of those people who in the last century faulted the Mahdi for unifying the country by force. Now, he said, they claim to rule the country better than the Mahdi did. But times are different, he said. Today's government does not face the foreign threat that the *Mahdiyya* faced. "Brazen imperialism is no more," he said, "the so-called scramble for Africa is over," and the challenge is to finish uniting the Sudanese. Begun by the Mahdi, he said, the task of unification has been mishandled by the heavy-handed Turabi regime.

Sudanese say that Sadiq's problem as an officeholder was that he was too intellectual and too indecisive. He also suffered from limited political support, which he was unable to extend beyond the Sufi clans loyal to his family. Sadiq said his government sought to forge a modern state with the help of independent citizens' organizations. Though he recognized that Sudan's political parties were based on religious and tribal loyalties, he said he had done his best to give the Umma Party a national identity for the first time, just as Sudan itself

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was evolving from a tribal to a national identity. Turabi's NIF, by contrast, has not only been oppressive, he said, but in seeking to Islamize the society, it is as totalitarian as the *Mahdiyya* once was.

"I can't prophesy, but I'm confident that Sudan will get out of this," Sadiq said. "The opposition benefits from the government's unpopularity. Sudanese now recall my years in power with nostalgia, and I'm popular again, though I can't imagine that I'll want to return to politics. The problem is that Turabi's party has all of the institutions of the society in its hands, and the opposition is totally disorganized. The government promises free elections, but I doubt that it will have them. Free elections would change their nature. The only way it can survive is if the elections are cooked, which is what I suppose will happen. Without fraud and coercion, I think their game is up."

The government has spoken often of elections to legitimize its rule, and experimentation with the process has taken place in a few localities. But the NIF has never won more than 20 percent of the vote in past elections, and it is unlikely to do better today. Turabi, who was himself defeated when he stood for parliament in 1986, has by no means persuaded the Sudanese of the sincerity of his democratic commitment. Elections results are sure to be rigged, they say, because the NIF will never put its rule in jeopardy. Clearly, popular dissatisfaction with the Islamic state runs deep, but Turabi and his followers have entrenched themselves so skillfully—far more than any previous regime—that it may be impossible to get them out.

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The Israel-PLO Accord Is Dead

Amos Perlmutter

THE FAILURE OF OSLO

THE DECLARATION of Principles signed by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) at the White House on September 13, 1993, is for all intents and purposes dead. The repeated atrocities by Palestinian suicide bombers, including the grisly death of 20 Israeli soldiers in Beit Lid and the murder of 22 civilians in downtown Tel Aviv, serve only as dramatic illustrations of just how ineffectual the so-called Oslo accord has become. As it stands now, the whole Oslo process is unraveling, jolted by a wave of fundamentalist terrorism that deepens the prevailing pessimism among even dovish Israelis.

The original treaty—not to mention the high hopes behind it—has been so altered by both the PLO and Israel as to have become barely recognizable. Israeli plans for limited but continued West Bank settlement caused an international outcry after the expansion of Efrat, a settlement near Bethlehem. Israel has so far refused to withdraw the Israeli Defense Forces from the West Bank's major cities before the Palestinian elections for their autonomy authority, which should have been held months ago. Fifty-nine Israelis have been killed in the past nine months by suicide bombers from Islamic Jihad and Hamas, the Islamic resistance movement. For their part, many Palestinians bitterly complain that Israel has not given up anything and call the IDF's withdrawal from the turbulent Gaza Strip a blessing for Israel. They

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excoriate Israel's Labor-led government for refusing even to clear the handful of militant settlers out of downtown Hebron after one American-born fanatic massacred 29 worshipers in Hebron's Ibrahimi mosque. The Declaration of Principles has increasingly become a document that reflects neither reality nor probability.

This is not what the handful of Israeli and Palestinian negotiators had in mind when they secretly hammered out the accord in Norway. The pact called for an IDF withdrawal from Gaza and the West Bank town of Jericho, which would then fall under the civilian control of a Palestinian autonomy government headed by PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat. All Israeli settlements would remain intact, and the new Palestinian police would work together with the IDF to guarantee internal security and fight Hamas. In nine months, the IDF would redeploy throughout the remainder of the West Bank to prepare for Palestinian elections and the extension of autonomy to the entire West Bank. The most contentious issues—settlements, refugees, borders, Palestinian statehood, security, and Jerusalem—would be deferred until another set of talks, scheduled to begin in the third year of autonomy. The Declaration of Principles itself was accompanied by mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO, once the bitterest of enemies, and by a commitment from Arafat to end terrorism and remove calls for Israel's destruction from the PLO charter. Taken together, the Oslo accords represented a bold bid for a lasting reconciliation between Palestinians and Israelis, and promised to usher in a new era of regional peace.

The debate over Oslo's provisions, however, has divided the Palestinian nationalist movement. Those Palestinians who support Oslo do not trust Israel. On the other hand, the rejectionist front believes that this is no time for diplomacy, and that the military struggle with Israel must be continued until all of Palestine—including pre-1967 Israel—is liberated. Arafat, once the symbol of Palestinian nationalism, has become tarnished goods.

The Oslo accord is also being met with increased doubt and hostility in Israel. Immediately after the dramatic White House handshake, Israel was ready to return most of the territories it took during the Six Day War of 1967 in exchange for real peace. But the Israeli public is

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now deeply suspicious of the aims of the Palestinian nationalist movement. The only person who still seriously believes in Oslo is its adoptive father, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. Polls demonstrate the growing strength of the rightist Likud, which promises a harsh anti-terror campaign and rejects territorial compromise. Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu's fortunes are rising not because a Likud government would be better for Israel but because the nation's trust in Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin has seriously deteriorated.

Oslo will probably linger on like a comatose patient on life support. But as it stands today, this will be a long, tortuous, and unsatisfactory process, carried on amid the din of Hamas terrorism and the building of additional Jewish settlements. Ultimately, the demise of Oslo threatens to topple the Rabin government and render Arafat obsolete. The Middle East peace process may stagger on, but the Oslo accord will never yield its desired fruit.

EYELESS IN GAZA

OSLO'S FLAWS have many roots, including weak and inconsistent PLO leadership, conflicting strategies, and faulty negotiating techniques. First, the continued weakening of the peace process is partly owed to the absence of authoritative and authentic Palestinian leadership. Arafat has isolated himself in his office in Gaza City and has scarcely set foot in Jericho since his arrival in the self-rule zones. He long ago lost the support of Palestinian intellectuals in the territories. Today, however, just about everyone is opposed to him in one way or another. In his recent book, even Abu Mazen, the chief PLO negotiator in Oslo, bitterly criticizes Arafat. Worse, a generation of radical Palestinian nationalists and Muslim fundamentalists has emerged in the occupied territories to violently oppose Oslo, demanding the destruction of Israel proper and an end to land-for-peace diplomacy.

Second, Israel and the PLO approached the negotiations from completely different angles. Coming to terms with the Palestinians was the basis for Rabin's winning 1992 election platform, but Labor designed its solutions and drew up its maps in a political and intellectual vacuum. The problem was that the Israeli negotiators designed the parameters

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of the process around Israeli needs and demands. On timing, Israel wanted the process to evolve in stages; on space, the final decisions on boundaries, settlements, and Jerusalem would be made later; and on the prickly issue of Palestinian sovereignty—well, that would be dealt with last, because the whole issue was a serious electoral danger to Rabin.

The Palestinian agenda, on the other hand, was almost exactly the opposite. On timing, Arafat pushed a sooner-rather-than-later agenda. Arafat has repeatedly proclaimed that every inch of territory evacuated by the Zionist enemy will become Palestinian. On space, the Palestinians would not surrender an inch of territory, which meant no border rectifications, no settlers, and, above all, no united Israeli-dominated Jerusalem. As for statehood, the end of the process would see total Palestinian sovereignty over all of the West Bank and Gaza, including East Jerusalem. The differences between the two sides have actually widened since Oslo, given Arafat's ever more provocative and reckless pronouncements since 1993.

The critical Israeli errors stem from ignoring basic rules of negotiating. Frustrated by the grindingly slow talks with the Palestinian negotiating team in Washington, Peres leaped at the Norway back channel to the PLO. In 1993, however, the leadership of the intifada was more vibrant than the all-but-moribund PLO, which had lost most of its funding from the Persian Gulf states and much of its international credibility by backing Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Nevertheless, after the West Bankers' negotiating team in Washington presented what seemed to Rabin unacceptable demands regarding settlements and Jerusalem, Rabin chose to accept Arafat's offer to postpone all of the thorniest issues until later. Arafat's less threatening offer enticed Rabin to catapult the fading apparatchiks and anachronistic terrorists of the PLO in Tunis back into the foreground.

The entire exercise led to some fundamental errors. Rabin accepted the Oslo concept after Peres and other senior Foreign Ministry diplomats persuaded themselves, and then a reluctant Rabin, that Arafat could deliver. The Rabin government acted despite extensive Israeli intelligence showing that Arafat was patently weak, did not represent the new Palestinian generation in the territories, and was in fact commonly despised by the intifada's veterans.

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Moreover, the divisive permanent status issues—Jerusalem, borders, and settlements—have repeatedly come to the forefront. The interim phase also represents an ongoing invitation for Oslo's foes—extremist Israeli settlers and Palestinian radicals—to try to derail the process, as bloodily as necessary. The trust between the two old adversaries that the interim stage was supposed to build is nowhere in sight. If anything, what confidence existed has been eroded by the interim phase.

The process could collapse completely over the issue of Jerusalem, which is just what Oslo was designed to avert. Israelis will not accept a divided Jerusalem as their capital, nor will the Palestinians accept anything less than the establishment of East Jerusalem as their capital and Palestinian—not Jordanian—control over the city's Islamic shrines. Both sides continue to thrust Jerusalem onto the agenda, which could make the holy city the straw that breaks the camel's back. Faisal al-Husseini, one of the West Bank leaders of Arafat's al-Fatah movement, is clandestinely establishing a Palestinian foreign office and other departments in Jerusalem. The city's mayor, however, is Ehud Olmert, an opportunistic young Likud leader determined to turn East Jerusalem into an Arab ghetto amid Jewish Jerusalemites. For his part, Arafat time and again speaks of Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, while Rabin repeatedly assures Israelis that Jerusalem will remain Israel's eternal, indivisible capital.

HAMAS RULES

IN ESSENCE, Rabin ended up negotiating with the weakest of all parties among politically active Palestinians: Arafat's Tunis-based PLO. This approach may have appealed to a former general like Rabin, but it was exactly wrong politically. The Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, as public opinion polls have demonstrated, reject the Oslo process; about 70 percent of the Palestinians either do not trust or totally reject the Oslo process.[1] The floundering Arafat, by contrast, is completely dependent on several security services and spends most

[1] *Ha'aretz*, November 9, 1994. The PLO's chief pollster in Gaza also told *Ha'aretz*, Israel's premier daily newspaper, that he refuses to ask respondents if they support Arafat, claiming that including such a question would be too embarrassing.

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of his resources from donor countries shoring up his regime at the expense of the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.

In contrast to the weak and discredited PLO, Islamic radicalism and the intifada have created a powerful Palestinian-Arab movement that currently represents Palestinian nationalism on the ground. Now that hopes for an independent Palestinian state have been rekindled, the hard-liners are unwilling to accept even an Israeli return to its 1967 borders. Both the intifada radicals and Hamas, as well as their ruthless terrorist wings, continue to speak of Jerusalem as their capital and pamphleteer on the ouster of Jews from historic Palestine. At the point in history where the Palestinians finally might have fulfilled their dream of statehood, an aggressive movement, fueled by small but fanatical militant cells and violently opposed to Oslo, has emerged to challenge the fading Arafat and his PLO.

Today Peres asks us, "What was the alternative to Oslo?" The alternative was to continue to negotiate in Washington with the new generation of Palestinian leaders. There is no question that the alternative would have been difficult and probably would not have yielded immediate results, but the difficulties were not entirely insurmountable. Such talks would have taken time—an electorally inconvenient factor for Rabin and Peres—but the result might have been a more effective and realistic resolution. In effect, Rabin anointed Arafat as the Palestinian people's leader at exactly the point when he was failing to be that leader. Arafat and Fatah now have no alternative to Oslo, which has come to define the PLO's center. In February, the PLO Executive Committee resolved to continue implementing Oslo, despite strong outside opposition.

The reinvigorated and radicalized post-Oslo Palestinian nationalist movement, as heir to the intifada, brawls and sprawls and thrashes about with great fury, but lacks significant leaders. The leadership of the movement is talented and well-educated (both in Western secular venues and through traditional Islamic schooling) but lacks standout personalities or anyone as charismatic as the once-legendary Arafat. They represent all the secular classes—lawyers, academics, doctors, journalists, engineers, and members of the media—and are also prominent among the traditional classes of religious preachers

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and teachers. Ideologically, the new leaders call incessantly for total Arab domination of Palestine and for the continuation of the armed struggle against Israel. They advocate ousting settlers by the use of terror, seek to make Jerusalem the Palestinian capital, and reject any form of democratic government. Their maximalist aspirations carry with them a patriotic, religiously flavored euphoria that can translate into a willingness to die for the cause.

Moreover, Hamas controls the education system in Gaza from kindergarten through high school, as well as the religious schools, mosques, and the Islamic universities in Gaza and Jerusalem. The Islamists' social services amount to Gaza's welfare state, providing for the people even as Arafat pampers his security services and bureaucrats. In the West Bank, Hamas could probably gain 30 to 40 percent of the vote for the self-government administration. This is a prospect that chills Arafat enough that he, like the Israeli government, would like to postpone the elections as long as possible.

Like it or not, however, Hamas and the intifada generation represent maximalist but popular aspirations of the Palestinian people. For Israel to salvage something out of the Oslo mess, it should not entirely abandon Arafat, but should help him broaden his base of support to include the intifada generation and the non-terrorist sections of Hamas. After the current wave of suicide bombings, no Israeli electorate will ever accept Hamas as part of a Palestinian negotiating team. But that does not mean that Hamas cannot be indirectly linked to a modified Oslo process. The intifada generation and Hamas—itself a product of the uprising—are popular enough in the West Bank and Gaza that members of anti-Arafat groups will have to be incorporated into the administration of any Palestinian state. Internal elections within Fatah itself would elevate a young, new leadership of intifada veterans. If he wants to survive politically, Arafat will have to appoint individual members of Hamas to various posts in his administration. The West Bank cannot be run by the Palestinian police, an estimated 15,000, and Arafat's security services. But it is not, not should it be,

Like it or not, Hamas represents maximalist but widely popular Palestinian aspirations.

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Israel's place to impose the widening of his administration on Arafat. Such a move would only strengthen the perception among Palestinians that Arafat is a "colonial stooge" or "Rabin's Tel Aviv agent," which Hamas already accuses him of being. To strengthen his position, Arafat must reach this conclusion himself—sooner rather than later.

APRÈS NOUS, LA DELUGE

THERE HAS BEEN some talk among pundits of building a wall between Israel and a Palestinian state. This is a fallacy at best, since the two are so inextricably linked. The idea of Palestine as a sovereign state requires prior agreement on boundaries that do not yet exist. Even now, Israel is bent on building settlements whose existence will dictate borders. Israel's negotiations with Syria, Egypt, and Jordan did not involve such a messy handicap as the issue of Jerusalem. So far, separation is merely a slogan. Under present conditions, the separation plan Rabin intends to submit to his cabinet is unlikely to work. The public's soured mood will make it almost impossible for Rabin to cede West Bank lands to the Palestinians as agreed on in Oslo. Thus, separation is a political gimmick, a self-deception by Rabin whose only usefulness is to defend his position against his right-wing opposition.

Even so, much of the future depends on the results of the next Israeli elections. If Rabin wins in 1996—still a likely prospect, since he remains Israel's most substantial leader—new Israeli electoral reforms could make Rabin's cabinet face off against a Likud majority in the Knesset, Israel's parliament. This would guarantee political gridlock and a dramatic change in the peace talks.

The 1996 elections could also produce a refutation of Rabin's Oslo policy and the emergence of Netanyahu of the Likud as prime minister. The Likud accepts the concept of autonomy, as adopted by former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin in the 1979 Camp David peace treaty with Egypt. Netanyahu says he favors continuing negotiations with the Palestinians, but about autonomy, not Palestinian statehood. Obviously that will not be accepted by Arafat, which would make it the final blow to the Oslo process. The consequences for Israel would be dire. The intifada could restart with even

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

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

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greater vigor than before, accompanied by more terrorism and continuous attacks on the settlements. The likely Likud defense minister, Ariel Sharon, would handle the revolt in the most brutal way—which would return the Jewish state to its pre-Labor status as an international pariah state, as it was for almost a decade under Yitzhak Shamir, the Likud's last prime minister. Israel's new peace treaty with Jordan would be jeopardized. The budding economic relationships between Israel and the Persian Gulf states and between Israel and Morocco would certainly end, and the general economic consequences would be serious. American Jews would be alienated, thereby harming Israel's major outside source of support. Israel's relationship with Washington would be strained, since no president, whether Democrat or Republican, will tolerate a return to the vicious status quo ante cycle of Israeli-Palestinian tension. It would certainly hurt Israel's growing ties with the Far East, especially India and China, which remain a great achievement of the Rabin government. And it would deeply split Israeli society between the supporters of Oslo and the opponents of an independent Palestinian state.

If Netanyahu's Likud wins the 1996 elections, Israel will return to being a world pariah.

A Likud victory would also strengthen the Palestinian radicals. Arafat, an accommodator who leads by consensus, will move in their direction and become the international spokesman of Palestinian rage, something he did very well before Oslo. His propaganda machinery should not be underestimated. He could well return to the old Tunis posture of confrontation.

Since a Likud victory would be the final nail in Oslo's coffin, hopes for the Middle East peace process ride on a Rabin victory. Both Rabin and Arafat are at the mercy of Oslo, and their political careers are tied together. In a second term, Rabin could discreetly press for a more representative Palestinian coalition. In the end, an Arafat-Rabin deal cannot succeed without the participation of the political wing of Hamas and the intifada generation.

Perhaps the most significant move Israel could make to restore Palestinian faith in the peace process would be to address the issue of

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settlements. Rabin could accept the plan of Israeli Environment Minister Yossi Sarid, a leader of the dovish Meretz party, proposing the creation of two major settlement blocs, one around Jerusalem, the other near the highway between Tel Aviv and Haifa. This would concentrate most of the settlers who will be transferred from the center of the West Bank to within the 1967 Green Line, an act of goodwill toward the Palestinians. Military arrangements will also have to be made with Jordan and the Palestinians on joint control of the Jordan River.

On the Palestinian side, the autonomy elections and a willingness on the part of Arafat to bow to reality might induce him to include more representative Palestinians. Without a coalition government, Arafat will never manage to establish his rule or create political stability in the future Palestinian state. This assumes, of course, that Arafat's sense of his own survival is as keen as ever, and that his vision is not so narrow as to exclude his rivals. Vigorous counterterrorism work by Arafat's security forces, in cooperation with Israeli intelligence and the IDF, could stem the tide of fundamentalist terrorism. Blunt condemnations of future attacks by Arafat himself, rather than his deputies, could boost Rabin's flagging electoral fortunes.

But even such a faintly optimistic scenario will have to wait until the Oslo process lets out its final death rattle. The process no doubt will reel on—transformed, transgressed, weakened, and always embattled—right into the 1996 Israeli elections. Until then, the cunning of history is that both Rabin, who is contemptuous of Arafat, and Arafat, who resents Rabin, are electorally locked together and must continue the charade of the ongoing process. In the end, Rabin's government would probably accept a Palestinian state, but not on the order of the arrangements made by Begin and former Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat, which called for placing all of the West Bank under Palestinian control. Twenty percent of that territory is now earmarked to secure Jerusalem, the major artery of the Tel Aviv-Haifa highway, and the Jordan River. For Arafat to support so truncated a state would be an act of either political courage or suicide. But if all efforts founder on the rock of maximalism, the only alternative is a permanent state of guerrilla war right into the next century—a prospect that is daunting even for the Likud.

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Egyptian-Israeli Relations Turn Sour

Fawaz A. Gerges

A COLD PEACE GETS ARCTIC

FAR MORE threatening to the Middle East peace process than the increase in bloody attacks by Islamic militants against Israelis are the recent strains in Egyptian-Israeli relations. For the last five months, notwithstanding the diplomatic niceties of their regular meetings, the Egyptian and Israeli leaderships have clashed publicly over a wide range of issues that have brought the two countries to the brink of crisis. The verbal war reveals deep insecurity, suspicion, and hostility. This dramatic turn of events raises disturbing questions not only about the future direction of Egyptian-Israeli relations but also about the long-term viability of the peace process itself.

The main point of contention is the character and composition of the new Middle East order and the roles of Egypt and Israel in it. Their competing visions struggle to shape the region's dynamics in their own images. Israel hopes to construct a new regional order that is Middle Eastern instead of Arab, in which Israel would be the dominant economic power. Thus, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres recently called for expanding the Arab League's membership to include Israel and other non-Arab Middle Eastern states.

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

EWK/CARTOONISTS & WRITERS SYNDICATE

Since the signing of their peace accord with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1993, the Israelis have pursued active economic diplomacy to lift the Arab economic boycott against Israel and establish links with various Arab states. Israel's campaign has led to important breakthroughs with Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and several Persian Gulf countries. The Arab boycott is being quietly and unceremoniously buried. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Peres, and other ministers, leading a large team of Israeli businessmen at a major economic conference last October in Casablanca, Morocco, impressed on their Arab counterparts the mutual benefits of economic collaboration, promising high financial returns and incentives. But Peres, according to the Egyptian press, went further, poking fun at Egypt's failing political and economic record: "Egypt led the Arabs for 40 years and brought them to the abyss; you will see the region's economic situation improve when Israel takes the reins of leadership in the Middle East."

Peres' statement poured fuel on simmering Egyptian fears. Israeli actions and words confirmed Egyptian suspicions that Israel aims to dominate the area—at the expense of Egypt's regional role. To an Egyptian leadership already beleaguered by a rising tide of Islamic extremism, the marginalization of Egypt in the Arab arena would do intolerable harm to the internal stability of the regime. Historically, Egypt has led the Arab interstate system, and Egyptian leaders have used their investment in Arab affairs to legitimize their power at home and obtain external assistance. For example, former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's pursuit of pan-Arab unity was designed to make Egypt a power to be reckoned with on the local and

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international stage. Likewise, the alliance that his successor, Anwar al-Sadat, forged with Saudi Arabia and Syria enabled him to go to war against Israel in 1973, thus salvaging his reputation and presidency. Sadat's signing of the 1979 Camp David peace treaty with Israel was such a radical departure from Egypt's previous regional policies that Egypt became a pariah within the Arab world. Egypt's isolation was short-lived, however. President Hosni Mubarak slowly but steadily reintegrated Egypt into the Arab fold. Mubarak has served as a moderate and reasoned voice in pushing his Arab counterparts to make peace with Israel. He hoped to capitalize on the current Israel-PLO peace process not only to regain Egypt's key position in the Arab arena but also to endear his regime to the United States.

The Egyptian ruling elite resents and mistrusts Israel's decision to bypass Egypt and establish direct ties with other Arab states. They feel that Egypt should continue to be the mediator between Israel and the other Arabs. Little wonder that Israel's bold economic diplomacy and lobbying tactics at the Casablanca conference elicited a strong response from Cairo. Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa made it clear that Egypt was opposed to the formation of a Middle East common market before a comprehensive political settlement is reached. By linking the normalization of economic relations between Arabs and Israelis to political progress, Egypt aimed to slow Israel's diplomatic offensive, which could undermine Egypt's regional and international standing and weaken its bargaining power. Mubarak himself had to intervene to allay the fears of Egyptian intellectuals: "Any assumption that Israel is capable of swallowing up Egypt is wrong. Egypt has always been, and will continue to be, a pivotal state in the region."

These tensions have made a cold peace downright arctic. Today, both of the two great breakthroughs in the Middle East peace process—Camp David and the Oslo accord—are at risk.

A NUCLEAR LINE IN THE SAND

THE EGYPTIAN leadership also tied the peace process to the elimination of nuclear weapons in the Middle East by insisting that Egypt

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would not sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) when it comes up for renewal in April unless Israel also signs and opens up its nuclear facilities to international inspections. Egypt hoped to assert its leadership role by mobilizing Arab support and by showing Israel that Egypt would not tolerate any attempt to dominate the region. Given the heavy lobbying by the Clinton administration and other Western officials, Egypt will probably sign the NPT, but the nuclear question will remain, ready to be activated whenever clouds gather over the Israeli-Egyptian landscape.

Egypt linked the peace process to nuclear disarmament in the Middle East.

Egypt's willingness to incur U.S. unhappiness reflected the Egyptians' frustration and their determination to regain the initiative by remaining fully engaged in the Arab-Israeli theater. As Ibrahim Nafie, the influential editor of the Cairo newspaper *Al-Ahram,* put it, "It is not our intention to create a future that allows Israel, as a reward for withdrawal, to make gains at the expense of Egypt's own position in the Arab world." Historically, the course of the Arab-Israeli conflict has been dictated by Egypt's pivotal position in the Arab world. The Arabs, for example, could not make war against Israel after Sadat left the Arab circle in 1975. In the same vein, Egypt wants to ensure that the Arab-Israeli peace process strengthens its national security, rather than weakening its regional influence.

In this context, Mubarak's December mini-summit in Alexandria with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad was aimed at coordinating a common Arab policy toward Israel along the lines advocated by Egypt. These included explicit support for Syria's and the PLO's negotiating positions with Israel, postponing the normalization of Arab relations with Israel until a comprehensive political settlement is reached, and refusing to sign the NPT unless Israel agrees to international inspections or the establishment of a formal structure to discuss a nuclear-free Arab-Israeli theater. This and other steps signaled a new activist phase in Egyptian regional policy: Egypt would check Israel's ambitions in the area by drawing a line in the sand beyond which Israel could not go. Cairo would also seek a return to the principles laid out in the 1991 Madrid peace conference.

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As a result, Egyptian officials have become more critical of Israel's stand on the peace process, which they argue fuels terrorist attacks by Islamic militants, and have become more vocal in blaming Israeli intransigence for delaying a compromise with Syria.

Israeli officials and opinion makers publicly expressed their dismay and anger at Egypt's new unfriendliness. Rabin himself accused Egypt of "extremism" on the nuclear issue and in its support for Syria. The Israeli prime minister expressed doubt about the stability and viability of the Egyptian political system by implying that a hostile Islamic government might come to power in Cairo and warning that Israel must prepare itself for a war against the Arab states. Moreover, an Israeli Foreign Ministry position paper recommending that Egypt be "punished" was leaked to the influential Israeli newspaper *Ha'aretz,* which concluded that if Egypt continued its negative policy, Israel should take strong punitive measures. These include Israeli intervention in Washington to reduce U.S. aid to Egypt, criticism of Cairo's alleged human rights abuses and violation of U.N. Security Council sanctions against Libya, and the relocation of Israeli-Palestinian talks currently being held in Cairo.

The Israeli pronouncements stirred up an outcry in Egypt's foreign policy circles and media. Mubarak himself described as "regrettable" Rabin's statement about the need for Israel to remain on a war footing. "Dropping hints about the possibility of war is very grave indeed," he warned. "This makes us feel concern about signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty." His senior political adviser, Osama al-Baz, was blunter: "Israel's brandishing of the war option would not scare the Arab states because they trust the effectiveness of their military apparatus." In the same vein, Moussa called on Rabin to cease questioning Egypt's long-term stability. A member of the Egyptian parliament accused Israel of trying to suffocate Egypt by undermining its role in the region.

AN AX TO GRIND

MOST SEGMENTS of Egypt's civil society have expressed deep mistrust of Israel. Most intellectuals, trade unions, and cultural and reli-

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gious figures have called on the government to refuse normalization with Israel and even to reassess its position on the peace process. For example, the grand sheikh of al-Azhar, Egypt's most important center for Islamic learning, refused a request to meet Israeli President Ezer Weizman during the latter's visit to Cairo last December, saying that "the climate was wrong because of the continuing Israeli occupation of Arab countries and of Jerusalem." The Coptic pope, Shanouda III, attacked Israel's "expansionist" policies on the West Bank and claimed that competing Israeli and Palestinian claims on Jerusalem represent "a major obstacle that probably could not be overcome except through war." He added that he was against making peace with Israel while it still occupies Arab territories, and praised Syria for its insistence on total Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights.

Although much of this verbal war is mere rhetoric designed to test the other nation's will and commitment, the fundamental political differences between Egypt and Israel should not be minimized. These disputes revolve around Israel's and Egypt's political and economic roles in the new Middle East order and the lack of progress on both the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Syrian fronts. Given their political and military weights and geostrategic positions, Egypt's and Israel's interests are bound to clash in the new Middle East. The challenge for both will be to keep their competition in check and prevent their cold peace from turning into cold war.

The frightening thing is that this verbal escalation finds deeper and more hostile echoes within the public opinion of both Egypt and Israel. A poll conducted by *Al-Ahram Weekly* last December found that for most Egyptians the "psychological barrier" with Israel is still very much in place 15 years after the signing of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty. The poll, which sampled the views of 1,505 Egyptians 18 years of age and older, showed that the public was opposed to formal ties with Israel. Asked whether they would buy Israeli goods and whether they would like to visit Israel, 71 percent and 63 percent of respondents, respectively, said no. An even greater majority—75 percent—said no to the eventuality of industrial cooperation with Israel.

Although a majority expressed little faith in the ability of the peace process to restore Palestinian rights, the poll revealed much greater

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dissatisfaction about Egypt's relations with Israel. According to *Al-Ahram Weekly,* the results indicate that "the Egyptian public felt it had its own ax to grind with Israel." Ironically, the upper strata of society, which are expected to have more crystallized and enlightened views, were highly represented in the poll. In a similar vein, Israeli public opinion polls reveal a hardening of views about concluding peace agreements with the Palestinians and Syrians. Israel's disillusionment with the Oslo accords has been accompanied by a spate of articles in the Israeli press fretting about the state of relations with Egypt and calling for retaliatory measures against the Egyptians.

POWERHOUSE OR PUPPET?

THE DETERIORATION of Egyptian-Israeli relations has been paralleled by a crisis in Cairo's dealings with Washington. Last December, a series of articles in the U.S. press criticized Egypt's domestic and foreign policies, alleging that Cairo was violating U.N. sanctions against Libya. *The Washington Post* went further, calling on the Clinton administration to give Egypt "a blunt warning to drop a pact with the devil that President Mubarak has forged with Colonel Qaddafi." The Egyptians believe that the attacks on Egypt in the American media were orchestrated by the U.S. government or by what they see as "the powerful Zionist lobby." Their suspicions were reinforced when senior administration officials pressured Egypt to vote for an indefinite extension of the NPT. Some members of Congress also have hinted that they might seek to reduce the $2 billion in annual foreign aid that Egypt receives unless Egypt stops vacillating on such key issues as the nuclear treaty, Israel, and Libya.

For all these reasons, the besieged Egyptian leadership is convinced that U.S. foreign policy is aimed at curtailing, not augmenting, Egyptian influence in the region. It accuses Israel and its supporters in the United States of poisoning the atmosphere between Washington and Cairo and of subtly threatening to have U.S. foreign aid to Egypt cut off. Egyptians strongly defend their ties with Libya on the grounds of national security. Libya employs tens of thousands of Egyptian workers, who send their remittances home; it

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is also the largest Arab investor in Egypt. Egyptian officials feel that they cannot sever economic links with Tripoli without further damage to their economy and society.

Egyptian officials warn the United States against using a double standard and dancing to the Israeli tune. Senior diplomats contend that the U.S.-Egyptian relationship is based on mutual interests, not dependency. Far from being a "satellite" or "proxy" of the United States, Baz warned, "Egypt is a superpower in the Middle East. It will not bow down before any country." The Egyptian ruling elite feels that Washington has failed to give due credit to Cairo for its constructive role in the peace process and its fight against terrorism in the Middle East. They had hoped that Arab-Israeli peace would secure U.S. aid to Cairo, which would help ensure the survival of their regime against the Islamists. Instead, U.S. and Israeli criticism of Egypt has coincided with the escalation of the Islamists' threat to the Mubarak regime. It is little wonder that Mubarak's frustration with the Clinton administration has reached the boiling point. The U.S. government, he claims, is holding secret talks with the Islamist "terrorists" who are waging a bloody campaign to topple his government. Egyptian officials blame the deterioration of U.S.-Egyptian relations on Israel's refusal to sign the NPT and on U.S. "interference in certain questions, including the question of human rights."

SO MUCH FOR THE PEACE DIVIDEND

EGYPT'S FOREIGN POLICY elite seem to have reached a consensus that the current peace process will further erode their country's power vis-à-vis other regional players, particularly Israel. They already sense this subtle shift of fortunes in the "unseemly rush" by Persian Gulf and Maghreb Arabs to do business with Israel without any coordination with Egypt. In the post-peace era, Egyptian mediation between Israel and the other Arab states will no longer be needed, since Israel will have direct access to other Arab states and Egypt cannot compete with the more dynamic Israeli economy. In Egyptian eyes, Israel's access to advanced Western technologies, coupled with substantial U.S. support, will enable it to dominate the new Middle East eco-

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nomic order. Such an eventuality, which would undermine Egypt's leadership of the Arab world and inflict material and political damage at home, would tip the balance of power in favor of the Islamists and threaten the very survival of the Egyptian government.

But the Islamists do not represent the only real threat to Mubarak. More menacing is the inability of the Egyptian economy to take off, provide employment for the army of college graduates, and feed a fast-growing population. Egyptian officials' reassessment of their role in the peace process reflects a deep fear of economic uncertainties. They now realize that Egypt is unlikely to receive any peace dividend and that Israel's integration into regional Arab economies will come at the expense of their country. They have even resigned themselves to the likelihood that U.S. aid to Egypt will soon be reduced or cut entirely.

Egypt's leaders fear that Israel's integration into the Middle East will come at their expense.

The need to protect its national interests has prompted Cairo to confront Israel vigorously and to mobilize the Arab world against further normalization with the Jewish state. For now, Egypt has convinced the important Persian Gulf states to postpone establishing ties with Israel and to refuse to sign the NPT unless full peace is established in the region and Israel signs the nuclear treaty. The two regional summit meetings attended by Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the PLO in Cairo and Washington in February failed to resolve the fundamental political differences between Egypt and Israel. This crisis in relations threatens to unravel the peace process and pit the two states against each other in a new, destructive rivalry that might escalate out of control.

The Egyptian-Israeli rivalry would also worsen if the Israel-PLO agreement collapsed. Such an outcome would further erode Egypt's trust and confidence in the peace process, heightening the tensions between Cairo and Jerusalem. Mubarak has already warned Israel that failing to implement its agreement with the PLO will have dire repercussions for the entire Middle East peace process: "We will not only be back to point zero, but the situation will be even worse than before." The collapse of Oslo, Mubarak argues, would strengthen the

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region's extremists and weaken moderates like him. Egypt's leadership would be forced to bow to public sentiment not only by distancing itself from Israel, but by severing its political ties with the Jewish state. But Mubarak emphasizes that Egypt would not contemplate returning to the Egyptian-Israeli belligerence of the 1948-73 period. A more likely scenario would be escalation of the political confrontation between Egypt and Israel, plunging the region into another era of instability.

The United States has an enormous stake in the Cairo-Jerusalem axis; it has invested heavily in the two countries, making them by far the largest recipients of U.S. foreign aid. Israel and Egypt receive $3.2 billion and $2.1 billion, respectively, each year. Since 1979, Cairo has been a close ally of Washington—initiating the peace process, serving as an interpreter between Israel and the other Arabs, and legitimizing the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq. Although the Egyptians initially hoped to draw the United States into the arena, they have been disappointed by Washington's embrace of the Israeli position. U.S. interests lie in bridging the gap between its two friends by acting as an impartial mediator. Without formally endorsing either the Egyptian or Israeli vision of the new Middle East order, the Clinton administration needs to reassure Mubarak about its commitment to the economic development of Egypt and to show sensitivity to Egyptian concerns about nuclear weapons and the lack of political progress on the Palestinian and Syrian fronts. Alienating Cairo will irreparably damage the cause of peace in the region. Egypt holds the key to the Arab world. Without its consent and active participation, Arab-Israeli peace agreements will remain just so much ink on paper.

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Democratization and War

Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder

DANGERS OF TRANSITION

THE IDEA that democracies never fight wars against each other has become an axiom for many scholars. It is, as one scholar puts it, "as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations." This "law" is invoked by American statesmen to justify a foreign policy that encourages democratization abroad. In his 1994 State of the Union address, President Clinton asserted that no two democracies had ever gone to war with each other, thus explaining why promoting democracy abroad was a pillar of his foreign policy.

It is probably true that a world in which more countries were mature, stable democracies would be safer and preferable for the United States. But countries do not become mature democracies overnight. They usually go through a rocky transition, where mass politics mixes with authoritarian elite politics in a volatile way. Statistical evidence covering the past two centuries shows that in this transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war-prone, not less, and they do fight wars with democratic states. In fact, formerly authoritarian states where democratic participation is on the rise are more likely to fight wars than are sta-

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ble democracies or autocracies. States that make the biggest leap, from total autocracy to extensive mass democracy—like contemporary Russia—are about twice as likely to fight wars in the decade after democratization as are states that remain autocracies.

This historical pattern of democratization, belligerent nationalism, and war is already emerging in some of today's new or partial democracies, especially some formerly communist states. Two pairs of states—Serbia and Croatia, and Armenia and Azerbaijan—have found themselves at war while experimenting with varying degrees of electoral democracy. The electorate of Russia's partial democracy cast nearly a quarter of its votes for the party of radical nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Even mainstream Russian politicians have adopted an imperial tone in their dealings with neighboring former Soviet republics, and military force has been used ruthlessly in Chechnya.

The following evidence should raise questions about the Clinton administration's policy of promoting peace by promoting democratization. The expectation that the spread of democracy will probably contribute to peace in the long run, once new democracies mature, provides little comfort to those who might face a heightened risk of war in the short run. Pushing nuclear-armed great powers like Russia or China toward democratization is like spinning a roulette wheel: many of the outcomes are undesirable. Of course, in most cases the initial steps on the road to democratization will not be produced by any conscious policy of the United States. The roulette wheel is already spinning for Russia and perhaps will be soon for China. Washington and the international community need to think not so much about encouraging or discouraging democratization as about helping to smooth the transition in ways that minimize its risks.

THE EVIDENCE

OUR STATISTICAL analysis relies on the classifications of regimes and wars from 1811 to 1980 used by most scholars studying the peace among democracies. Starting with these standard data, we classify each state as a democracy, an autocracy, or a mixed regime—that is, a state with features of both democracies and autocracies. This classification

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is based on several criteria, including the constitutional constraints on the chief executive, the competitiveness of domestic politics, the openness of the process for selecting the chief executive, and the strength of the rules governing participation in politics. Democratizing states are those that made any regime change in a democratic direction—that is, from autocracy to democracy, from a mixed regime to democracy, or from autocracy to a mixed regime. We analyze wars between states as well as wars between a state and a nonstate group, such as liberation movements in colonies, but we do not include civil wars.[1]

REGIME CHANGE
(COMPOSITE INDEX)



Because we view democratization as a gradual process, rather than a sudden change, we test whether a transition toward democracy occurring over one, five, and ten years is associated with the subsequent onset of war. To assess the strength of the relationship between democratization and war, we construct a series of contingency tables. Based on those tables, we compare the probability that a democratizing state subsequently goes to war with the probabilities of war for states in transition toward autocracy and for states undergoing no regime change. The results of all of these tests show that *democratizing states were more likely to fight wars than were states that had undergone no change in regime.* This relationship is weakest one year into democratization and strongest at ten years. During any

[1] On the definition of war and the data on war used in this analysis, see Melvin Small and J. David Singer, *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980*, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982.

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

given ten-year period, a state experiencing no regime change had about one chance in six of fighting a war in the following decade. In the decade following democratization, a state's chance of fighting a war was about one in four. When we analyze the components of our measure of democratization separately, the results are similar. On average, an increase in the openness of the selection process for the chief executive doubled the likelihood of war. Increasing the competitiveness of political participation or increasing the constraints on a country's chief executive (both aspects of democratization) also made war more likely. On average, these changes increased the likelihood of war by about 90 percent and 35 percent respectively.

The statistical results are even more dramatic when we analyze cases in which the process of democratization culminated in very high levels of mass participation in politics. States changing from a

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

mixed regime to democracy were on average about 50 percent more likely to become engaged in war (and about two-thirds more likely to go to war with another nation-state) than states that remained mixed regimes.

The effect was greater still for those states making the largest leap, from full autocracy to high levels of democracy. Such states were on average about two-thirds more likely to become involved in any type of war (and about twice as likely to become involved in an interstate war) than states that remained autocracies. Though this evidence shows that democratization is dangerous, its reversal offers no easy solutions. On average, changes toward autocracy also yielded an increase in the probability of war, though a smaller one than changes toward democracy, compared to states experiencing no regime change.

NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRATIZATION

THE CONNECTION between democratization and nationalism is striking in both the historical record and today's headlines. We did not measure nationalism directly in our statistical tests. Nonetheless, historical and contemporary evidence strongly suggests that rising nationalism often goes hand in hand with rising democracy. It is no accident that the end of the Cold War brought both a wave of democratization and a revival of nationalist sentiment in the former communist states.

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CHANGE IN THE PROBABILITY OF INTERSTATE WAR FOR A STATE UNDERGOING DEMOCRATIZATION

(BASED ON THE RESULTS IN PREVIOUS GRAPHS)



In eighteenth-century Britain and France, when nationalism first emerged as an explicit political doctrine, it meant self-rule by the people. It was the rallying cry of commoners and rising commercial classes against rule by aristocratic elites, who were charged with the sin of ruling in their own interests, rather than those of the nation. Indeed, dynastic rulers and imperial courts had hardly been interested in promoting nationalism as a banner of solidarity in their realms. They typically ruled over a linguistically and culturally diverse conglomeration of subjects and claimed to govern by divine right, not in the interest of the nation. Often, these rulers were more closely tied by kinship, language, or culture to elites in other states than to their own subjects. The position of the communist ruling class was strikingly similar: a transnational elite that ruled over an amalgamation of peoples and claimed legitimacy from the communist party's role as the vanguard of history, not from the consent of the governed. Popular forces challenging either traditional dynastic rulers or communist elites naturally tended to combine demands for national self-determination and democratic rule.

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This concoction of nationalism and incipient democratization has been an intoxicating brew, leading in case after case to ill-conceived wars of expansion. The earliest instance remains one of the most dramatic. In the French Revolution, the radical Brissotin parliamentary faction polarized politics by harping on the king's slow response to the threat of war with other dynastic states. In the ensuing wars of the French Revolution, citizens flocked to join the revolutionary armies to defend popular self-rule and the French nation. Even after the revolution turned profoundly antidemocratic, Napoleon was able to harness this popular nationalism to the task of conquering Europe, substituting the popularity of empire for the substance of democratic rule.

After this experience, Europe's ruling elites decided to band together in 1815 in the Concert of Europe to contain the twin evils of nationalism and democratization. In this scheme, Europe's crowned heads tried to unite in squelching demands for constitutions, electoral and social democracy, and national self-determination. For a time nationalism and democratization were both held back, and Europe enjoyed a period of relative peace.

But in the long run, the strategy failed in the face of the economic changes strengthening popular forces in Western and Central Europe. British and French politicians soon saw that they would have to rule by co-opting nationalist and democratic demands, rather than suppressing them. Once the specter of revolution returned to Europe in 1848, this reversal of political tactics was complete, and it led quickly to the Crimean War. British Foreign Secretary Palmerston and French Emperor Napoleon III both tried to manage the clamor for a broader political arena by giving democrats what they wanted in foreign affairs—a "liberal" war to free imprisoned nations from autocratic rule and, incidentally, to expand commerce.

But this was just the dress rehearsal for history's most potent combination of mass politics and rising nationalism, which occurred in Germany around the turn of the twentieth century. Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, counting on the conservative votes of a docile peasantry, granted universal suffrage in the newly unified Reich after 1870, but in foreign and military affairs, he kept the elected Reichstag subordinate to the cabinet appointed by the kaiser. Like the sorcerer's apprentice,

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however, Bismarck underestimated the forces he was unleashing. With the rise of an industrial society, Bismarck's successors could not control this truncated democracy, where over 90 percent of the population voted. Everyone was highly politicized, yet nobody could achieve their aims through the limited powers of the Reichstag. As a result, people organized direct pressure groups outside of electoral party politics. Some of these clamored for economic benefits, but many of them found it tactically useful to cloak their narrow interests in a broader vision of the nation's interests. This mass nationalist sentiment exerted constant pressure on German diplomacy in the Wilhelmine years before 1914 and pushed its vacillating elites toward war.

Democratization and nationalism also became linked in Japan on the eve of the Manchurian invasion in 1931. During the 1920s Japan expanded its suffrage and experimented with two-party electoral competition, though a council of military elder statesmen still made the ultimate decisions about who would govern. These semi-elected governments of the 1920s supported free trade, favored naval arms control, and usually tried to rein in the Japanese army's schemes to undermine the Open Door policy in China. During the 1920s, Young Turks in the army developed a populist, nationalist doctrine featuring a centrally planned economy within an autarkic, industrialized, expanded empire, while scapegoating Japan's alleged internal and external enemies, including leftist workers, rich capitalists, liberals, democrats, Americans, and Russians. After the economic crash of the late 1920s, this nationalist formula became persuasive, and the Japanese military had little trouble gaining popular support for imperial expansion and the emasculation of democracy. As in so many previous cases, nationalism proved to be a way for militarist elite groups to appear populist in a democratizing society while obstructing the advance to full democracy.

The interconnection among nationalism, democratization, and war is even clearer in new states. In today's "Weimar Russia," voters disgruntled by economic distress backed belligerent nationalists like Zhirinovsky, put ostensible liberals like President Boris Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev on the defensive on ethnic and foreign policy issues, and contributed to the climate that led to war

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in Chechnya. In "Wilhelmine Serbia," the political and military elites of the old regime, facing inexorable pressure for democratization, cynically but successfully created a new basis for legitimacy through nationalist propaganda and military action, and they recently won elections that were only partially manipulated. Until its recent decree suspending the activities of the main opposition party, Armenia had moved quite far toward full democracy while at the same time supporting an invasion of its ethnic foes in Azerbaijan. The Azeris have been less successful in sustaining momentum toward democracy. However, in Azerbaijan's one relatively free and fair presidential election, the winner, Abulfaz Ali Elchibey, attacked the incumbent for being insufficiently nationalist and populist. Elchibey's platform emphasized Turkic identity and the strengthening of the Azeri nation-state to try to mount a counteroffensive against the Armenians. In other ethnically divided societies, where holding an election is like taking a census, democratization has often become an opportunity to exercise the tyranny of the majority.

THE SORCERER'S APPRENTICE

ALTHOUGH DEMOCRATIZATION in many cases leads to war, that does not mean that the average voter wants war. Public opinion in democratizing states often starts off highly averse to the costs and risks of war. In that sense, the public opinion polls taken in Russia in early 1994 were typical. Respondents said, for example, that Russian policy should make sure the rights of Russians in neighboring states were not infringed, but not at the cost of military intervention. Public opinion often becomes more belligerent, however, as a result of propaganda and military action presented as faits accomplis by elites. This mass opinion, once aroused, may no longer be controllable.

For example, Napoleon III successfully exploited the domestic prestige from France's share of the victory in the Crimean War to consolidate his rule, despite the popular reluctance and war-weariness that had accompanied the war. Having learned this lesson well, Napoleon tried this tactic again in 1859. On the eve of his military intervention in the Italian struggle with Austria, he admitted to his ministers that

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"on the domestic front, the war will at first awaken great fears; traders and speculators of every stripe will shriek, but national sentiment will [banish] this domestic fright; the nation will be put to the test once more in a struggle that will stir many a heart, recall the memory of heroic times, and bring together under the mantle of glory the parties that are steadily drifting away from one another day after day."[2] Napoleon was trying not just to follow opinion but to make public opinion bellicose, in order to stir a national feeling that would enhance the state's ability to govern a split and stalemated political arena.

Much the same has happened in contemporary Serbia. Despite the memories of Ustashe atrocities in World War II, intermarriage rates between Croats and Serbs living in Croatia were as high as one in three during the 1980s. Opinion has been bellicized by propaganda campaigns in state-controlled media that, for example, carried purely invented reports of rapes of Serbian women in Kosovo, and even more so by the fait accompli of launching the war itself.

In short, democratizing states are war-prone not because war is popular with the mass public, but because domestic pressures create incentives for elites to drum up nationalist sentiment.

THE CAUSES OF DEMOCRATIC WARS

DEMOCRATIZATION typically creates a syndrome of weak central authority, unstable domestic coalitions, and high-energy mass politics. It brings new social groups and classes onto the political stage. Political leaders, finding no way to reconcile incompatible interests, resort to shortsighted bargains or reckless gambles in order to maintain their governing coalitions. Elites need to gain mass allies to defend their weakened positions. Both the newly ambitious elites and the embattled old ruling groups often use appeals to nationalism to stay astride their unmanageable political coalitions.

Needing public support, they rouse the masses with nationalist propaganda but find that their mass allies, once mobilized by pas-

[2] Alain Plessis, *The Rise and Fall of the Second Empire, 1852-1871*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 146-47.

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sionate appeals, are difficult to control. So are the powerful remnants of the old order—the military, for example—which promote militarism because it strengthens them institutionally. This is particularly true because democratization weakens the central government's ability to keep policy coherent and consistent. Governing a society that is democratizing is like driving a car while throwing away the steering wheel, stepping on the gas, and fighting over which passenger will be in the driver's seat. The result, often, is war.

Political stalemate and imperialist coalitions. Democratization creates a wider spectrum of politically significant groups with diverse and incompatible interests. In the period when the great powers were first democratizing, kings, aristocrats, peasants, and artisans shared the historical stage with industrialists, an urban working class, and a middle-class intelligentsia. Similarly, in the post-communist world, former party apparatchiks, atavistic heavy industrialists, and downwardly mobile military officers share the stage with populist demagogues, free-market entrepreneurs, disgruntled workers, and newly mobilized ethnic groups. In principle, mature democratic institutions can integrate even the widest spectrum of interests through competition for the favor of the average voter. But where political parties and representative institutions are still in their infancy, the diversity of interests may make political coalitions difficult to maintain. Often the solution is a belligerent nationalist coalition.

In Britain during the period leading up to the Crimean War, neither the Whigs nor Tories could form a lasting governing coalition because so many groups refused to enter stable political alliances. None of the old elites would coalesce with the parliamentary bloc of radicals elected by urban middle-class and Irish voters. Moreover, protectionist Tories would not unite with free-trading Whigs and Peelite Tories. The social and political mid-Victorian equipoise between traditional and modern Britain created a temporary political stalemate. Lord Palmerston's pseudo-liberal imperialism turned out to be the only successful formula for creating a durable ruling coalition during this transitional period of democratization.

The stalemate in Wilhelmine-era electoral politics was even more serious. In principle, coalitions of the left and right might have formed

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a two-party system to vie for the favor of the average voter, thus moderating policy. In fact, both left and right were too internally divided to mount effective coalitions with internally consistent policies. Progressives dreamed of a bloc extending "from Bassermann to Bebel," from the liberal-democratic middle classes through the Marxist working classes, but the differences between labor and capital chronically barred this development. Conservatives had more success in forging a "marriage of iron and rye," but fundamental differences between military-feudal Junkers and Ruhr industrialists over issues ranging from the distribution of tax burdens to military strategy made their policies incoherent. Germany wound up with plans for a big army and a costly navy, and nobody willing to pay for it.

In more recent times, incipient democratization has likewise caused political impasses by widening the political spectrum to include too many irreconcilable political forces. In the final days of Yugoslavia, efforts by moderates like former Prime Minister Ante Marković to promote a federalist, democratic, economic reformist platform were hindered not only by ethnic divisions but also by the cleavage between market-oriented business interests on the one hand and party bosses and military officers on the other. Similarly, in Russia, the difficulty of reconciling liberal, neo-communist, and nationalist political platforms and the social interests behind them has led to parliamentary stalemate, attempts to break the stalemate by presidential decree, tanks in the streets, and the resort to freelancing by breakaway regions, the military, and spontaneous privatizers of state property. One interpretation of Yeltsin's decision to use force in Chechnya is that he felt it necessary to show that he could act decisively to prevent the unraveling of central authority, with respect not only to ethnic separatists but also to other ungovernable groups in a democratizing society. Chechnya, it was hoped, would allow Yeltsin to demonstrate his ability to coerce Russian society while at the same time exploiting a potentially popular nationalist issue.

Inflexible interests and short time horizons. Groups threatened by social change and democratization, including still-powerful elites, are often compelled to take an inflexible view of their interests, especially when their assets cannot be readily adapted to changing polit-

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ical and economic conditions. In extreme cases, there may be only one solution that will maintain the social position of the group. For Prussian landowners, it was agricultural protection in a nondemocratic state; for the Japanese military, it was organizational autonomy in an autarkic empire; for the Serbian military and party elites, it was a Serbian nationalist state. Since military bureaucracies and imperial interest groups occupied key positions in many authoritarian great powers, whether monarchal or communist, most interests threatened by democratization have been bound up with military programs and the state's international mission. Compromises that may lead down the slippery slope to social extinction or irrelevance have little appeal to such groups. This adds to the difficulty of finding an exit from the domestic political impasse and may make powerful domestic groups impervious to the international risks of their strategies.

Competing for popular support. The trouble intensifies when elites in a democratizing society try to recruit mass allies to their cause. Threatened elite groups have an overwhelming incentive to mobilize mass backers on the elites' terms, using whatever special resources they might retain. These resources have included monopolies of information (the Wilhelmine navy's unique "expertise" in making strategic assessments), propaganda assets (the Japanese army's public relations blitz justifying the invasion of Manchuria), patronage (Lord Palmerston's gifts of foreign service postings to the sons of cooperative journalists), wealth (the Krupp steel company's bankrolling of mass nationalist and militarist leagues), organizational skills and networks (the Japanese army's exploitation of rural reservist organizations to build a social base), and the ability to use the control of traditional political institutions to shape the political agenda and structure the terms of political bargains (the Wilhelmine ruling elite's agreement to eliminate anti-Catholic legislation in exchange for Catholic support in the Reichstag on the naval budget).

This elite mobilization of mass groups takes place in a highly competitive setting. Elite groups mobilize mass support to neutralize mass threats (for instance, creating patriotic leagues to counter workers' movements) and counter other elite groups' successful efforts at mass mobilization (such as the German Navy League, a political

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counterweight to the Junker-backed Agrarian League). The elites' resources allow them to influence the direction of mass political participation, but the imperative to compete for mass favor makes it difficult for a single elite group to control the outcome of this process. For example, mass groups that gain access to politics through elite-supported nationalist organizations often try to outbid their erstwhile sponsors. By 1911, German popular nationalist lobbies were in a position to claim that if Germany's foreign foes were really as threatening as the ruling elites had portrayed them, then the government had sold out German interests in reaching a compromise with France over the Moroccan dispute. In this way, elite mobilization of the masses adds to the ungovernability and political impasse of democratizing states.

Ideology takes on particular significance in the competition for mass support. New entrants to the political process, lacking established habits and good information, may be uncertain where their political interests lie. Ideology can yield big payoffs, particularly when there is no efficient free marketplace of ideas to counter false claims with reliable facts. Elites try out all sorts of ideological appeals depending on the social position they are defending, the nature of the mass group they want to recruit, and the kinds of appeals that seem politically plausible. A nearly universal element of these ideological appeals, however, is nationalism, which has the advantage of positing a community of interest uniting elites and masses. This distracts attention from class cleavages that divide elites from the masses they are trying to recruit.

The weakening of central authority. The political impasse and recklessness of democratizing states is deepened by the weakening of the state's authority. The autocrat can no longer dictate to elite interest groups or mass groups. Meanwhile, democratic institutions lack the strength to integrate these contending interests and views. Parties are weak and lack mass loyalty. Elections are rigged or intermittent. Institutions of public political participation are distrusted because they are subject to manipulation by elites and arbitrary constraints imposed by the state, which fears the outcome of unfettered competition.

Among the great powers, the problem was not excessive authoritarian power at the center, but the opposite. The Aberdeen coalition

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that brought Britain into the Crimean War was a makeshift cabinet headed by a weak leader with no substantial constituency. Likewise, on the eve of the Franco-Prussian War, Napoleon III's regime was in the process of caving in to its liberal opponents, who dominated the parliament elected in 1869. As Europe's armies prepared to hurtle from their starting gates in July 1914, Austrian leaders, perplexed by the contradictions between the German chancellor's policy and that of the German military, asked, "Who rules in Berlin?" Similarly, the 1931 Manchurian incident was a fait accompli by the local Japanese military; Tokyo was not even informed. The return to imperial thinking in Moscow today is the result of Yeltsin's weakness, not his strength. As the well-informed Moscow analyst Sergei Karaganov recently argued, the breakdown of the Leninist state "has created an environment where elite interests influence [foreign] policy directly."[3]

In each of these cases, the weak central leadership resorts to the same strategies as do the more parochial elite interests, using nationalist ideological appeals and special-interest payoffs to maintain their short-run viability, despite the long-run risks that these strategies may unleash.

Prestige strategies. One of the simplest but riskiest strategies for a hard-pressed regime in a democratizing country is to shore up its prestige at home by seeking victories abroad. During the Chechen intervention, newspaper commentators in Moscow and the West were reminded of Russian Interior Minister Viacheslav Plehve's fateful remark in 1904, on the eve of the disastrous Russo-Japanese War, that what the tsar needed was "a short, victorious war" to boost his prestige. Though this strategy often backfires, it is a perennial temptation as a means for coping with the political strains of democratization. German Chancellor Johannes Miquel, who revitalized the imperialist-protectionist "coalition of iron and rye" at the turn of the century, told his colleagues that "successes in foreign policy would make a good impression in the Reichstag debates, and political divisions would thus be moderated."[4] The targets of such strate-

[3] Karaganov, "Russia's Elites," in Robert Blackwill and Sergei Karaganov, *Damage Limitation*, Washington: Brassey's, 1994, p. 42.

[4] J. C. G. Rohl, *Germany without Bismarck*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, p. 250.

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gies often share this analysis. Richard Cobden, for example, argued that military victories abroad would confer enough prestige on the military-feudal landed elite to allow them to raise food tariffs and snuff out democracy: "Let John Bull have a great military triumph, and we shall have to take off our hats as we pass the Horse Guards for the rest of our lives."[5]

Prestige strategies make the country vulnerable to slights to its reputation. Napoleon III, for example, was easily goaded into a fateful declaration of war in 1870 by Bismarck's insulting editorial work on a leaked telegram from the kaiser. For those who want to avoid such diplomatic provocations, the lesson is to make sure that compromises forced on the leaders of democratizing states do not take away the fig leaves needed to sustain their domestic prestige.

MANAGING THE DANGERS

THOUGH MATURE democratic states have virtually never fought wars against each other, promoting democracy may not promote peace because states are especially war-prone during the transition toward democracy. This does not mean, however, that democratization should be squelched in the interests of peace. Many states are now democratizing or on the verge of it, and stemming that turbulent tide, even if it were desirable, may not be possible. Our statistical tests show that movements toward autocracy, including reversals of democratization, are only somewhat less likely to result in war than democratization itself. Consequently, the task is to draw on an understanding of the process of democratization to keep its unwanted side effects to a minimum.

Of course, democratization does not always lead to extreme forms of aggressive nationalism, just as it does not always lead to war. But it makes those outcomes more likely. Cases where states democratized without triggering a nationalist mobilization are particularly interesting, since they may hold clues about how to pre-

[5] Letter to John Bright, October 1, 1854, quoted in John Morley, *The Life of Richard Cobden*, abridged ed., London: Thomas Nelson, pp. 311-12.

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vent such unwanted side effects. Among the great powers, the obvious successes were the democratization of Germany and Japan after 1945, due to occupation by liberal democracies and the favorable international setting provided by the Marshall Plan, the Bretton Woods economic system, and the democratic military alliance against the Soviet threat. More recently, numerous Latin American states have democratized without nationalism or war. The recent border skirmishes between Peru and Ecuador, however, coincide with democratizing trends in both states and a nationalist turn in Ecuadorian political discourse. Moreover, all three previous wars between that pair over the past two centuries occurred in periods of partial democratization.

In such cases, however, the cure is probably more democracy, not less. In "Wilhelmine Argentina," the Falkland Islands/Malvinas War came when the military junta needed a nationalist victory to stave off pressure for the return of democracy; the arrival of full democracy has produced more pacific policies. Among the East European states, nationalist politics has been unsuccessful in the most fully democratic ones—Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary—as protest votes have gone to former communists. Nationalism has figured more prominently in the politics of the less democratic formerly communist states that are nonetheless partially democratizing. States like Turkmenistan that remain outright autocracies have no nationalist mobilization—indeed no political mobilization of any kind. In those recent cases, in contrast to some of our statistical results, the rule seems to be: go fully democratic, or don't go at all.

In any given case, other factors may override the relative bellicosity of democratizing states. These might include the power of the democratizing state, the strength of the potential deterrent coalition of states constraining it, the attractiveness of more peaceful options available to the democratizing state, and the nature of the groups making up its ruling coalition. What is needed is to identify the conditions that lead to relatively peaceful democratization and try to create those circumstances.

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Latin America is that the process goes most smoothly when elites threatened by the transition—especially the military—are given a golden parachute. Above all, they need a guarantee that they will not wind up in jail if they relinquish power. The history of the democratizing great powers broadens this insight. Democratization was least likely to lead to war when the old elites saw a reasonably bright future for themselves in the new social order. British aristocrats, for example, had more of their wealth invested in commerce and industry than in agriculture, so they had many interests in common with the rising middle classes. They could face democratization with relative equanimity. In contrast, Prussia's capital-starved, small-scale Junker landholders had no choice but to rely on agricultural protection and military careers.

In today's context, finding benign, productive employment for the erstwhile communist nomenklatura, military officer corps, nuclear scientists, and smokestack industrialists ought to rank high on the list of priorities. Policies aimed at giving them a stake in the privatization process and subsidizing the conversion of their skills to new, peaceful tasks in a market economy seem like a step in the right direction. According to some interpretations, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev was eager to use force to solve the Chechen confrontation in order to show that Russian military power was still useful and that increased investment in the Russian army would pay big dividends. Instead of pursuing this reckless path, the Russian military elite needs to be convinced that its prestige, housing, pensions, and technical competence will improve if and only if it transforms itself into a Western-style military, subordinate to civilian authority and resorting to force only in accordance with prevailing international norms. Not only do old elites need to be kept happy, they also need to be kept weak. Pacts should not prop up the remnants of the authoritarian system, but rather create a niche for them in the new system.

Another top priority must be creating a free, competitive, and responsible marketplace of ideas in the newly democratizing states. Most of the war-prone democratizing great powers had pluralistic public debates, but the debates were skewed to favor groups with

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money, privileged access to the media, and proprietary control over information ranging from archives to intelligence about the military balance. Pluralism is not enough. Without a level playing field, pluralism simply creates the incentive and opportunity for privileged groups to propound self-serving myths, which historically have often taken a nationalist turn. One of the rays of hope in the Chechen affair was the alacrity with which Russian journalists exposed the costs of the fighting and the lies of the government and the military. Though elites should get a golden parachute regarding their pecuniary interests, they should be given no quarter on the battlefield of ideas. Mythmaking should be held up to the utmost scrutiny by aggressive journalists who maintain their credibility by scrupulously distinguishing fact from opinion and tirelessly verifying their sources. Promoting this kind of journalistic infrastructure is probably the most highly leveraged investment the West can make in a peaceful democratic transition.

Finally, the kind of ruling coalition that emerges in the course of democratization depends a great deal on the incentives created by the international environment. Both Germany and Japan started on the path toward liberal, stable democratization in the mid-1920s, encouraged by abundant opportunities for trade with and investment by the advanced democracies and by credible security treaties that defused nationalist scaremongering in domestic politics. When the international supports for free trade and democracy were yanked out in the late 1920s, their liberal coalitions collapsed. For China, whose democratization may occur in the context of expanding economic ties with the West, a steady Western commercial partnership and security presence is likely to play a major role in shaping the incentives of proto-democratic coalition politics.

In the long run, the enlargement of the zone of stable democracy will probably enhance prospects for peace. In the short run, much work remains to be done to minimize the dangers of the turbulent transition.

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Heading Off War in the Southern Balkans

Misha Glenny

BOSNIA AND MACEDONIA: TWINS

In the month prior to late June 1991, when war engulfed the former Yugoslavia, the presidents of two constituent republics, Alija Izetbegović of Bosnia and Kiro Gligorov of Macedonia, spared no effort trying to close the widening chasm between Serbia and Croatia. Both men understood that in the event of armed conflict their republics could be the bloodiest theaters of war. Bosnia was especially threatened because it formed a wedge between Serbs and Croats as they attempted to establish the borders of their new nation-states by force.

Macedonia, so far, has escaped the horrors that its twin, Bosnia, has suffered. Yet if war continues in the northern Balkans, a gradual destabilization of Macedonia is almost certain to magnify the threat to its existence and to the wider security of the southern Balkan region. Even with relative peace in the northern Balkans, the tensions between ethnic Albanians and Macedonians make for a fragile state.

The political problems facing Macedonia are remarkably similar to those that destroyed Bosnia. Throughout the Cold War, both republics depended on the Yugoslav federation to ward off the territorial claims of their more powerful neighbors. The majority populations of Bosnia and Macedonia are relative newcomers to the Balkan drama. The Muslim and Slavic Macedonians have assumed

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the character of a modern nation only since 1945, partly due to a gradual historical maturation and partly due to Marshal Josip Tito, the former Yugoslav dictator, who encouraged Macedonian development to dilute the influence of Serbs and Croats in Yugoslavia. Macedonians are no longer satisfied to be cast as extras, the role allotted them during World War II. This time they have claimed center stage by asserting the right to form the core of two new nation-states in the Balkans. This makes the current conflict more complicated than its predecessor of 1941-45.

But the chief similarity lies in the two nations' strategic importance for the region. Dominance of Bosnia is the key to control of the Adriatic coast. Macedonia is the only territory where the Balkan mountains can be traversed from north to south, from Belgrade to Thessaloníki, and west to east, from Durres to Istanbul. Consequently, these two territories have repeatedly suffered as the main theaters of war when European turmoil has thrown the constitutional order of the Balkan region into question. Their geostrategic importance is paramount.

In modern times, Bosnia and Macedonia have always required the protection of an external power to survive, be it the Austro-Hungarians, the Ottomans, or a federal Yugoslavia. Without such guarantees both republics have had to rely on the goodwill of their minority populations for stability and security: the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia, the Albanians in Macedonia. If that goodwill is withdrawn—as happened in Bosnia in 1992—the republic is finished.

Macedonia is now heading down the same path as Bosnia. Although ethnic Albanians do not have nearly the Serbs' and Croats' military power, Macedonia is even less well-equipped to defend itself than Bosnia was.

STUMBLING IN THE NORTH BALKANS

IGNORANCE OF this political reality has led to grave mistakes by international actors in the ongoing drama among Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats. A glaring example has been the Clinton administration's Bosnia policy, which has been ridiculed comprehensively by both

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opponents and supporters of the Bosnian government. The Bosnian government in Sarajevo feels betrayed because Washington's rhetoric in favor of a unified Bosnia was never backed by force. One should either wage war on behalf of the Bosnian government or clearly state that one has no intention of doing so. Washington's great mistake was that it did neither: it held out the prospect of intervention if the Bosnian government's position continued to deteriorate, then did nothing when it came to the crunch.

Clinton's pusillanimity, however, did not endear him to others. The Serbs perceive the Americans as chiefly responsible for the hardships created by U.N. sanctions (even though the sanctions were, of course, approved by all five permanent members of the Security Council). In addition, they believe that the demonization of the Serbs was designed in Germany and manufactured in the United States. The Russians have been alarmed by Clinton's apparent willingness to consider NATO air attacks without consulting them, in a region where Russia believes it has vital interests. The Europeans have been exasperated by Washington's vacillation, provoking one senior official involved in the mediation of the Yugoslav wars to tell the Americans "to piss or get off the pot." Indeed, U.S. presidential hopeful Senator Robert Dole's decision to introduce legislation calling for the lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia was probably motivated more by the Senate majority leader's wish to embarrass the president at his weakest foreign policy point than by an overwhelming commitment to restoring peace in the northern Balkans.

Clinton held out the prospect of intervention to Bosnia, but did nothing in the crunch.

Some sympathy must be extended to the White House and State Department. In the 1992 presidential campaign, Clinton seized on the public disgust provoked by television coverage of the detention camps run by the Bosnian Serbs. Holding this banner of moral outrage aloft when he assumed office, he remained unaware that it was an insufficient weapon with which to attack the politically complex collapse of the Yugoslav federation. Moreover, the range and depth of foreign policy problems confronting the new Democratic admin-

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istration were far greater than those facing President Bush, even in his last two years in office.

The core problem was the administration's inability to identify any U.S. interests in Croatia and Bosnia. Initially policy was guided purely by an emotional response to Serbian atrocities. However, the more deeply the United States became involved, the more this moral position was muddied by security implications. The conflict in the northern Balkans involves two key relationships—one with Russia, the other with Turkey—that America must redefine following the collapse of communism. In the case of Bosnia, Washington was unable to satisfy Turkish demands without alienating the Russians and vice versa, and this contributed to wild zigzags in policy.

The growing catalogue of failures, however, did not deter the United States from stepping up its interest and diplomatic activity in the area. Vice President Gore became the chief sponsor of the Washington accords, signed in March 1994, which envisaged a federation of Bosnia's Muslims and Croats and a confederation of this new Bosnian entity and Croatia. Following the Washington accords, the Croatian government agreed to lease part of the Adri-

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atic island of Brač to the U.S. military, which established an intelligence-gathering center there.

The accords further increased the influence of Peter Galbraith, the U.S. ambassador to Zagreb, who became the key architect of a plan to reintegrate the rebel areas now controlled by separatist Croatian Serbs into Croatia proper. The plan would give the half million Croatian Serbs far more political autonomy than they held before the war in exchange for the reintegration of the territories they now hold—roughly 27 percent of the prewar nation. Throughout 1994, many commentators considered Galbraith's statements on domestic Croatian politics as authoritative as those of President Franjo Tudjman. Despite universal criticism, the White House clearly had no intention of running away from Balkan politics with its tail between its legs.

U.S. COMPETENCE IN THE SOUTH BALKANS

IF THE Bosnian and Croatian policies of the United States have been such a failure, how is it that the American approach to the delicate web restraining conflict in the southern Balkans has been so mature? It has been particularly impressive compared with the clownish efforts of the European Union (EU).

A breakdown in relations between Macedonia's Slav majority and Albanian minority would provoke an internal collapse. In such an event, three of Macedonia's neighbors (Albania, Serbia, and Bulgaria), if not more, would be forced to consider filling the resultant power vacuum. If war reaches Macedonia, it will no longer matter whether a solution to the Bosnian and Croatian wars can be found—a whole new series of conflicts, distinct from the northern Balkans except in their common origin, would begin.

Two axes are emerging, one dressed in the garb of Eastern Orthodoxy, one veiled in Islamic raiment. These axes run roughly along the geopolitical lines that divide Macedonia. Bulgaria plays a maverick role, entrenched in the Eastern Orthodox camp but historically at odds with both Greece and Serbia over a number of issues. Macedonia is isolated and caught between a unilateral commercial blockade

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by Greece, which has made fuel and raw materials scarce, and the U.N. sanctions against the rump Yugoslavia, which have deprived Macedonia of its major trading partner. Nevertheless, its very existence as a multinational state prevents the hardening of the two axes. If a war were fought over its territory, it is likely that the conflict would quickly assume some characteristics of an ethnic and religious war such as Bosnia's. This implies an ever-greater struggle for influence between the Belgrade/Athens axis and the Albanian/Turkish alliance.

The spillover of this struggle into the Aegean Sea would be most disturbing. Such a conflict would be much more disruptive to the immediate interests of the United States than the Bosnian war has been. In particular, it would threaten American lines of communication with the Middle East. The EU has never been as concerned as the United States with the strategic importance of the southern Balkans and the Aegean Sea. But the EU does have a special responsibility in the region because Greece is a member state.

If Macedonia implodes, resolving war in Bosnia and Croatia will no longer matter much.

The disputes between Greece and three of its neighbors—Macedonia, Albania, and Turkey—highlight the extreme difficulties the EU faces in establishing a common foreign and security policy. Greece has used a variety of reasons to justify its persistent obstructionism. Athens has blocked an EU aid package to Albania (although it relented late last year), resisted Turkey's bid to enter a customs union with the EU (this too has been overcome), and imposed a blockade on Macedonia. Greece has asserted that use of the name "Macedonia" by the former Yugoslav republic implied a claim on the neighboring Greek province of Macedonia. It also objected to Macedonia's use of a Hellenic symbol, the Star of Vergina, which consists of 16 rays surrounding a sunlike disk. It was the emblem of Alexander the Great's dynasty in the fourth century B.C.; Alexander was an ancient Makedon (who bear no relation to the Slav Macedonians of today) whose dominion included Greece. Western diplomats and U.N. officials stationed in Macedonia argue that the blockade worsens the economic difficulties the landlocked state faces. This in turn,

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they say, undermines relations between Albania and Macedonia, the cornerstone of the latter's stability.

Legally challenged by the EU, Athens justified its actions by claiming that Macedonia was a national security threat. This was a ludicrous argument, but legally the only one that Greece could use to override Maastricht treaty trade statutes. The remaining 11 EU members oppose Greece's regional policy, but they can do nothing about it, and the blockade remains in effect. Public admonishments and mediation efforts have only raised anti-EU sentiment in Greece.

While Greece's stance on Macedonia is self-defeating and presented in an infuriatingly emotional manner, the EU's inability to conduct subtle and effective diplomacy in a region where major armed conflict remains a distinct possibility is disturbing. The contrast is stark between the chaotic, failed diplomacy of the EU and the subtle, if sometimes opaque, American strategy. U.S. policy in the southern Balkans generally suffers from agency overkill. The White House, the State and Defense Departments, and the local embassies are all running apparently separate programs that seem to be heading generally in the same direction but often along different paths. In addition, there have been sharp differences of interpretation among the U.S. diplomatic missions in Belgrade, Zagreb, Sarajevo, Skopje, Sofia, Tirana, Athens, and Ankara.

TURKEY'S SHIFTING SIGNIFICANCE

THE STRENGTHENING of American influence in the southern Balkans began after Bulgaria's revolution of 1989, after which the United States intensified its interest in Bulgarian domestic politics. Following communism's collapse in Albania, the United States again invested an inordinate amount of diplomatic capital in a relatively obscure Balkan state, a move that slowly eroded the political influence of Italy and Greece and the military influence of France and Britain. As Albania's ties with the United States have become closer, so has its relationship with Ankara.

The American fascination with picaresque and slightly wacky Balkan bit players was due partly to the shift in Turkey's geostrategic

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significance after 1989 and partly to a misinterpretation of the Yugoslavian conflict that has been adjusted somewhat since Richard Holbrooke's appointment as assistant U.S. secretary of state. Until 1989, Turkey was important mainly for its role as the most southeasterly bulwark against Soviet access to the Mediterranean Sea and as the only large secular democracy with an overwhelmingly Muslim population. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey's role has changed. It has competed energetically but largely in vain with Russia for influence in the Caucasus and former Soviet Central Asia. Despite this failure, its voice is not disregarded, especially in complex matters like the route of the proposed pipeline that would transport oil from Azerbaijan to the West.

The U.S. viewed the Balkans as a problem of blood lust, rather than of territorial expansion.

The United States considers Turkey vital to blocking Iranian and Iraqi influence in the region. It served as a base for U.N. operations inside northern Iraq while fighting a vicious war against its own Kurdish population in the southeast of the country. The value of Turkish support for the Middle East peace process would immediately become evident if it were withdrawn. In the Balkans, Turkey's troops are participating in authorized peacekeeping, and Turkey's diplomats, together with the Americans, are attempting to soothe the bitter relationship between Bosnia and Croatia. Turkey has also committed to supplying Albania with weaponry and other military supplies should Albania find itself at war with Serbia over Kosovo.

Dramatic changes in Europe have had a profound impact on domestic Turkish politics. Failed economic stabilization policies, particularly of the current Çiller government, have fueled the electoral successes of the Islamic Welfare Party. But disaffection with traditional secular politics has been strengthened by a widespread perception that the wars in Bosnia and Chechnya are Christian crusades against helpless Muslim populations (and that the West is standing by and letting them happen). Although less radical than other political movements, such as Iran's clerics, Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front, and Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, Turkey's Wel-

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fare Party could jeopardize American interests in the region were it to become the leading force in Turkish politics.

The United States' increased interest in the southern Balkans was prompted primarily by its concern about Turkey. However, during the Bush administration and the first half of President Clinton's term, there were indications that the policy was also informed by a desire to isolate Serbia. During that time U.S. policymakers appeared to believe that the spark that could light a wider Balkan war was not Macedonia but Kosovo. This was due in part to the misperception that irrational blood lust rather than calculated territorial expansion was the cause of the Balkan conflict. Warnings issued by both Bush and Clinton to the Serbian government not to stir up trouble in Kosovo were redundant. Serbian President Slobodan Milošević had no intention of opening up a southern front of military conflict on territory that the Serbs already controlled. The U.S. stress on Kosovo was due in part to the pronounced Albanophilia and Serbophobia within State Department ranks.

American attention first focused on the fragility of Macedonia and the ambiguous Albanian role there in early 1994, when Albania's state-controlled media began supporting radicals in the Albanian community of western Macedonia. These radicals wanted no participation by the ethnic Albanians' Democratic Prosperity Party in Macedonia's governing coalition. Understanding the incendiary potential of polarization, American officials warned against meddling, and Albanian President Sali Berisha did as he was told and snuggled back up to his benefactors. Since this incident, American policy has shifted away from the issue of Kosovo and toward four more likely flash points: Albanian-Greek relations, the Macedonian question, and the two Turkish-Greek disputes, over the Aegean and over Cyprus.

A DELICATE BALANCING ACT

AMERICAN DIPLOMATS are working hard to reverse the growing polarization of Greek and Turkish positions and to keep those tension from exacerbating the Aegean and Cyprus disputes. One senior

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U.S. official in Washington explained that "in order to keep Turkey happy, we have become involved in a delicate balancing act in the southern Balkans. If you appear to favor Turkey too much, Greece becomes nervous and so you need to find a way to calm Athens."

The U.S. State Department has put the juggling act required in the region into the capable hands of three envoys. In negotiating with Greece and Macedonia, Matthew Nimetz has exhibited patience, skill, and an ability to gain both parties' trust, but has yet to overcome the diplomatic gulf between the two and achieve a lifting of the Greek blockade of Macedonia. Richard Shifter sought to broker a normalization of Greek-Albanian relations, and America's overall diplomacy has now borne real fruit. Fresh mediation between Greece and Turkey by U.S. special representative Richard Beattie on the divisive Cyprus issue is just getting under way. President Clinton has supported his envoys with letters to the region's political leaders and given special attention to the war-threatening controversy between Greece and Turkey over Greek territorial claims in the Aegean Sea. He has sent letters to the prime ministers of both countries and dispatched a U.S. battle cruiser to the scene.

Operating largely outside the auspices of NATO, the U.S. Defense Department has stationed two spy planes in northern Albania to monitor troop movements in Bosnia and Serbia. In addition, it has deployed 500 marines in Macedonia, who operate largely on orders from Washington, not from the U.N. peacekeeping mission of which they are theoretically a part. More recently, Clinton has lifted the arms embargo on Romania, Albania, and Bulgaria and promised increased military cooperation between Macedonia and the United States.

This activity may not yet amount to a coherent military strategy for the southern Balkans, but it cannot be entirely haphazard. In the minds of government officials of the southern Balkan region, it makes sense. From Belgrade to Ankara, they are convinced that the United States has a grand regional design. Although each government has a different interpretation, they all exaggerate the importance of even the most innocent American move, increasing expectations of and alarm over American policy.

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A MATTER OF URGENCY

THE UNITED STATES is still unsure how to deal with the most likely cause of instability in the region—relations between ethnic Albanians and Macedonians inside Macedonia. There are now strong indications that Washington understands this to be a matter of some urgency. Since the elections in Macedonia last October, ethnic Albanians and Macedonians have clashed over the former's attempt to establish an Albanian-language university in Tetovo, the center of Albanian politics in Macedonia. In January, the leading moderate in the PDP, Abdurahman Aliti, warned in an interview that his party might walk out of both the governing coalition and the parliament in Skopje as a possible prelude to establishing an Albanian assembly in Tetovo. In early February, fears of a breakdown were confirmed when Haliti resigned as vice chairman of parliament over a dispute about the use of identification cards in Macedonia.

Unfortunately, the U.S. mission in Skopje is very weak and has contributed little to attempts at settling the university dispute. If the United States is unable to bring the two sides together and reduce the growing tension in Macedonia, much of its good diplomatic work in the area will have been wasted.

American policy in the region is not borne of altruism but of a clear understanding of Washington's interests. The southern Balkans region remains exceptionally unstable, and its myriad conflicts are probably more than one foreign service can cope with, especially while more pressing catastrophes are nearby. One reason the U.S. State Department has sought to dissuade Croatia from expelling U.N. peacekeepers there is that a massive escalation of fighting in Croatia and Bosnia, which most international agencies fear would result, would further threaten Macedonia's stability. Nonetheless, the United States has done more in the southern Balkans than anybody else and is to be congratulated for its perspicacity. This has been a quiet, if crucially unfinished, triumph for which the Clinton administration deserves due credit.

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Toward Post-Heroic Warfare

Edward N. Luttwak

THE OBSOLESCENCE OF TOTAL WAR

ONLY ONE thing could possibly link the protracted warfare in the former Yugoslavia, the destruction of Grozny, and the recent border fighting between Ecuador and Peru. Once more, as in centuries past, wars are rather easily started and then fought without perceptible restraint. When belligerents see that no particular penalty is paid for opening fire first or using any and all means of warfare—even the wholesale destruction of cities by aerial or artillery bombardment—self-imposed restraints on the use of force are everywhere eroded. The border fighting between Ecuador and Peru had only just begun when tactical bombing was employed, as if it were no more consequential than one more infantry skirmish.

This new season of war is upon us as one more consequence of the passing of the Cold War. The latter induced or intensified a number of hot wars in the contested zones between each camp as each superpower provided allies and clients with weapons and expertise far beyond their own capacities. Thus the Middle East especially became something of a preferred battleground by proxy.

At the same time, however, the fear that escalation could eventually reach the nuclear level inhibited any direct combat whatsoever by the superpowers themselves in Europe or anywhere else, even on the

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smallest scale. Above all, the Cold War suppressed many potential shooting wars in a great part of the world because neither superpower would tolerate them within its own camp. Both, moreover, were notably vigilant in controlling the form and geographic scope of the wars they fought in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, and also the wars their allies and clients fought, again for fear of an escalation to direct clash and nuclear war.

The concept of war governing those encounters has long been so strongly entrenched that it is not even commonly recognized as particular, but rather is seen as the only possible concept for now and always. It envisages only wars fought for great national purposes that can evoke public fervor, by armed forces that represent the aroused nation rather than merely a body of professionals going about their business. Yet that is only one concept of war, as even casual readers of military history well know. Far from an eternal verity, the concept is a rather modern innovation, associated with a particular phase of fairly recent history. Before the French Revolution, most wars were fought for much less than imperative purposes that rarely evoked popular enthusiasm, with prudent strategies and tactics to conserve expensive professional forces. While no great purposes at hand could motivate the entire nation in war, there is much justification for some eighteenth-century warfare of our own, with modest purposes and casualty avoidance as the controlling norm.

THE NEW CULTURE OF WAR

The Cold War culture of intense but controlled tension, which required disciplined constraints on the use of force, seems to have influenced even nonaligned nations such as India and Pakistan. To use force at all during the Cold War came to be seen almost everywhere as a very grave decision indeed, to be made only after the fullest deliberation, usually after all other means had been exhausted. Further decisions to escalate to regular infantry combat rather than deniable guerrilla operations, armored warfare and artillery support rather than infantry, aerial bombing rather than ground warfare were deemed worthy of distinct political decisions at the highest levels

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instead of being left, as in the past, to the discretion of military commanders. The latter complained, sometimes loudly, but they obeyed, thus affirming the new culture of restraint.

Restraint did not prevent 138 wars between 1945 and 1989, by the most expansive count, which killed as many as 23 million people. But in the previous 44 years, which included two world wars, many more were killed. In the absence of any restraint arising from strategic prudence, internal repression killed many more people over the years 1945-89 than all 138 wars combined.

Now that the Cold War no longer suppresses hot wars, the entire culture of disciplined restraint in the use of force is in dissolution. Except for Iraq's wars, the consequences have chiefly been manifest within the territories that had been Soviet, as well as Yugoslav. The protracted warfare, catastrophic destruction, and profuse atrocities of eastern Moldavia, the three Caucasian republics, parts of Central Asia, and lately Chechnya, Croatia, and Bosnia have certainly horrified and moved many Americans. But this diverse violence derives from the same postimperial devolution of epic, unprecedented scale or from purely localized sources. Hence one could still hope that the new readiness to start unrestrained wars would at least be geographically confined, if only within an area already vast.

The fighting between Ecuador and Peru, the mounting recklessness manifest between Greece and Turkey, and also perhaps Pakistan's increasing boldness over Kashmir suggest the more sinister possibility that a new, much less restrained culture of war is emerging and spreading far and wide. Nothing is now countering a number of perverse precedents. Aggression and willful escalation alike remain unpunished; victors remain in possession of their gains; the defeated are abandoned to their own devices. It was not so during the Cold War, when most antagonists had a superpower patron with its own reasons to control them, victors had their gains whittled down by superpower compacts, and the defeated were often assisted by whichever superpower was not aligned with the victor.

One may wonder what precedents the Ecuador-Peru fighting will set. Without knowing its map-changing results, one cannot assert that other dormant Latin American border disputes will be revived. But it

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would be most surprising if those disputes were not now undergoing some reappraisal, if only by politicians interested in defining ultranationalist stances for themselves. Moreover, some deceleration, if not an outright reversal, is certain to occur in the downward trend in military spending by many Latin American countries. That most positive development of recent years, which yielded important political and economic benefits, is now endangered. The Ecuador-Peru war could turn out far more costly for Latin America as a whole and indirectly for the United States too than its limited dimensions might suggest.

THE MEANING OF "WAR"

CAN THE United States counter perverse precedents and the new culture of wars easily started and fought without restraint? Beyond diplomacy is the controversial remedy of armed intervention, with or without a multilateral framework, with or without foreign auxiliaries. But aside from its suitability in any particular setting (in some it is unimaginable), military force collides with the general refusal of the American public to sanction interventions in place after place without end.

That political given must be accepted, but it is contingent upon the cost in U.S. casualties of a particular concept of war and particular methods of intervention—the only concepts and methods the U.S. military establishment now offers. If these could be changed drastically to minimize the exposure of U.S. military personnel to the risks of combat, the response of public opinion to proposed military interventions should also change. The United States might then do more to dissuade aggression and escalation.

Much is implicit in American political discourse, the official manuals of the U.S. military services, and the popular understanding of the very word "war" when the United States is a protagonist. Quite naturally, the various Weinberger-Powell-Cheney doctrines, which set out to define several preconditions for any decision to send U.S. military forces into combat, are based squarely, tacitly, and without discussion on the same concept of war. While the three sets of preconditions differ in detail, they all require vital, fervor-arousing U.S. national interests to be clearly threatened, and that the United States

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employ forces powerful enough to win not only decisively but also quickly, before the fervor abates and the nation is no longer aroused.

War fought for grand purposes is yet another product of the French and American revolutions. With some chronological laxity, however, I here label it "Napoleonic" because grand purposes often imply the decisive employment of large forces in large operations, in true Napoleonic fashion. The concept originally emerged in reaction to the typical warfare of eighteenth-century Europe, ridiculed by Napoleon and systematically criticized by Carl von Clausewitz.

While fully recognizing that the cautious methods of the prior age of warfare were congruent with their times and the habitually modest aims of what were called "cabinet wars," Clausewitz was scathing in his descriptions. Demonstrative maneuvers meant to induce enemy withdrawals without firing a shot were readily called off if serious fighting ensued. Superior forces avoided battle if there was a risk of heavy casualties even in victory. Prolonged sieges were preferred to determined assaults and circumspect pursuits to all-out exploitation in the wake of battle victories. At the strategic level, elaborately prepared offensives had unambitious objectives, promising campaigns were interrupted by early retreats into winter quarters merely to avoid further losses, and offensive performance was routinely sacrificed to the overriding priority of avoiding casualties and conserving forces for another day, with much effort expended to build and garrison linear defenses and fortifications.

Napoleon triumphed over such cautious military practices with bold strategic offensives powered by the mass and momentum of rapidly concentrated forces, and that was the kind of warfare that Clausewitz advocated. Envisaging only wars fought for great national purposes, and with the unification of Germany in mind, Clausewitz exposed the logical error of half-hearted, risk-avoiding methods likely in the long run to be more costly. To be sure, Clausewitz concurrently derived the strongest argument for strategic prudence from his insistence on the primacy of political considerations, but that did not affect his demonstration of the economy of tactical and operational boldness, a formula for efficacy that can easily become detached from its justifying context of correspondingly ambitious goals.

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Complete with profound insights into the eternal mechanics and psychology of war, the teachings of Clausewitz remain unsurpassed. Along with parallel examples of the merits of risk-taking drawn from the successes of the great captains of history (a highly selective list that omits prudent victors, favoring Patton and Hannibal, for example, over Bradley or Fabius Cunctator), they pervade the professional discourse of U.S. service academies and war colleges and can easily be recognized in current field manuals and official doctrinal statements. Many such documents are prefaced by restatements of the principles of "war" (concentration, mass, momentum, etc.) that are actually in large part the Clausewitzian principles of Napoleonic war.

Its moral economy is damaged as the United States remains a passive witness to atrocity.

Both were fully appropriate to the circumstances of the two world wars and also of the Cold War as far as the planning of nonnuclear operations was concerned. Neither fits present circumstances, domestic or international. There are no threatening great powers on the current world scene, only a handful of quiescent rogue states, and many lesser wars and internal disorders that cannot arouse the nation, for none of them directly threatens the United States or its compelling interests. The preconditions of Napoleonic war-making, or for that matter of military interventions as specified in the Weinberger-Powell-Cheney doctrines, are therefore absent.

Yet its moral economy is damaged as the United States remains the attentive yet passive witness of aggressions replete with atrocities on the largest scale. Moreover, there is no doubt that the diffusion of the new culture of wars easily started and quickly escalated is damaging U.S. material interests. Commercial opportunities, not all of them small, are being lost every day wherever guns are firing, and many more could be lost in the future.

Given the performance of certain modern weapons, if military planning is appropriately modified to fully exploit their technical potential, it may be possible to emulate the casualty-avoiding methods of eighteenth-century warfare and thus conduct armed yet virtually bloodless interventions. To be sure, U.S. aims would have to be

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correspondingly modest and remain so, resisting all temptations to achieve more than partial, circumscribed, and often slow results as firmly as any good eighteenth-century general.

At present, by contrast, there is a profound contradiction between the prevailing military mentality, formed by the Napoleonic concept of war with its Clausewitzian adjuncts, and current exigencies. The Somalia intervention came to a sudden end after the bloody failure of a daring helicopter raid in true commando style—a normal occupational hazard of high-risk, high-payoff commando operations. But given the context at hand—a highly discretionary intervention in a country of the most marginal significance for American interests—any high-risk methods at all were completely inappropriate in principle. Nor was what happened the result of an error of judgment, still less of malfeasance. In accordance with the prevailing mentality, the senior military planners allowed a role in the Somalia undertaking to U.S. Special Operations Command, which naturally mounted its own kind of operations, which in turn inherently entailed the risk of casualties.

The casualties of war were not a decisive consideration, within reasonable limits, so long as the Napoleonic concept still applied. War fought for great purposes implies a willingness to accept casualties even in large numbers. Moreover, a certain tolerance for casualties was congruent with the demography of preindustrial and early industrial societies, whereby families had many children and losing some to disease was entirely normal. The loss of a youngster in combat, however tragic, was therefore fundamentally less unacceptable than for today's families, with their one, two, or at most three children. Each child is expected to survive into adulthood and embodies a great part of the family's emotional economy. Even in the past, the United States never had the supply of expendable soldiers that was the fuel of discretionary great power wars fought for colonial aggrandizement or yet more recondite motives. Still less is there such a supply of expendable lives at present, when all other low-birthrate, postindustrial societies refuse to sanction the casualties of any avoidable combat.

How, therefore, can armed forces, staffed by professional, salaried, pensioned, and career-minded military personnel who belong to a nation intolerant of casualties, cope with aggressors inflamed by

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nationalism or religious fanaticism? Yet to avoid combat and do nothing allows not only aggressive small powers such as Serbia, but even mere armed bands such as those of Somalia, to rampage or impose their victories at will.

Some view the dilemma as unprecedented and irresolvable. Actually it is neither. If we free ourselves from the Napoleonic concept to recognize the historical normality of eighteenth-century warfare, we can find many situations in which the same dilemma arose and was successfully overcome. As far back as two millennia, the professional, salaried, pensioned, and career-minded citizen-soldiers of the Roman legions routinely had to fight against warriors eager to die gloriously for tribe or religion. Already then, their superiors were far from indifferent to the casualties of combat, if only because trained troops were very costly and citizen manpower was very scarce. Augustus, famously, went to his grave still bitterly mourning the three legions Varus lost in Germany years before.

THE ROMAN SIEGE

THE ROMANS relied on several remedies to minimize their troop losses while overcoming enemies from Britain to Mesopotamia. In the first place, it was their standard practice to avoid open-field combat, especially spontaneous engagements, if at all possible, even if their forces were clearly superior. Rather than face the uncertainties of time and place, which could result in an equally unpredictable casualty toll, the Romans routinely allowed their enemies to withdraw to positions of their own choosing, even if well fortified or naturally strong. Having thus turned a fluid situation into a far more controllable set-piece encounter, the Romans would gather forces and assemble equipment and supplies to commence systematic siege operations. Even then their first priority was not to breach enemy defenses but rather to build fairly elaborate fortifications to protect their besieging units, to minimize whatever casualties enemy sallies could inflict. Overall, the siege was the medium in which the Romans could best exploit both their technological superiority in siege craft and their logistic advantage, which normally enabled them patiently to

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outlast the food supplies of the besieged. A purposeful, calculated patience was a signal military virtue.

Trade embargoes and armed blockades, the modern equivalents of the Roman siege, are not tactical but strategic. But so long as the Napoleonic concept prevails, it is impossible to exploit their full capacity to achieve warlike results without the casualties of war. For the presumption of an aroused nation greatly discounts any results not rapidly achieved, while the effects of embargoes and blockades are cumulative rather than immediate and may be long delayed. Moreover, the Napoleonic concept only recognizes decisive results, while the effects of embargoes and blockades are usually partial rather than complete, even if very much worth having. For example, since 1990 those means have controlled the military resurgence of Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Its armed forces have not been allowed to recover from the equipment losses of 1991 and have instead been steadily weakened as imported weapons destroyed or worn out are not replaced. True, only direct oil exports by tanker or pipeline have been denied, but the lesser quantities Iraq has been able to send out overland have not been enough for rearmament. Nor does the imminent possibility that the United Nations will lift its prohibition on Iraqi oil exports alter the effective containment, without a more active use of force, of a serious threat. Incidentally (in this case), the decisive result that only an all-out war could have achieved would have been even more temporary and indecisive, for the complete destruction of Iraq's military strength would immediately have made containing Iran's threat that much harder.

> To exploit trade embargoes and blockades fully would require a renewed concept of war.

Likewise, in the former Yugoslavia, amid the utter failure of every other diplomatic or military initiative of the United Nations, European Community, or NATO, only the denial of Serbian and Montenegrin imports and exports—notoriously incomplete though it has been—has had positive effects. In addition to the certain if unmeasurable impact on Serbian and Montenegrin war capabilities, the

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trade embargo has moderated the conduct of Belgrade's most immoderate leadership. The embargo dissuaded at least the more blatant forms of combat and logistic support for the Serb militias of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slavonia, and Krajina and also induced whatever slight propensity has been shown to negotiate, if only in the hope of securing the lifting of the arms embargo. The prospect of perpetuating the embargo has almost certainly helped to avert an invasion of Macedonia, still now precariously vulnerable to Serb expansion aided and abetted by Greek malevolence.

Even by the most optimistic reckoning, those results are sadly inadequate. Nevertheless, without any cost in blood or treasure, the trade embargo has achieved much more than the expensive and ineffectual U.N. armed intervention or the tens of thousands of yet more expensive NATO air patrols over Bosnia, flown by heavily armed fighter-bombers that hardly ever fight or bomb, even as the carnage below them continues.

Against those two instances of at least partial success, in the entire record of blockades and embargoes, many outright failures can be cited. But quite a few of them only came to be considered failures because of the premise that results must be rapid to be at all worthwhile. It would take a new (or rather renewed) concept of war that esteems a calculated, purposeful patience to allow the full exploitation of embargoes and blockades, or of any slow and cumulative form of combat. As it is, the Napoleonic and Clausewitzian emphasis on sheer tempo and momentum unconsciously induces an almost compulsive sense of urgency, even when there are no truly imperative reasons to act quickly. British Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery was not the first nor the last general to achieve success where others had failed simply by insisting on thorough preparations where others had hurriedly improvised.

A compulsive sense of urgency was much in evidence during the first weeks of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, when the systematic air attack of strategic targets in Iraq was viewed with unconcealed impatience by many of the subordinate military commanders on the scene. News accounts duly conveyed their skepticism about the value of strategic bombing and their corresponding eagerness to see the air

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attack diverted to Iraqi army units and other tactical targets to open the way for a ground offensive as soon as possible.

The most senior officers resisted this upward pressure on the chain of command, which reflected no objective imperatives but only deeply rooted instinct as well as more obvious bureaucratic urges. But the pressure could not be completely denied. Well before strategic bombing was virtually stopped to provide air support for the ground campaign, which began on the 39th day of the war, many of the aircraft best suited to continue the methodical destruction of Iraqi research, development, production, and storage facilities for conventional and nonconventional weapons were instead diverted to attack some 4,000 individual armored vehicles.

> In Iraq, precision air attack on a strategic scale was not given time to realize its potential.

The diversion of the air effort from strategic to tactical targets was to have unhappy consequences. In the aftermath, many important nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare installations remained undestroyed. For in spite of the great abundance of U.S. combat aircraft, less than 200 were fully equipped to attack strategic targets with precision weapons. That number, as it turned out, was simply too small to exhaust in less than 39 days a long list of targets, which included command and control, electrical supply, telecommunication, air defense, and oil refining and storage facilities, as well as air and naval bases, rail and road bridges, and any number of supply depots.

The same compulsive urgency almost certainly played some role in shaping the decision to launch the ground offensive on the 39th day of the war instead of, say, the 49th. By the former date the air campaign had thoroughly hollowed out Iraq's military strength, not least by cutting off most supplies to frontline units. Hence it cannot be argued that the decision to start the ground offensive sooner rather than later caused any more U.S. and allied casualties than the incidentals of war would in any case have claimed, the total number being so very small. But had the air campaign been prolonged just ten more days, 2,000 more sorties could have been flown against strategic targets. The novel instrument of precision air attack on a strategic scale,

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so slow in its methodical sequence but so effective in its cumulative results, so costly to acquire but so exceedingly economical in U.S. lives, was simply not allowed enough time to realize its full potential.

The central importance attributed in the immediate aftermath of the war to the swiftly victorious ground offensive was also suggestive of the dominant influence of the Napoleonic concept on civilian opinion. Though little more than a mopping-up operation, it resonated with the prevailing mentality much more than the air campaign because it was both rapidly executed and visibly decisive.

PATIENT AIR POWER

THE KEY professional argument advanced by the most senior U.S. military chiefs to reject all proposals to employ U.S. offensive air power in Bosnia rested on the implicit assumption that only rapid results are of value. After first noting that anything resembling area bombing would inevitably kill many civilians, the chiefs argued that the potential targets were simply too elusive, or too easily camouflaged in the rugged Bosnian terrain, to allow effective precision attacks. They took it for granted that any air operation would have to be swiftly concluded, or even amount to no more than a one-time attack. Any one precision air strike certainly can easily fail because the assigned targets are concealed by bad weather, are no longer where last spotted, or are successfully camouflaged. There is no doubt that weapons such as the 120-millimeter mortars much used by Serb militias to bombard Sarajevo can be quickly moved and readily camouflaged; even much more elaborate howitzers and field guns can be elusive targets.

But this argument utterly obscured the drastic difference between a one-time strike, or any brief operation for that matter, and a patiently sustained air campaign with sorties flown day after day, week after week. If one sortie fails because of dense clouds, the next one, or the one after that, will have clear visibility. If one sortie misses a howitzer just moved under cover, the next might spot another actually firing. If one sortie is called off because the target is too close to civilians, another can proceed to completion. What was the great hurry to

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finish an air operation quickly? The fighting in Bosnia continues even now, years after the use of U.S. air power was originally rejected on the grounds that nothing much could be achieved in a few days.

But of course the other presumption of the Napoleonic concept of war—that only decisive results are worth having—was even more consequential. As the most senior U.S. military chiefs correctly pointed out, air strikes alone could not end the war in the former Yugoslavia, nor save the Bosnian state from its enemies, nor safeguard civilians from rape, murder, or forcible deportation. Therefore, it was argued by implication, air power alone was useless. Actually it would be much worse than that because the Serb militias would immediately retaliate against U.N. troops, thereby causing the withdrawal of U.N. contingents from Bosnia, which might in turn force the United States to send its own troops.

Given the dubious assumption that U.N. troops were in fact usefully protecting vulnerable civilians, and the prior assessment that air attacks alone would be useless, the conclusion was inevitable. True, air attacks alone could not possibly end the war nor save Bosnia. But a sustained air campaign could most certainly have reduced the use of artillery against cities, a particularly devastating form of warfare. That would have sufficed to ameliorate a tragic situation and demonstrate the active concern of the United States—much less than a total remedy, but much more than nothing.

CASUALTY-FREE WARFARE

A FURTHER aspect of Roman military practice is relevant for current acquisition policies as well as tactical doctrines. It is enough to recall images of legionary troops to see how far offensive performance was deliberately sacrificed to reduce casualties. The large rectangular shield, sturdy metal helmet, full breastplate, shoulder guard, and foot grieves were so heavy that they greatly restricted agility. Legionnaires were extremely well protected but could hardly chase enemies who ran away, nor even pursue them for long if they merely retreated at a quick pace. Moreover, to offset the great weight of armor, only a short stabbing sword was issued. The Romans evidently thought it much

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more important to minimize their own casualties than to maximize those of the enemy.

Much better materials than iron and leather are available today, but it is symptomatic of an entirely different order of priorities that till now very little research and development funding has been allocated to advanced body armor. In fact the best such items now available have been privately developed for sale to law enforcement agencies.

The modern equivalent of Roman fortifications is not to build walls or forts with modern techniques, but rather to emulate the underlying Roman priorities. That applies to weapons as much as tactics. Most notably, current cost-effectiveness criteria do not yet reflect the current sensitivity to casualties. In setting overall budget priorities, alternative force categories—ground, maritime, and air—are still evaluated by cost and combat performance, without treating casualty exposure as a coequal consideration. Yet the risk of suffering casualties is routinely the decisive constraint, while the exposure to casualties for different kinds of forces varies quite drastically, from the minimum of offensive air power to the maximum of army and marine infantry. Also revealing is the entire debate on stealth aircraft, which are specifically designed to evade radar and infrared detection. When judged very expensive, stealth planes are implicitly compared to non-stealth aircraft of equivalent range and payload, not always including the escorts the latter also require, which increase greatly the number of fliers at risk. Missing from such calculations is any measure of the overall foreign policy value of acquiring a means of casualty-free warfare by unescorted bomber, a weapon of circumscribed application but global reach. Casualty avoidance is not yet valued at current market prices.

Present circumstances call for even more than a new concept of war, but for a new mentality that would inject unheroic realism into military endeavor precisely to overcome excessive timidity in employing military means. A new post-Napoleonic and post-Clausewitzian concept of war would require not only a patient disposition, but also a modest one, so as to admit the desirability of partial results when doing more would be too costly in U.S. lives, and doing nothing is too damaging to world order and U.S. self-respect.

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Why the IMF Needs Reform

Zanny Minton-Beddoes

THE HALIFAX CHALLENGE

AT THEIR next summit in Halifax this June, the leaders of the Group of Seven (G-7) industrialized nations have set themselves the task of revising the Bretton Woods framework, which is widely credited as a foundation of the postwar economic prosperity among Western nations. High on their agenda should be reform of one of its main components, the International Monetary Fund.

Why reform the IMF? The current international economic environment is more hopeful than ever before. For the first time, the overwhelming majority of the world's population lives in some form of market economy. The industrial world enjoys a rare combination of growth and low inflation; the "Washington consensus," a model of economic development that emphasizes macroeconomic discipline and open markets, is being adopted by more countries. The IMF played crucial roles in the 1980s debt crisis and in the transformation of former communist economies. Radical change, many might argue, is neither necessary nor desirable.

Such complacency is misplaced. There is a gulf between the rhetoric and reality of the IMF's role, a gulf that has been emerging since the fixed exchange rate system broke down in the early 1970s but which is proving increasingly hazardous. The growth of capital markets has rendered the organization impotent in industrialized countries; the

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world's richest economies neither borrow from the IMF nor are they required to follow its policy advice. Its role in the developing world is worrisomely unclear. The Mexican crisis earlier this year is a case in point. The IMF proved wholly inadequate at crisis prevention (it did not foresee the Mexican debacle), and its attempts at crisis resolution were dangerously improvised (it pledged a disproportionate share of its liquid resources to Mexico, breaking all existing rules on the limits of financial support).

In the world's poorest countries it has effectively become a development institution with a narrow macroeconomic focus. This role is a far cry from the original notion of providing countries with temporary financial support and raises the question of overlap with the World Bank. The IMF is floundering as it looks for a role.

THE MODERN FINANCIAL SYSTEM

THE GOALS of the founders of the IMF were breathtakingly ambitious: to create a system that would foster prosperity through stable exchange rates and free trade. The IMF was a key part of the Bretton Woods vision crafted just after World War II. It would oversee the fixed exchange rate system and provide short-term support to countries facing financial difficulties. Half a century later, the world economy has changed beyond recognition. It is almost a cliché to point out that a key characteristic of the global financial system in the 1990s is the size, complexity, and speed of international capital markets. The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in the early 1970s, the removal of capital controls and, most important, technological and financial innovation have transformed global finance. No longer are the world's savings segmented by country; investors can seek out the best returns in ever more markets and hedge their risks with increasingly sophisticated financial instruments.

The geographic scope of the global financial system is also extending. As developing countries open up their economies, cut their budget deficits, and privatize state assets, they attract foreign capital. Private financial flows to emerging economies soared to $160 billion in 1993 from less than $42 billion in 1989, with the increase dominated

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by foreign direct investment and portfolio investment. Much of the explosive growth in capital flowing to emerging markets in the early 1990s was related to low interest rates in industrialized countries. As a result the growth rate slowed sharply last year, when rising interest rates made the returns on traditional assets like U.S. Treasury bills more attractive. In the wake of the Mexico crisis there will doubtless be a temporary reversal of the flow of funds as the euphoria over "emerging markets" is tempered. But the long-term trend is clear. While developing countries will have to rely primarily on their own savings to finance investments, there is no doubt that freer capital flows are a natural corollary of free trade. The size of capital markets in industrialized countries is on the order of $35 trillion. Shifting even one-half of one percent of this portfolio to emerging economies would more than double their current annual flow of private foreign finance.

NEW PLAYERS, NEW CHALLENGES

EXCHANGE RATE management among the world's major economies is almost impossible in the face of this private-sector financial muscle. As financial integration continues, and bond and equity markets become increasingly integrated across countries, macroeconomic management by an individual country will be increasingly constrained. Sweden and Italy, for example, were forced by the market to compensate for fiscal profligacy with high interest rates; Mexico's lax monetary policy was punished even more dramatically.

Another challenge is posed by the seemingly new ways in which the financial system can break down. The possibility that an isolated collapse can precipitate the breakdown of an entire system is inherent in all financial systems. The debt crisis of the 1980s posed such "systemic risk." The growth of bond and equity-based finance should, in theory, reduce systemic risk. If a country defaults on its bonds or if its stock markets collapse, individual investors face the loss. However, as Mexico showed, bondholder crises bring new problems. Markets are liable to panic.

In addition, there is the "tequila effect": the risk of contagion when a sudden loss of confidence in one market precipitates the collapse of other markets as investors try to recoup their initial losses by selling else-

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where. After the Mexico crisis, markets from Bangkok to Buenos Aires suffered as investors abandoned emerging markets and "fled to quality." The result of such contagion is apparently irrational market behavior, where countries in good economic shape suffer from crises elsewhere.

Fears of such volatility will doubtless have some beneficial effect: they will prod developing countries into increasing their own rates of saving. But countries may see too many costs in the "Washington consensus" of economic reform and be tempted to return to less open or even autarkic economic systems. Fostering global integration means ensuring that reformist countries continue on the liberalizing path.

Finally, many countries are still excluded from the new world of private finance. More than 80 percent of the private capital that has surged into developing countries since 1989 has gone to only 20 countries. Many countries, largely those in Africa, have yet to benefit from the private-sector development revolution. Political instability, war, and bad economic policy have prevented them from attracting foreign funds. Heavily indebted, they still rely on a near-stagnant pool of foreign aid. As industrialized countries lose the enthusiasm and the resources for providing foreign aid, these countries risk getting left out altogether.

HOW DOES THE IMF FIT IN?

THE BRETTON WOODS vision—and its attendant role for the IMF—bears scant resemblance to today's world. John Maynard Keynes and his colleagues had a profound mistrust of market-based international financial coordination. The institution they founded was designed to manage a system of fixed exchange rates predicated on a world of low capital mobility. The IMF initially had three basic functions: overseeing a system of pegged (but adjustable) exchange rates, promoting currency convertibility to foster international trade, and acting as lender of last resort for countries facing short term balance-of-payments crises.

Some of these functions have changed, but the original goals remain surprisingly unaltered. Certainly the IMF no longer presides over a system of fixed exchange rates, since no such system exists. But it still aims to monitor the world's monetary system and provide finan-

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cial support (with policy conditions attached) to needy economies.

For the world's richest countries, however, the IMF has lost most of its relevance. It collates useful statistics, undertakes useful economic research, and occasionally recommends economic policies that influence domestic debates. But the IMF largely lacks the power to constrain. No major industrial country has borrowed from it since the mid-1970s. In annually reviewing the health of domestic economies, its opinions are regarded more as henpecking than hectoring. Michel Camdessus, current head of the IMF, did little more than irritate the Germans with his public criticisms of the Bundesbank's policy of high interest rates.

Policy coordination among the world's major economies, to the extent that it occurs at all, is informal. During the 1980s, the G-7 made some attempts to formalize exchange-rate management—the Plaza and Louvre agreements, for example. Tellingly, the IMF was barely involved. Nor did it have any role in the creation (or humiliation) of Europe's Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). Ironically, the IMF has become a victim of the success of its policies. Once a developing country gains (or regains) access to large amounts of private capital, it no longer requires IMF financial assistance. Private rating agencies then become the barometer of a country's economic health.

The IMF's focus has shifted to the developing world. The debt crisis of the early 1980s and later the collapse of communism provided new rationales for the IMF's existence and an impetus for adopting new methods. Though it still professed to be a source of short-term financial support, the IMF created longer-term lending programs in the wake of the debt crisis, recognizing that the financial difficulties of countries like Brazil, Argentina, and even Mexico could not be solved overnight. It forged for itself a central coordinating role—cajoling banks toward providing insolvent countries with new money in return for improved economic policies. It became both a police officer of economic policy and a mediator between debtors and creditors.

When a balance-of-payments crisis in an emerging market is caused by a massive outflow of short-term foreign capital (as it was in Mexico), the IMF's limitations are underscored: it may not have the speed or resources to cope. In the aftermath of December's bungled

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devaluation of the peso, Mexico reluctantly turned to the IMF. Negotiations for short-term balance-of-payments assistance were begun, but the markets were unimpressed. The peso continued to fall. As the specter of default loomed, the Clinton administration came up with a $40 billion package of loan guarantees. This eclipsed the IMF entirely. After the package failed to muster congressional support and the Americans drew up an alternative plan, Camdessus saw the chance to reestablish the organization's relevance, and the IMF pitched in $17.8 billion to the second rescue plan: a pledge far higher than its rules would permit, and one impossible to repeat for many other countries, at least with its current resources.

To reestablish its relevance, the IMF pitched in $17.8 billion in loans to Mexico.

Camdessus' quest for relevance in the Mexican crisis wholly undermined the supposedly rule-based nature of the IMF, and it has been widely interpreted as an example of the IMF's increasing politicization. "Saving" Mexico is, after all, predominantly a U.S. concern: it shares the lengthy border along the Rio Grande, and American funds held most of the outstanding short-term Mexican debt. Nonetheless, Mexico is probably less an example of direct political pressure than of managerial opportunism.

In other cases, however, IMF politicization has been obvious. To help the former communist countries, the IMF lent money to them with unusually weak conditions. The rationale, quite reasonably, was that these countries faced problems of economic stabilization and structural reform that were qualitatively different from those of other IMF members. The reality, however, is that the IMF and the World Bank were tapped by the G-7 as the best vehicles for Western assistance. Tight budgets (and lack of political will) precluded a new Marshall Plan. Shoring up reformers has become a political imperative that overrides many of the technical rules. It would be naive to expect any multilateral institution not to reflect the political concerns of its major shareholders, and it would be churlish to suggest that fostering a transition to capitalism is not a crucial Western responsibility. But it would be equally foolish to pretend that this role fits neatly under the IMF's original mandate.

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Another area where the IMF's practice differs from its rhetoric is in the world's poorest countries, those that rely on the drip feed of foreign aid. Here the IMF has become an integral part of the aid machine, its presence permanent and its stamp of approval a prerequisite for much foreign assistance. In these countries the IMF's role (like the World Bank's) is to promote "structural adjustment," the ubiquitous phrase that describes the policy package of liberalization and privatization that is designed to help poor countries integrate into the world economy. These issues are the bread and butter of development economics; their complexity and long-term nature, however, sit uneasily with the IMF's purported mandate of addressing balance-of-payments problems in the short term. The result is that many criticize the IMF for having an excessively short-term horizon and concentrating too much on cutting budget deficits and controlling credit while neglecting the core issues that affect a country's capacity to produce goods and services.

TAILORING TO SUIT

THE MIXED IMF record of success, ad hoc improvisations, and adaptations has led to calls for reform. But of what sort? Combining the work of the IMF and the World Bank, as some have suggested, might be more efficient, but it would probably result in a loss of focus. The relatively small, disciplined IMF would become entangled in the bureaucratic sprawl of the World Bank.

Another suggestion is to reorient the IMF toward a more central position in economic policy coordination among major economies. The Bretton Woods Commission, a independent review panel of financial experts chaired by Paul Volcker, former chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, stressed the need for greater economic convergence and stability among major economies and called for the IMF to focus again on international monetary issues, its original mandate. In particular, the commission felt the IMF should become a locus for coordinating exchange rate management, leading to a more formalized system of exchange rates.

This is misguided on several counts. First, the global prosperity that accompanied the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates

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has become erroneously identified with the Bretton Woods institutions themselves. The world did have both record growth rates and fixed exchange rates between 1950 and 1970. But the Bretton Woods system was held up by America's willingness to underwrite it; the IMF was little more than a facilitator. The system broke down in the early 1970s because the United States was no longer willing to subordinate domestic policy concerns to international monetary stability and because the growth of private capital flows made a fixed rate system untenable. The financing of the Vietnam War and the growth of the Euromarkets forced the demise of Bretton Woods.

It is increasingly difficult to see how a system of fixed, quasi-fixed, or openly targeted exchange rates among the world's biggest economies could work. Many economists have argued that global capital markets are pushing the world toward one of two extremes: a system of floating rates or a single unified currency. Quasi-fixed regimes are simply no longer possible. Even if a less extreme view is taken—that greater policy coordination would yield greater exchange rate stability—it is not clear that there is currently much political appetite for this among the IMF's major shareholders, the G-7 countries.

Since the Mexican crisis, calls for reform have come from a new direction. The IMF traditionally provided limited and conditional financial support to countries with no other outside source of finance. During the debt crisis of the 1980s this role broadened to include acting as a coordinator between banks and the insolvent developing countries they were exposed to, providing limited catalytic financing, and helping to correct economic policies that lay at the heart of the debtor countries' crises. The policy measures, rather than the amount of money, were key.

In Mexico, however, the goal was different. The American rescue package sought to prevent default by shoring up confidence in the market. In effect, the aim was to act as lender of last resort ex ante: prevent a financial collapse by lending large amounts of money up front. Such an approach poses difficulties. One is the amount of money required. As more countries become integrated into the global capital market, it is harder to foresee how much money would be required to underwrite such liquidity crises. A broad concept of lender of last

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resort creates an obvious moral hazard. The United States and the IMF in effect bailed out bondholders in the Mexican crisis. If such an approach were systematized, emerging economies would be tempted to pursue bad policies and international investors to fund them, both secure in the knowledge that they would be bailed out.

Also fraught with difficulty is the idea that the IMF should be able to lend large amounts of money on short notice to a country suffering an "unjustified" speculative attack. Camdessus proposed such a role after the debacle involving Europe's Exchange Rate Mechanism; he has pursued it with renewed vigor after the Mexico crisis. Though conceptually appealing, such a notion assumes that the IMF understands a country's economic fundamentals better than the market. It would try to prevent the natural reappraisal of risk that follows any financial crisis. The practicality of such an approach is prohibitive. How much money would be required to instill confidence in the markets? How much money would it take to convince George Soros and his ilk that speculating on a particular currency was not worthwhile?

These reform proposals are trying to fulfill the IMF's mandate in a profoundly changed world. The modern financial system cannot be "managed" by an international institution. In a world of high capital mobility, the traditional emphasis on exchange rate management and the provision of liquidity are both less feasible and less appropriate.

THE ROLE TO PLAY

ACKNOWLEDGING THAT the global financial system is overwhelmingly market-driven does not reduce the IMF to irrelevance. It has important roles to play in two main areas: mitigating the risks and failures of financial markets and integrating new players.

Reducing risk requires better monitoring of capital flows and economic policy. This would allow the IMF to play a far greater role in crisis prevention, particularly in countries whose access to capital markets is more recent and at greater risk. The IMF should promote the timely publishing of key economic indicators and rate countries on the quality of their economic statistics. Its judgments about economic policy should be made public. In today's world, greater open-

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ness by the IMF would provide more reassurance to markets than secret negotiations about policy advice. In essence, the IMF should become more like a public rating service, providing financial and economic analyses of stability and risk.

Mexico has shown dramatically how severely policy mistakes are punished by the market. In such situations the IMF should fulfill two objectives. It should first try to minimize market overreaction through helping a country announce rapid corrective policy measures. The second goal should be to concentrate on finding ways to develop private sector liquidity. In Mexico, for example, short-term debt could have been rolled over into longer-term maturities backed by oil reserves. Had there been no prospect of an official bailout, investors would have found such a solution preferable to default. In any market panic, it is in the interest of every individual investor to exit as quickly as possible. Providing a bailout merely enables them to do so at others' expense.

The IMF should help restructure debt by acting like a judge in bankruptcy court.

In extreme cases, where a country faces insolvency rather than illiquidity, the IMF should play a central role in coordinating a debt restructuring. An analogy first proposed by Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs is that of a bankruptcy court judge: the IMF would able to announce a debt moratorium, declare fresh "working capital" a higher priority than obligations to previous creditors, and organize the restructuring of existing obligations. Such a role would give the IMF increased power in relation to both official creditors and private markets, but, if operated according to strict rules, it would improve the efficiency of debt workouts. The beginning of this kind of role was seen in the debt crises of the 1980s.

A fund that concentrates on promoting prudent macroeconomic policy and bankruptcy adjudication will retain a distinct role in integrating countries that still do not have access to private capital. Countries remain outside the private financial system because of poor economic policies, because heavy debt burdens render them uncreditworthy, and because they lack the legal and institutional infrastructure private capital requires. In former communist countries

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the greatest challenge is reorienting centrally planned economies. In Africa, political instability and corruption are at the root of the problem. In all cases a government's commitment to reform is crucial; the IMF's role should be to help it achieve macroeconomic stability and, where necessary, play a central role in working out debt.

Even here, though, the IMF's financial role should decrease. Given the declining Western appetite for foreign aid, this may seem an odd conclusion. Surely the world's poorest countries will need access to official funds for some time. The lesson of the last 20 years, however, is that balance-of-payments support to provide short-term relief is not the answer. More often than not the money is misspent, resulting in higher debt burdens, which inhibit growth and integration. The long-term funding that the poorest countries need should be targeted to specific areas like education, health, and so forth. These cheap loans should be provided by the World Bank and accompanied by specific reforms in these sectors. Along with other bilateral foreign assistance and debt relief, they should be contingent on ongoing IMF approval of a country's reform package. The IMF should be the police officer promoting policies that allow rapid integration into private capital markets; the goal should be economic integration rather than direct poverty alleviation.

An IMF that develops along these lines may seem a pale shadow of the Keynesian vision. It would neither manage the world's monetary system nor be a major lending institution. However, it would address the challenges faced by today's financial system. Far from becoming irrelevant, it would have a key role in fostering integration and mitigating risk. In the modern world these will be crucial functions in the promotion of global prosperity. The spirit of the Keynesian vision remains; its interpretation should be updated.

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Overcoming the Legacies of Dictatorship

Tina Rosenberg

NEW DEMOCRACIES, OLD WOUNDS

"No one touches anyone," warned General Augusto Pinochet in October 1989, two months before Chile's first free elections since his 1973 coup. "The day they touch one of my men, the rule of law ends. This I say once and will not say again." The old junta leader's comment, made almost casually to reporters, cast a pall over the fiesta-like campaign atmosphere. As expected, the anti-Pinochet forces won. But the general's warning still hangs in the air. Pinochet's democratic successors have chosen not to call his bluff.

Pinochet's language was unusually blunt, but the dilemma that the old tyrant's warning created for the new Chilean republic was nothing new. One of the first questions a newly democratic nation must face is what to do with its old dictators. Since the French Revolution, it has been clear that the choices new democracies make—whether and how to investigate a tyranny's legacy, try its leaders, purge its bureaucrats, or touch one of its gunmen—can set the course for a democratic system. But only in the past 15 years or so have nations become fully aware of what is at stake when dealing with a repressive past.

After World War II, the notion of human rights and civil liberties—previously believed to be out of reach for the citizens of most countries—was increasingly accepted by a growing number of

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Argentinian mothers protest on behalf of the "disappeared," 1988.

nations. In addition, since the mid-1970s, a staggering number of countries have turned from dictatorship to elected civilian government. First came southern Europe—Portugal, Greece, and Spain. In the 1980s, the wave hit Latin America—Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. In 1992, El Salvador ended a war that took the lives of 75,000 civilians. In the 1980s and early 1990s, at least 15 African nations moved away from repressive one-party rule and held multiparty elections. After 1989, the Soviet bloc completed the avalanche. All are now wrestling with their repressive pasts.

There are two main reasons to confront a grim past: to heal tyranny's victims and to alter the conditions that nurtured dictatorship in order to prevent its return. The new democracies have dreamed up a plethora of creative and often contradictory methods for fulfilling these broad obligations to past and future. They include choosing to leave the past behind and start afresh, an official apology by the new head of state, monetary reparations to the victims or their families, employment bans and purges that keep abusers from positions of public trust, truth commissions, and trials of political leaders or those who carried out torture and murder.

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The instruments chosen depend on the type of dictatorial system, the types of crimes it committed, the level of citizen participation in the dictatorship, the nation's political culture and history, the abruptness of the transition to democracy, and the new civilian government's resources and political power. As these factors vary widely, so do the choices countries have made. While it is early to judge these choices, some general guidelines can be drawn up by comparing two large groups of new democracies: the former military dictatorships of Latin America and the former communist dictatorships of Eastern Europe.

In the two regions, both the type of the past victim and the nature of the future threat are almost diametrically opposed. Roughly put, repression in Eastern Europe was wide, while in Latin America it was deep. And in Latin America the challenge to democracy comes from military dominance of a weak civilian government, while in Eastern Europe the danger is repression by capricious government officials unchecked by law. The challenge to both continents is to deal with past abuses of power in ways that do not replicate them.

Some nations have met the challenge. Most, although they could still change course, have merely reinforced old antidemocratic habits. The lessons of Latin America and Eastern Europe might help other countries to choose their paths: nations recently emerging from dictatorship or restricted democracy, such as South Africa, Haiti, and Malawi, and nations that are ending long and brutal wars, such as Ethiopia, Mozambique, Guatemala, and Angola. Sadly, for many countries, democracy will be only a temporary phenomenon. If they do not successfully deal with a repressive past today, future opportunities may await.

THE BAD OLD DAYS

THE NEW democracies' strategies for confronting the past depend largely on the nature of the former authoritarian regime. While comparisons between such different regions must be flawed by overgeneralization—Latin American countries can differ almost as sharply from one another as from the countries of Eastern Europe—the

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differences between the two areas shed much light on the problems of confronting the past.

Ideology. Communist leaders pronounced themselves the instrument of the working class, the standard-bearers of a beautiful ideal. They aimed for nothing less than the transformation of their citizens, the building of a "new socialist man." The good socialist citizen attended May Day parades, joined Marxist-Leninist scientific study groups, voted for the party slate, and hung peace slogans in his window. In the harsher police states, he denounced suspicious activity by his neighbors or colleagues. Latin leaders, by and large, indulged in no such nonsense. They ruled because they possessed more guns. Military leaders held a highly developed anticommunist ideology, but they did not seek to impose it on the public. In Pinochet's Chile, for example, the regime's good citizen was apolitical—he went to work, came home to play with his children, and kept his head down. If his neighbor returned from a long absence with a shuffling gait and dead eyes, the good citizen noticed nothing.

The nature of repression. The nature of the typical state crime in the two regions also differed. In Latin America, the generals crushed dissent with murder, torture, and forced disappearance. This intense repression was focused on a small percentage of the population. Even the 9,000-plus Argentines who disappeared in the "dirty war" against the left were a small slice of the nation. These crimes, while sponsored by the state, had clear authors. In tiny Uruguay, former political prisoners sometimes ran into their torturers on the street. Mothers in Argentina often knew the names and whereabouts of their disappeared children's military kidnappers. And torture and murder were illegal according to then-extant laws.

While Stalinism in the U.S.S.R. itself was violent and sustained on a scale unimaginable in Latin America—7 million executed, 5 million dead of government-induced famine, 15 million sent to the gulag—communist violence was much reduced in Eastern Europe. After Stalin's death in 1953, communist regimes kept power mainly through corruption and coercion. Citizens and apparatchiks who behaved correctly won privileges, and those who did not lost them. Violence was seldom necessary. (The great exception was Albania, which was still

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shooting its poets in the late 1970s and was staunchly Stalinist until 1990.) In Eastern Europe, state repression was far more diffuse than in Latin America—few people suffered physical harm, but almost everyone suffered some deprivation. While the outspoken went to jail, one did not need to be politically active to suffer the regime's wrath. Millions who exhibited insufficient communist enthusiasm lost their jobs, their children's schooling, their weekend cottages, or their passports. All except the most privileged endured travel restrictions, lack of privacy, shoddy goods, shortages, and constant lies. All lived smaller lives in nations where all things were measured by political loyalty. This repression was not illegal, but the very foundation of the system. It was perpetrated not by an individual, but a whole government. Tapping a telephone or sending a family into internal exile can only be done with the support of an entire bureaucratic apparatus. Indeed, it required the collaboration of virtually the whole populace.

Cooperating with tyranny. Another difference between the two types of dictatorship is that Eastern Europe's communist dictatorships sought public participation, while Latin America's right-wing military dictatorships sought public silence. In Latin America, although many influential people endorsed the ideologies that gave rise to murder and torture, one can point to a few hundred men who committed the actual crimes. The Eastern bloc dictatorships were conspiracies of all of society. Just as almost everyone was a victim of communism by virtue of living under it, almost everyone also participated in repression. Inside a communist regime, lines of complicity ran like veins and arteries inside the human body. Even the most natural responses of self-preservation were also, in a sense, acts of collaboration. The eighth-grade history teacher who taught students of the glorious march of the proletariat and its vanguard, the Communist Party; the journalist who wrote positive articles because she knew she would be fired for writing negative ones; the millions who fooled their leaders into thinking they were beloved by granting them their votes and cheering at party rallies—all were complicit. Their complicity was hidden, even from themselves, by that fact that every ordinary citizen behaved the same way. It seemed normal. But such "normal" collaboration kept the regime alive. "The question we must ask isn't what

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some 'they' did," said Jan Urban, a Czech journalist and dissident. "It's what we did." The horror of communism was in the sum of the parts. In short, the East European dictatorships were criminal regimes, while the Latin American dictatorships were regimes of criminals.

LEGACIES OF INJUSTICE

BESIDES DIFFERING in nature, the Latin American and East European dictatorships also differ in the troubling legacies they have left behind—legacies that threaten democracy in contrasting ways. In Latin America, the old dictatorships gave way to newly democratic states that are too weak to guarantee that the juntas will not return to power. In Eastern Europe, it is the state that is too strong, prone to abuses reminiscent of the dictatorial past.

The East Europeans lived on ideology, and that ideology is now discredited. In the former Soviet Union, there are several regimes as repressive, centralized, and personalist as their communist predecessors, but they manage to achieve all of communism's oppressiveness without its ideology. Although post-communist socialist political parties thrive today and have even regained power in Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary, they differ startlingly little from their current political adversaries. The 1993 elections in Poland, for instance, saw a dispute between the socialists and a center-right party over an economic plan they both advocated. In Hungary's odd current coalition between socialists and former dissidents, a socialist finance minister sped up privatization and other reforms that had stalled, paradoxically, under the previous center-right government. Clearly, communism in Eastern Europe was shot through the heart and will not rise from the grave.

But communism has left behind a poisonous residue. The people of Eastern Europe had 45 years to accustom themselves to governments endowed with arbitrary and absolute power. (In many parts of Eastern Europe, they began getting used to this centuries ago.) They saw law twisted daily for political ends. No institutions existed that could check the power of the party—no independent judiciary or stubborn legislature inside the government, no opposition parties or

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independent press outside. In Albania, the very practice of law was banned. With a few notable exceptions, there was no civil society. The word "rights" meant nothing to the average citizen.

This legacy poses a triple threat to the future of democracy. It has left citizens unaccustomed to searching for their own values and morals, and more comfortable simply accepting those supplied ready-made by the state. Today most people still do not acknowledge this lack of responsibility for their own actions, nor that this acquiescence was crucial to perpetuating the repressive regime. Such people can be easily persuaded to let demagogues do their thinking for them. Hagen Koch, a former East Berlin border guard official, described for me some of the cultural education projects he ran for border guards, including showing movies about the "Great Patriotic War," the Soviet name for World War II. I asked him if East Germany had been on the winning or the losing side. "Oh, we won, of course," he said. It was a staple of East German propaganda that the bad ones were those Germans over there. The last thing the communist leaders wanted was a serious examination of their citizens' participation in the Nazi regime; the lack of such a national soul-searching helped East Germans slide smoothly and immediately into another dictatorship.

Today many East Europeans want new devils to blame for their troubles. They seek harsh measures to restore order to a complex and insecure world. The trend grows toward Europe's historic pathology, intolerant nationalism. Gypsies have been beaten or killed almost everywhere, and police often do little to investigate those crimes. Many countries treat ethnic minorities as second-class citizens. Today many East Europeans listen transfixed as Slobodan Milošević in Serbia, Vladimír Mečiar in Slovakia, and István Csurka in Hungary wave their lists of names of Croats, Hungarians, Jews, or Gypsies.

Communism's second poisonous legacy is a state unsure of its role. The states of Eastern Europe do not suffer the existential crises of the former Soviet republics, which are building governments from scratch. But they have no experience in checking the whims of their leaders through laws and constitutions. While most East European leaders are not budding tyrants, the point is to limit personalist rule with laws that can stop those who are.

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The third piece of the grim communist heritage is that Eastern Europe's democracies lack the judicial and civil institutions that could rein in unscrupulous leaders. In most East European countries, judges are accustomed to the phone call from a party boss suggesting the disposition of a case. Recently there has been a spurt of laws—some of them revivals of communist-era statutes—punishing criticism of government officials and the publication of state secrets. These laws are so vague they can be turned against any critic of government policy. Political control of the judiciary and media and restrictions on free expression and assembly are most widespread in the former Yugoslavia and the East European countries where civil society always lagged behind: Romania, Slovakia, and Albania. Here, leaders' new "nationalist" or "democratic" labels seem to matter little; many still behave like old communists. And a lack of democratic experience encourages the average East European to accept laws like these as normal.

Eastern Europe's communist rulers lived on ideology; Latin America's dictators lived on guns.

The legacy of the Latin American dictatorships is very different. While the East European dictatorships lived on an ideology that is now discredited, the Latins lived on guns, which never go out of fashion. Even after a transition to democracy, powerful militaries still have those guns, the support of the influential upper class, and the arrogance that justified their abuses.

Civilian governments have proven unable to keep repressive security forces from carrying out torture and murder in many countries, notably Peru, Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, El Salvador, and Guatemala. Even under democracy, police and soldiers remain secure in the knowledge that their crimes will be judged in friendly military courts or not at all. The number of security officers who served or are serving significant terms for murder or torture in all of Latin America's former dictatorships probably does not reach double digits.

The militaries are more than a day-to-day threat to civilians: they have put elected governments on notice that democracy exists at the military's pleasure. Latin America has seen two previous waves of

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democratization in this century. At the crest of the second wave, in 1960, Paraguay was the only military dictatorship in South America. But by 1976, Colombia, Venezuela, Suriname, and Costa Rica were the only non-dictatorships in Central and South America. And monsters lurk below the glassy surface of today's elected Latin American governments. Venezuela has suffered three recent coup attempts. In 1992 Peru's president, Alberto Fujimori, assumed dictatorial powers with the backing of the military. The army is rumbling in Brazil. In most Latin nations, civilian presidents face the threat of overthrow if they attempt to cut military budgets or pensions, investigate military corruption, or try officers for human rights violations. Dictatorship falls periodically to democracy in most Latin nations, but it never stays dead.

The challenges to democracy in Latin America and Eastern Europe, then, come from opposite directions. In Latin America, state power is too limited to discipline a rogue military. In Eastern Europe, state power needs more limits to keep abusive officials from violating civil and human rights, and such abuses are tolerated by citizens who have been taught to accept the ready-made values provided by the state. This is a situation ripe for exploitation by the next demagogue to come along.

THE URGE TO PURGE

THE CONTRAST between Latin America, with its dangerously weak governments, and Eastern Europe, with its dangerously strong ones, becomes starker as the fledgling republics consider bold methods for dealing with the past. One such measure is the purge. Victims everywhere deserve to feel confidence in their new democratic governments, to know that the torturers and repressors are now outcasts who neither represent the state nor are able to continue their old practices. Spain's remarkable transformation after General Franco's death shows that this is not necessarily an absolute—people can break their old habits and forgive their enemies for events long past without purges. But in Latin America, such purges are crucial for democracy. There, the victims' blood is

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

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

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

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fresh, and the vicious cycle of repression and impunity that has plagued Latin America for centuries cannot be broken unless the military accepts civilian rule. Spain may have experienced real reconciliation, but most Latin countries have only an uneasy truce in which both sides are acutely aware of the distribution of power. True reconciliation cannot take place at gunpoint.

But guns limit the purges that have occurred. After El Salvador's civil war, the United Nations sponsored a groundbreaking ad hoc commission—a panel of Salvadorans chosen to name military officers who actively participated in or covered up human rights abuses. The government promised to purge, or in some cases transfer, the officers named. The commission interviewed witnesses, invited officers to present a defense, and finally named 102 men. Few in El Salvador were surprised when the most powerful of them refused to resign. The top 15 officers named, including General René Emilio Ponce, then defense minister, served out their 30 years in the armed forces and retired with full honors and pensions.

Eastern Europe is attempting purges as well. In the fall of 1991, President Václav Havel submitted a bill to the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly calling for a ban on top government jobs for everyone the state could prove did concrete harm. This commendable bill failed to pass. Instead, the assembly passed a law that came to be known as "lustration," which bans from top public-sector jobs for five years all those who were members of the People's Militia, held high-ranking government or party positions under communism, or appear in the secret police registry as collaborators. Those so found are considered guilty and must sue in court to prove their innocence.

Lustration shows that the trouble with purges in Eastern Europe is the reverse of the Latin American problem. The biggest danger is not that the guilty will stay in power, but that the innocent will be removed. Lustration's supporters maintain not that the secret police registry is largely correct, which is indisputable, but that it is perfect, and that no innocent person could possibly be considered guilty. The secret police, however, were no more perfect than any other large bureaucracy in communist Czechoslovakia. Some secret police officers wrote down names to meet a quota or win more

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expense money. The lustration law has ruined the careers and reputations of many who were listed by mistake or whose collaboration harmed no one. Indeed, one of those listed as a candidate for collaboration in the secret police files from 1965 was a youthful absurdist playwright who thanked his interrogator for "giving him inspiration for further literary endeavors." On this basis, a secret police official wrote that the young Václav Havel had a "positive" attitude toward the secret police and should be actively recruited as an agent.

Czechoslovakia's lustration has been the most publicized, but other countries have comparable laws. Bulgaria's law, which applies only to people in academic posts, is being challenged by a new socialist government. In Germany, lustration for high-level officials is fairer than the Czechoslovak version—firings are based on information from the subject's file, rather than just appearance on a list. But the average worker does not benefit from such subtleties. Every single holder of a public-sector job in eastern Germany can be fired for having informed or worked for the Stasi, the dreaded East German secret police. Berlin recently fired street sweepers who were found to have been on the Stasi payroll—even if they had been only Stasi bus drivers or potato-mashers in the Stasi cafeteria. Some bureaucrats were required to fill out questionnaires asking if anyone in their *household* had contact with the Stasi. The bans last 15 years. While the cabinet minister from Prague can surely find a new job in private industry, where can the third-grade teacher from Dresden go? Many former East Germans perceive the firings as a massacre. They have produced the least auspicious emotion for working through the past: victimization.

Lustration—purging former communist officials—smells like communism.

Poland and Hungary have abstained from the lustration boom. In part this is because their communist regimes—and particularly their secret police—were far less Stalinist. These were also places where the transition to democracy was negotiated, a process that encourages people to see each other in shades of gray rather than in black and white. Enemies become political adversaries, with whom it is

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possible to work. In Poland, the Solidarity government emerged from the transition negotiations with a policy of walling off the past with what leaders called a "thick line."

Still, many on the right fought for lustration. In June 1992, the government of Polish Prime Minister Jan Olszewski presented parliament with a list of secret police collaborators. It was a curious list, containing the names of most of the government's important political adversaries, including President Lech Walesa. A parliamentary commission found that of 64 names on the list, only 10 could really be suspected of collaboration. The Olszewski government fell and so did lustration. Neither ever recovered.

This is no great loss. Lustration smells like communism. The accused do not enjoy due process rights or the presumption of innocence. It can be a powerful political tool used against those who inconvenience new governments. Lustration punishes people not for their individual actions but for their appearance on a list. "I do not protect communists," said former Czech Premier Petr Pithart, a lustration opponent. "I protest against lists of any kind. Today it is communists who are on the list. It could be wealthy people tomorrow, perhaps macrobiotics the day after, and certainly the Jews. The logic of lists is implacable."

TRUTH COMMISSIONS

IN BOTH Eastern Europe and Latin America, high-profile official commissions to investigate a former dictatorship's crimes can help restore integrity to a country's political life. Truth commissions are especially necessary after dictatorships or wars marked by widespread torture and disappearance—crimes whose hideousness hinges in part on secrecy. Unveiling the full scope of tyranny lets its victims come to terms with their suffering and starts replacing the legacies of dictatorship with the habits of democracy.

It is not enough that the regime's crimes are widely known, or even that they are discussed on the state-sponsored TV news. The state must acknowledge and apologize for what it has done. On March 4, 1991, Patricio Aylwin, who succeeded General Pinochet as president

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of Chile, went on television and, voice breaking, apologized to the families of those killed by the previous government in the name of the entire nation. This was a moving statement, but more important, he presented a study of the junta's murders and disappearances, carried out by an eight-person Commission on Truth and Reconciliation whose members ranged from a human rights lawyer to former members of Pinochet's cabinet.

Aylwin took the idea from Argentina. When the junta's "dirty war" ended in 1983, Argentina's new democratic president, Raúl Alfonsín, named a panel of distinguished citizens to a National Commission on the Disappeared. When they were finished taking testimony in all corners of Argentina and in exile, they found the military junta had produced—or rather, not produced—at least 9,000 disappearances. "We have reason to believe the true figure is much higher," wrote the commission's chairman. Its report, called *Nunca Mas* (Never again), described the torture and killing inside secret detention centers, discussed the collaboration of judges and other groups, and told the stories of the victims where it could.

The value of such commissions is evident even before their reports are published. "We had just opened an office in a city in the south," said Alejandro Salinas, a commission staffer in Chile. "A woman came in to talk about her husband, who had disappeared. We invited her to take a seat. The Chilean flag was very prominently displayed, and she started to cry. To have the government of Chile invite her into this office to talk about her husband—it was overwhelming to her."

Truth commissions would be just as beneficial in Eastern Europe, although for different reasons. For the victims of communism, the workings of the repressive state remain veiled in secrecy, especially the great hydra-headed monster of the secret police. Victims deserve to understand the hidden structures that judged and punished them. In addition, democracy in Eastern Europe demands a society-wide self-examination to explain how dictatorship won the complicity of ordinary people.

To this end, Germany is carrying out two exemplary projects. First, to help individual victims of the Stasi, Germany allows them

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to request and read their own Stasi files. While in other countries this information is kept secret by the Interior Ministry, Germany is treating its people as citizens fully entitled to information about state actions that affected their lives.

The decision to read one's file can be a fateful one. Environmental activist Vera Wollenberger realized with horror that the informer who gave the Stasi intimate details of her health, finances, and letters to her children was none other than her husband. Because Stasi victims can find out who betrayed them, Germany is weathering a wave of emotional confrontations between victims and their spies. Some of these talks have been held in public auditoriums and on television. The sessions are painful but therapeutic, helping the spies to face their responsibility and the victims their anger. And while the Stasi files contain stories of horrifying betrayal, they also reveal great human goodness. After reading his file, newspaper editor Ulrich Schacter resolved to sit down and write all his friends thank-you letters; not one had informed for the Stasi.



GRAFF/CARTOONISTS & WRITERS SYNDICATE

General Augusto Pinochet

Other East European governments have been reluctant to open their files, arguing that they cannot match the German office's 1992 budget of 203 million marks and its staff of nearly 3,500. But scaled-down versions—perhaps a system that pulled 100 applicants' files each month—would still accomplish much of what the Germans have done. A 1993 vote in the Czech Republic in which ruling-party deputies rejected simply moving the files from Interior Ministry control to an independent organization suggests another reason for such reluctance: secret files are a potent political weapon, and governments are loath to relinquish absolute power over their use.

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Germany is also the only East European country sponsoring a truth commission, a committee of 16 members of the Bundestag known as the Enquetekommission, or commission of inquiry. It has sponsored papers and held 44 widely followed public hearings all over the former East Germany and in Bonn on the Stasi, the justice system, prisons, church-state relations, and other topics.

Truth commissions, like the opening of citizens' files, have not caught on in Eastern Europe. One explanation may be that these nations, fortunately, lack a major reason for the popularity of truth commissions with new Third World democracies. As in Chile and El Salvador, they are often the furthest the new government feels it can go when the very people likely to be tried still command the army. This sad reality highlights the single most important difference between the threats to democracy in Eastern Europe and Latin America. In Latin America the threat to democracy comes from outside a government lacking the necessary powers, and in Eastern Europe the threat comes from within a government that holds too many.

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

THE MOST sweeping mechanism for dealing with past repression is trial in a court of law. Here, too, the contrasts between the Latin and East European dictatorships dictate very different paths for the two continents. External support and U.S. encouragement would embolden Latin America's weak new democracies, who fear that trying to bring junta veterans to justice might prompt a military coup. By contrast, in Eastern Europe, the danger is not that the new democracy might fall, but that it might go so far in its pursuit of the cogs in a communist state's wheels that it mimics its dictatorial predecessor's contempt for the rule of law.

In both regions, victims of torture and the relatives of the murdered and disappeared deserve justice. Trials can help restore victims' dignity and prevent private acts of revenge by those who, in the absence of justice, would take it into their own hands. Some lawyers also view them as an obligation under international law.

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In Latin America, torture and murder were typical of a regime's repression, illegal at the time of commission, and committed by clearly identifiable perpetrators. Trials for such crimes are crucial for democracy's long-term prospects in Latin America. They are the only way to establish civilian control of the military and the primacy of law over force. They warn would-be murderers and torturers that crime carries a price. And, of course, convictions deter the specific individuals on trial, many of whom still pose a threat to democracy, from future offenses. Trials demonstrate to polarized nations accustomed to solving disputes through killing that other ways exist, express society's condemnation of violence, and show that democratic governments do indeed differ from dictatorships.

Latin Americans liken trying military officials to throwing democracy out a 20-story window.

The few trials of past human rights violators that the new Latin American democracies have managed to hold have given defendants no cause to claim abuse. The 1985 trials in Argentina of nine members of the "dirty war" junta were models of due process. When injustice has occurred, it has worked to the advantage of powerful defendants; those accused of death squad murders in El Salvador have usually been acquitted for "lack of evidence." Indeed, the truth commission in El Salvador recommended against trials, concluding that the courts were so weak that trials would not be a meaningful exercise.

Trials are crucial for democracy's long-term health, but they are seldom attempted. Most new civilian governments view trials as the equivalent of throwing democracy out a 20-story window. Three military uprisings in Argentina were enough to convince Alfonsín to end the trials; his successor as president, Carlos Saúl Menem, even pardoned the junta leaders already convicted. The newly elected government of Paraguay was able to try some of its human rights abusers only because they came from the police, not the army, which was more of a threat.

There are, however, ways to strengthen democracy in the long term without committing suicide in the short term. More pressure for justice from the United States, the Organization of American

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States, human rights groups, and others could help balance military pressure for impunity. Civilian governments might privately welcome such pressure. In the past, the United States has often been a voice against trials—most recently in Haiti, where the chief U.S. negotiator, former President Jimmy Carter, advocated a far more sweeping amnesty than the Haitian parliament later endorsed. While a country's own courts are the preferred forum, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is now providing a court of last resort. In 1988 it decided its first case, ordering the government of Honduras to pay reparations to the families of two disappeared men. Since then it has heard 16 cases against seven countries and has become a regular forum for human rights trials when national courts have proven impotent.

The real threat to East European democracy is not communism but unchecked state power.

As in Latin America, victims of torture and the relatives of the murdered and disappeared of Eastern Europe should demand full justice. But most of the criminals of the Stalinist regimes are now dead or very old, and since that time, acts of physical violence have been few. They should, however, be prosecuted. By the end of 1993, 198 officials of the former Czechoslovakia had been prosecuted—some for corruption, others for beating demonstrators and other acts of violence. Twenty-nine have been convicted. Polish General Wojciech Jaruzelski may be tried for his role in the shootings of protesters in Gdansk in 1970, when he was defense minister.

These trials serve justice, but as the crimes involved were not the typical communist abuses suffered by the general public, they do not satisfy the thirst for justice among communism's victims. People want to try the men and women who opened their letters, taught them lies in the guise of history, designed their pitiful Trabant automobiles, and took their passports. But it cannot be done. Complicity was so widely shared that trials would add literally millions of new cases to already overburdened and understaffed courts. Such trials would be impossible without violating individuals' rights to due process. East Germans hated Erich Mielke, the head of the Stasi, and Margo Honecker, who was minister of education, but it is hard to find a

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

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legally indictable reason to try them: tapping telephones and teaching Marxist-Leninist social studies were both legal at the time. And who tapped the telephones? Who barred students from college? Trials by their very nature judge the actions of individuals, and these were acts of the great repressive machine as a whole.

Some of the new democracies, however, are determined to try their old leaders—with the charges to be filled in later. They are like the marksman who shoots first and then chooses his target. The worst offender is Germany. Markus Wolf, the head of foreign espionage for the Stasi, was sentenced to six years for bribery and treason. Treason, however, is usually defined as an offense against one's own country, and West Germany was decidedly not Wolf's. In October 1993 Mielke, the Stasi chief, was sentenced to six years in prison for his part in the 1931 murders of two policemen on the basis of evidence gathered by the Nazis, possibly through torture. Germany has also tried border guards for killing fleeing citizens at the Berlin Wall. Their superiors, who gave the orders to shoot, often come to testify at the trials. If they are government employees, they receive a day's pay for their time. Then they walk out free men.

Such travesties of justice are unnecessary. Eastern Europe's new democracies need not struggle to convince the old dictators to submit to the law. Their surrender was unconditional. And surely the last place in Europe that needs to worry about the resurgence of its old communists is Germany, which simply engulfed them. Mielke was 85 and doddering when he was convicted. His Stasi was occupied by students and peace activists cataloging the files; the apparatus needed for his crimes is impossible to reconstruct. There was no need to nab the erstwhile Stasi chief for tax evasion to keep him off the street. Erich Mielke is not Al Capone.

Even worse, ersatz justice resorts to the communist habits of twisting law to fit political needs. In some places this means criminalizing decisions that were clearly political judgment calls. Bulgaria, for example, is trying several former officials for giving away government funds to Third World communist movements. Trials are also used to solve current political problems. In Albania, former Prime Minister Fatos Nano—the most attractive leader of

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the socialist party opposing the current government—was sentenced to 12 years in jail for embezzlement. Many Albanians suspect that the government simply wanted to lock up its most charismatic critic. Such trials undermine the rule of law.

Unchecked power was necessary to maintain a communist regime. But the reverse is not true; one does not need to be a communist to seek unchecked power. Such power in the service of anticommunism is just as dangerous. Unfortunately, many of the measures East European governments have taken to deal with the past abuse their power. Citizens do not enjoy full due process rights to defend themselves from lustration. Decisions that affect lives, careers, and reputations are made in secret. The legal system is placed at the service of political goals. This behavior is the legacy of the past that is hardest to change. The real threat to democracy in Eastern Europe today is not communism but the state's unchecked power.

How can a nation deal with its history in ways that do not repeat it? Despite their great differences, the new democracies of Latin America and Eastern Europe have essentially the same task: to go as far as they can to bring past repressors to accountability without crossing the line into new injustice. The Latins must struggle to go further, while the East Europeans must resist the impulse to go too far. But Latin America and Eastern Europe share a newfound belief in tolerance, accountability, and the rule of law. For both, the best way to deal with the past is to treat it according to the democratic standards they have now supposedly embraced.

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Reviews

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Robert McNamara, with map of Vietnam.

Robert McNamara recognized early that the war was unwinnable, but he tragically refused to act on his convictions.

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Review Essay

The Wrong Kind of Loyalty

McNamara's Apology for Vietnam

George C. Herring

In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. BY ROBERT S. MCNAMARA. New York: Times Books, 1995, 356 pp. $33.95.

As much as any other individual, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara personified the American commitment in Vietnam. He was "the can-do man in the can-do society in the can-do era," David Halberstam wrote in *The Best and the Brightest,* and during the Kennedy and early Johnson years, he managed America's expanding involvement almost as if he were a desk officer. Whether slogging through Vietnam in army fatigues, spewing out statistics to demonstrate progress, or presiding at a press conference, map on the wall, pointer in hand, he epitomized what came to be called "McNamara's war." Whatever the difficulties of the moment, he exuded a certainty that promised ultimate success.

In fact, as has long been clear, his public confidence far outlasted the emergence of personal skepticism, and McNamara's tearful departure from the Pentagon at the height of the Tet Offensive in early 1968, as much as Lyndon B. Johnson's March 31, 1968, speech, marked the inglorious end of an era once bright with promise.

As the war aroused growing controversy in the United States, McNamara became a major target for critics from both left and right. Ignorant of his muted, tightly constrained internal dissent, doves viewed him as the ultimate technocrat, whose blind faith in technology and statistics plunged the nation into a destructive quagmire. Hawks, on the other hand, denounced with growing venom his interference with the military and his refusal to give it the freedom and tools to win an eminently winnable war.

For McNamara, Vietnam became a source of great personal torment. He left office quietly in 1968, declining out of a sense of loyalty to his president to air publicly his grave doubts. From that day for-

GEORGE C. HERRING, Professor of History at the University of Kentucky, is author of *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975.*

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ward, he refused to speak of Vietnam, even when he resurfaced in the 1980s during the debate over nuclear responsibility. He broke his vow of silence only briefly, at the time of the Westmoreland-CBS trial and on the eve of the Persian Gulf War.

His completion of the book he "never planned to write" is as mysterious and characteristic of the man as his curious internal dissent against the war and his subsequent silence. He insists that he did not write to defend himself, and the results seem to speak for themselves on this score. His purpose, he claims, was rather to explain to the nation the reasons why its government and leaders acted as they did and to draw appropriate lessons. The fundamental question he raises is, why did the best and the brightest go wrong in Vietnam? Why did they make errors "not of values or intentions but of judgment and capabilities?"

DECLASSIFIED DOUBTS

In compiling this memoir, McNamara followed the example of his successor as secretary of defense, Clark Clifford, in *Counsel to the President*. Rather than rely on memory, he consulted the documentary record, examining the vast quantity of recently declassified materials and some sources not yet available to historians, such as Johnson's tape-recorded phone conversations. He also brought in historian Brian VanDeMark to help him access that record and ensure that "insofar as humanly possible" he remained faithful to it. This method gives the memoir an air of authority that others lack but robs it of some personal reflection. Clifford compensated by offering sometimes shrewd retrospective judgments about people and events. True to character, McNamara only occasionally provides the insights that give the documents fuller meaning. He reveals little on the interaction of personalities in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the decision-making process, or the conflict with the military and Joint Chiefs of Staff that raged throughout his tenure and reached a crisis point in late 1967.

McNamara does shed new light on the origins of the bombing halt of late 1965 and his inception of the Pentagon Papers project, and he provides important new examples of the way Johnson in the last years of his presidency squelched internal dissent. He also provides some illuminating personal insights, especially on his growing disillusionment with the war. He admits, for example, the profound impact on him of the self-immolation of the young Quaker, Norman Morrison, outside his Pentagon office in November 1965, and he deplores the way he bottled up his reaction. He also admits that the impact of visits to Harvard and Amherst in 1966 led to his realization that "opposition to the administration's Vietnam policy increased with the institution's prestige and the educational attainments of its students." Johnson long suspected that his defense minister's dovishness derived from the sinister influence of Robert Kennedy, but McNamara recalls a dramatic encounter in which Jackie Kennedy literally beat his chest and demanded that he "do something to stop the slaughter." Though a private person, he speaks with remarkable candor about the effects of the war on himself and his family.

What is truly remarkable about this book, however, is the pervasive apologetic tone. For public officials to write memoirs

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to defend their actions is conventional, and McNamara does this on occasion, mostly on smaller issues. He continues to insist that the alleged second Gulf of Tonkin attack of August 4, 1964, "appears probable but not certain" yet presents no new evidence. He defends the much-maligned body count as a measure of progress in the war yet rejects charges that he was a mindless number cruncher. He also claims the much-criticized McNamara line, his project for an electronic barrier, helped reduce North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam.

McNamara has never been conventional, however, and his memoir seems more apology than apologia. Throughout the book, he concedes—and deplores—the errors of his ways, for all practical purposes assuming personal responsibility for the Vietnam debacle. The list goes on almost in the fashion of a litany. The secretary of defense was a key figure in decisions to escalate the war between 1961 and 1965, and he readily concedes that the assumptions upon which he and his colleagues acted were badly flawed. They approached Vietnam, he recalls, with "sparse knowledge, scant experience and simplistic assumptions." Victims of their own "innocence and confidence," they foolishly viewed communism as monolithic, knew nothing about Indochina, and were "simple-minded" regarding the historical relationship between China and Vietnam. They badly misjudged Ho Chi Minh's nationalism and consistently overestimated South Vietnam's ability to survive. Regarding the key decisions of 1965, he admits he should have anticipated that bombing North Vietnam would lead to requests for ground troops. He concedes there should have been a public debate on the July 1965 decision for war. Over and over he acknowledges that he should have examined the unexamined assumptions, asked the unasked questions, and explored the readily dismissed alternatives.

McNamara was the primary war manager for both John F. Kennedy and Johnson, and here too he admits error. He concedes a lack of candor in his reports to the public, defending himself only to the point of wondering how top officials can be frank without aiding the enemy. He regrets on numerous peace initiatives that "we failed to utilize all possible channels and to convey our position clearly." He admits that he and his military and civilian colleagues repeatedly underestimated the ability of the North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front to endure losses.

THE PRISON-HOUSE OF CONTAINMENT

As to why the failure occurred, McNamara draws two conclusions. One, commonly cited by beleaguered top officials, is a "blizzard of problems" that left no time to think. Of the crucial decisions to escalate in 1964, for example, he writes that "we were left harried, overburdened, and holding a map with only one road on it. Eager to get moving, we never stopped to explore fully whether there were other routes to our destination." He also emphasizes the lack of expertise in the administration. In the Cuban missile crisis, he notes, the Kennedy administration had the great advantage of such veteran Kremlinologists as Llewellyn Thompson. For Vietnam, he insists, no such expertise was available, and major miscalculations resulted.

Much is compelling in McNamara's analysis. The speed of events in present

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times leaves precious little time for ordinary citizens, much less for harried top officials, to think. It has long been recognized, moreover, that the purge of Asia hands from the State Department during the McCarthy era crippled policy-making for Indochina and had a deadly impact on Vietnam decisions.

But is it really so simple? As former National Security Council official James C. Thomson, Jr., pointed out in the April 1968 *Atlantic Monthly,* even the available expertise was difficult to get to the top. And when it got to the top, such as State Department official Paul Kattenburg's criticism in the Kennedy years, it was ignored. McNamara admits, incidentally, that Undersecretary of State George Ball's dissent was dismissed because he was "Eurocentric."

Conceding McNamara's point that the pace of events is indeed dizzying, one must ask whether the real problem was the time available to think or the way people were thinking. U.S. policymakers miscalculated, to be sure, and they were woefully ignorant of Vietnam and the Vietnamese. In the final analysis, however, the American debacle in Vietnam was not primarily a result of errors of judgment or the personality quirks of the policymakers. It was a logical, if not inevitable, outgrowth of a worldview and a policy—the policy of global containment—that Americans in and out of government accepted without serious question for more than two decades. Even those who had time to think, intellectuals, for example, shared this view, as did most experts. The foreign policy elite had few dissenters until the United States was waist-deep in the big muddy. Those who did dissent normally concluded not that the worldview was wrong but that Vietnam was not doable. Some doves indeed advocated liquidating the Vietnam commitment only to save the larger containment policy.

Skeptics gained a hearing only with great difficulty because of the pervasive optimism that is so much a part of the American character. Top policymakers persisted in believing that, despite the problems in Vietnam, the United States, as always in the past, would eventually prevail. "In the lands of the blind, one-eyed men are king," said President Eisenhower in 1954, explaining his decision, against the recommendations of many of his expert advisers, to aid South Vietnam's Ngo Dinh Diem. Kennedy fell victim to the same delusion, as did Johnson.

If ever they wavered, the imperatives of domestic politics (about which McNamara says virtually nothing) brought them back into line. No political figure, especially a Democrat, was prepared to risk the fate that had befallen Harry Truman and Dean Acheson for the loss of China. Despite his doubts, Kennedy refused even to consider withdrawal from Vietnam until he had been safely reelected. Johnson repeatedly insisted that he was not going to be the president to see Vietnam go the way of China.

DISLOYALTY TO THE TRUTH

To his credit, McNamara recognized earlier than most of his colleagues that the war was not winnable. Tragically, however, he refused to act decisively on his convictions, and perhaps the most serious issue raised by his memoir involves his handling of his own steadily growing

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doubts. He readily admits—as has long been known—that his "sense of the war gradually shifted from concern to skepticism to frustration to anguish.... I had always been confident that every problem could be solved, but now I found myself confronting one—involving national pride and human life—that could not." He does not say exactly when he reached this conclusion. Some claim as early as the summer of 1965; most agree no later than the end of that year. Yet he revealed his doubts to only a few confidants. While desperately exploring presumably less costly and destructive alternatives, such as the bombing halt and peace offensive of late 1965 and a shift of focus to pacification and the McNamara line in 1966, he continued to give in piecemeal to military proposals for escalation. Only in 1967 did he propose radical changes in policy, and when his suggestions, predictably, were rejected, he quietly left government.

The reason historians usually give for his behavior is that he put loyalty to his president above what he had come to see as the unpleasant truth, and McNamara does nothing to challenge that notion here. He claims, somewhat lamely, that he hoped his November 1, 1967, memorandum calling for a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam and a change in the ground strategy would stir debate within the administration. Surely, from earlier dealings with Johnson, McNamara must have known better. Not only did the president refuse to distribute the memo to his other advisers and the informal advisory group known as the "wise men" then meeting in Washington, but he refused even to invite former wise men he knew had turned against the war. L.B.J. sought validation of his policy, not debate.

Many have argued that McNamara should have resigned in protest. Like others, including George Ball, he persuaded himself he could better influence policy by staying. He also believed, he notes here, that resigning and challenging the prevailing policy would have violated his responsibility to the president and his oath to uphold the Constitution.

In an era when personal ambition usually seems to prevail and loyalty seems a lost virtue, McNamara's stand appears in many ways admirable. But, it must be asked, what about loyalty to the truth, and does not loyalty to the Constitution, the welfare of the nation, indeed to the president demand a willingness to confront him with the unpleasant truth, to try any means available to force him from his self-destructive course? However honorable McNamara's intent, the nation—and indeed Lyndon Johnson—have been ill-served by this kind of loyalty.

Robert S. McNamara has accepted a full measure of responsibility for a great tragedy (far more for Vietnam than for America, it must be remembered). His candid memoir provides useful insight into his and America's agony over Vietnam. To understand what went wrong, however, requires looking beyond his essentially instrumental explanation. It was McNamara's war, yes, but also Dwight Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles' war, John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson's war, and Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger's war. The ideology of a generation of policymakers and a flawed set of policies, more than anything else, explain why the United States intervened in Vietnam and ultimately failed.

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Review Essay

The Myth of American Isolationism

Reinterpreting the Past

Paul Johnson

In the Time of the Americans: FDR, Truman, Eisenhower, Marshall, MacArthur—the Generation that Changed America's Role in the World. BY DAVID FROMKIN. New York: Knopf, 1995. $30.00.

We have here a popular history of American foreign policy from the end of the nineteenth century almost up to the present. It centers around the great political and military leaders born in the decade 1880-90, in particular Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, George C. Marshall, and Douglas MacArthur. But this theme gets lost in the author's inability to resist putting into the book everything he finds intriguing. He hops about from scene to scene and personality to personality like a historical Walter Winchell. We are told that Major Eisenhower often played golf with Major George Patton; that William G. Bullitt's wife began drinking at breakfast; that at Ambassador Bullitt's first meeting with Stalin the dictator gave him a hearty kiss, which Bullitt returned; that Marshall always refused to laugh at F.D.R.'s jokes, and suffered accordingly; and that John Foster Dulles had a sister who was "an enthusiastic Hitlerite."

This is gossip-column history, with a stress on the colorful detail. No harm in that, perhaps. There are thousands of dull books on America's involvement in foreign affairs during the twentieth century, and David Fromkin's anecdotal approach may not come amiss.

My quarrel with this book concerns the assumptions on which it is based. Because American historians, and indeed Americans generally, widely share these assumptions, they are worth debating.

Toward the end of his book, Fromkin states: "Ever since 1898 [the beginning of the Spanish-American War], the funda-

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mental question about American foreign relations had been whether the United States would choose to play a continuing role in world affairs." The notion that the United States has a real choice in such a momentous decision is related to the beliefs that the United States is naturally isolationist and that, until the Second World War, isolationism was the norm in U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, as a result of the humiliations and frustrations of American involvement in Somalia, there have recently been suggestions in the media that the United States is about to return to isolationism.

THE ISOLATIONIST IMPULSE

I want to suggest a different point of view, which, oddly enough, Fromkin's narrative confirms at various points. First, there is nothing unique, as many Americans seem to suppose, in the desire of a society with a strong cultural identity to minimize its foreign contacts. On the contrary, isolationism in this sense has been the norm whenever geography has made it feasible. A characteristic example is ancient Egypt, which, protected by deserts, tried to pursue an isolationist policy for 3,000 years with unparalleled success. In their ideograms and hieroglyphs, the Egyptians made an absolute distinction between themselves and others. To find a more modern example of a hermit state we need look no farther than Japan, which used its surrounding seas to pursue a policy of total isolation, again reflected in its ideograms. China, too, was isolationist for thousands of years, albeit an empire at the same time. Britain has been habitually isolationist even during the centuries when it was acquiring a quarter of the world. The British always regarded the English Channel as a cordon sanitaire to protect them from what they regarded as the continental disease of war. So, too, the Spanish were misled by the Pyrenees and the Russians by the great plains into believing isolationism feasible, as well as desirable.

The United States, however, has always been an internationalist country. Given the sheer size of the Atlantic, with its temptation to hermitry, the early rulers of the United States were remarkably international-minded. The original 13 colonies had, as a rule, closer links with Europe than with each other, focusing on London and Paris rather than Boston and Philadelphia. Benjamin Franklin has perhaps a better claim to be called a cosmopolitan than any other eighteenth-century figure. He was no slouch as a diplomat; indeed, he believed strongly in negotiations and mutually advantageous treaties between nations. Had the British War Office allowed him, George Washington might easily have been a professional soldier in George III's imperial army, pursuing a career in Europe or perhaps even India. America's ruling elite was always far more open toward, interested in, and knowledgeable about the world (especially Europe) than the French Canadians to the north and the Spanish- and Portuguese-Americans to the south. At Ghent in 1814, the U.S. team that negotiated the end of the War of 1812—John Quincy Adams, Albert Gallatin, Jonathan Russell, James Asheton Bayard, even Henry Clay—was every bit as globally conscious and well informed as its English counterpart.

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The truth is that, despite the oceans on both sides, the United States was involved with Russia (because of Oregon and Alaska), China (because of trade), Spain, Britain, and other European powers from its earliest days. Isolationism in a strict sense was never an option, and there is no evidence that the American masses, let alone the elites, favored it, especially as immigration widened and deepened ties with Europe. It is true that the United States, through most of the nineteenth century, was concerned with expanding its presence in the Americas rather than with global politics. But exponents of "America First," like John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, and John L. O'Sullivan—who coined the phrase "Manifest Destiny" in the 1840s—were imperialists rather than isolationists. The only time imperialism was an issue in an American election was in 1900, when the Democrats used it to attack what they saw as President William McKinley's expansionist policies. The voters' approval of American imperialism, if that is what it was, was reflected in McKinley's massive victory, by 292 to 155 electoral votes.

In the nineteenth century, when the United States needed to negotiate on the world stage, as it did during the Civil War, its diplomacy was deft and effective. Europeans find it hard to accept, and most Americans are unaware, that Americans tend to make excellent diplomats because they are thorough and go into matters from the fundamentals upward. I do not know why Fromkin dismisses President Woodrow Wilson's preparations for the Versailles peace negotiations as "amateurish." Colonel Edward House set up this process, known as "The Inquiry," in September 1917 on Wilson's instructions. It consisted of 150 or so experts, mainly academics, under Dr. S. E. Mezes and was housed in the American Geographical Society building in New York. As a result, Wilson and his colleagues were by far the best briefed delegation at Versailles. They alone had accurate maps and demographic information, describing in detail the many territories the conference was amalgamating or dividing. John Foster Dulles, who was counsel to the U.S. Peace Commission, told me in 1955 that "we Yankees were well ahead of you British and French" when it came to the factual minutiae. Dulles felt that some of the subsequent troubles in central and eastern Europe were the direct result of America's detailed proposals being overridden. Harold Nicolson, who was at Versailles and later wrote the best book on it, insisted, "Had the treaty of peace been drafted safely by the American experts, it would have been one of the wisest as well as the most scientific ever devised."

THE TWENTY-YEAR CRISIS

It is true that the United States appeared isolationist between the wars, and much of the tragedy of the Second World War is attributed to this fact. Fromkin treats this quasi-isolationist period as the norm. His thesis is that the generation born from 1880 to 1890—F.D.R., Eisenhower, Marshall, and others—was able to use the opportunity of the war against Hitler to break away finally from isolationism, "change America's role in the world," and create the epoch in global history he terms "the time of the Americans."

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The interwar period, however, is an aberration rather than the norm in America's relationship with the world, the result of accident rather than national will. The blame must rest primarily with Wilson's arrogant obstinacy, and then with his sick state of mind, which together bred his insistence that the treaty he had negotiated at Versailles, including the League of Nations provisions, be ratified unamended. Even before Wilson suffered his first massive stroke, on October 2, 1919, he had told Dulles, whom he had left behind in Paris, that the American delegation must not participate in implementing Versailles until the Senate formally ratified the treaty. Dulles, the very inverse of an isolationist, was refused permission, to his distress, even to assign temporary U.S. delegates to the 35 committees set up to enforce the treaty. This was irrational behavior, but what followed was worse. The American people were not opposed to U.S. participation in the league. Polls taken at the time showed that Americans wanted to join a permanent peacekeeping body by ratios of four or five to one. The Republican majority in the Senate also favored a league of some kind. Fromkin calculates that the true isolationists among the Republicans were not more than a dozen, to which I would add that even some of those might have been won over by well-drafted concessions.

Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, the Republican leader, however he figures in the U.S. mythology, was no isolationist either. Boston Brahmins were internationalists. The senator's great mentors were Henry Adams and Theodore Roosevelt, both internationalists, and all the evidence suggests he aimed for the kind of league they would have approved. In all essentials, Lodge was at least as good an internationalist as Wilson; better, indeed, since less self-righteous and fixed in his views. His "Fourteen Reservations" to Wilson's Fourteen Points were designed to meet valid objections and so ensure overwhelming Senate ratification. Such reservations would have improved the treaty, on balance, and it is pretty clear that the Europeans would have accepted them (even welcomed them, in some cases) rather than forgo U.S. participation in the league. As Fromkin points out, all kinds of people associated with the peacemaking under Wilson, such as Colonel House, Herbert Hoover, and Democratic leaders like William Jennings Bryan, favored the reservations. The only opponent of any significance was Wilson himself. In March 1920, Lodge controlled 49 senators' votes in favor of the league with reservations. The 23 votes Wilson controlled, added to this 49, were more than enough to secure U.S. membership in the league. But Wilson's 23 supporters voted against the league rather than accept the Lodge reservations. So America rejected membership. An overwhelmingly internationalist country was turned in an isolationist direction as a result of a personal failure of leadership by a dying man.

It can be argued, with more justice, that America was isolationist in the 1930s. A wound-nursing flight from the rest of the world was the mood of the times and was by no means confined to the United States during what the poet W. H. Auden characterized as a "low, dishonest decade." A fear of war that verged on pacifism enveloped Britain

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and France, too, during these years. Coming after nearly 70 years of dramatic economic expansion had made America the richest and most powerful country on earth, the Depression abruptly reduced half its population to penury. There was an atmosphere of hysteria in parts of the United States during the mid-1930s, not least in Washington, characterized by outbreaks of an intellectual disease to which America is prone: conspiracy theory.

Fromkin has an interesting section on the work of Dorothy Detzer, secretary of the Women's International League, who succeeded in stampeding the Senate toward statutory isolationism by arranging a political marriage between her favorite senator, Gerald Nye of North Dakota, and Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan. The two set up a special committee under Nye to hear evidence accusing the international arms trade of fomenting war. Among other things, the Nye committee supposedly proved that links between the Wilson administration, the banks, and the arms trade brought America into the First World War, and that much the same forces, having failed to push America into the league, were now again plotting wars of profit. Nye was undoubtedly an isolationist of sorts, but Vandenberg was an internationalist by instinct who played a notable role during and after the Second World War in creating the United Nations and securing passage of the Marshall Plan. For him, as for Americans as a whole, isolationism in the 1930s was an aberration. At the time, however, the emotional drive to cut off the United States from corrupt Europe was strong, and the hearings of the Nye committee gave birth to the 1935-39 Neutrality Acts. This comprehensive and abject legislation played into the hands of dictators and undermined President Roosevelt's efforts to help democracy in Europe. It also marked a departure from traditional American diplomatic principles, including the explicit doctrine of neutral rights and the hitherto consistent willingness, even while neutral, to distinguish between aggressor and victim nations.

But it was a phase; it passed. Even in the Republican Party, where isolationism flourished in the 1930s, its power was largely negative. No isolationist fared well in national politics. Governor Alfred M. Landon of Kansas was the only isolationist (of a kind) to secure the Republican nomination for president, in 1936, and he succeeded in carrying only two states, Maine and Vermont. Thereafter, as Fromkin points out, Republican isolationists failed to nominate one of their own, even in 1952, when their tremendous effort to push Senator Robert A. Taft's candidacy collapsed beneath the Eisenhower steamroller. Thereafter isolationism was effectively dead in federal politics.

AMERICA IS HERE TO STAY

Except for those few isolationist-ridden years of the 1930s, there has never been any substantial argument about whether the United States "would choose to play a continuing role in world affairs." It has to; it wants to; it intends to. The likelihood of Clinton's America, or any other America, shrinking into an isolationist posture is nil, though there will be passionate arguments about the purpose

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and degree of commitment to intervention and still more about the command structure of international efforts. No American administration or Congress will permit another Somalia-type fiasco, and I suspect that we will soon witness a growing bipartisan demand in America for a thorough reform of the United Nations and a modernization of its peacekeeping role along lines that permit the United States to act as its primary contributor. Like it or not, America will continue to be the world's reluctant sheriff, sometimes arriving late but always getting there. News media like CNN will ensure that Americans know in detail where trouble is afoot, even before the blood is dry and the screams die down. For in the end, America remains an idealistic and moralizing society, which cannot stand idly by when gross wickedness is taking place anywhere in the world. It will be "the time of the Americans" for as far ahead as we can see, and most Americans, in their warm and strong hearts, would not wish it otherwise.

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FRANCIS FUKUYAMA

Utopia Lost: The United Nations and World Order. BY ROSEMARY RIGHTER. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1995, 421 pp. $29.95.

This frank and tough-minded appraisal argues that the United Nations has developed so complex and dysfunctional a structure and is based on such inherently contradictory premises that large parts of the international bureaucracy are beyond reform and should be allowed to wither on the vine. This is a tragedy, according to the author, chief editorial writer of *The Times* of London, because the need and opportunities for a multilateral organization responsible for collective security and international human rights standards have never been greater. With rich historical detail, Righter shows how the mechanisms of the United Nations undermine its larger purposes and impede multilateral organizations that might do the job more effectively. The author argues that it is time for Western governments to get over their patronizing tolerance for an increasingly irrelevant and discredited organization and to think seriously how to salvage a viable core. Along the way, Righter provides analyses of other multilateral organizations like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (both, in theory, agencies of the United Nations) that have managed to avoid the United Nations' disease.

The Deadly Sin of Terrorism: Its Effect on Democracy and Civil Liberty in Six Countries. EDITED BY DAVID A. CHARTERS. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994, 247 pp. $55.00.

This book, comparing antiterrorist campaigns in six democracies (the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, France, Israel, and the United States), actually contains

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considerable good news. There were widespread fears during the 1970s and 1980s that terrorism would become endemic and undermine the civil liberties of democracies suffering it. Most, however, have instead managed to cope in ways that have not damaged their democratic credentials, such as setting up specialized antiterrorist agencies and cooperating on intelligence. The book suggests that the entire terrorist problem has been oversold by the media, both as a problem and as a threat to democracy.

The Vulnerability of Empire. BY CHARLES A. KUPCHAN. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994, 527 pp. $35.00.
This book purports to explain why imperial powers pursue policies that are ultimately self-undermining. The author argues that sudden shifts in the international balance of power impel states toward overly competitive or overly cooperative strategies. Once having chosen a path, they become locked into it even when external conditions change because the strategy has become a cultural artifact. The author creates an elaborate theoretical model of state behavior with many independent variables (for example, whether the state is rising or declining, vulnerable or invulnerable) based on only five cases—Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States. The predictive value and policy relevance of this model are questionable since the same external environment can lead to diametrically opposite responses of cooperation or competition; which response is right in principle or degree cannot be known except by hindsight. Since the author admits that what constitutes self-defeating behavior in the first place is dependent on his own subjective judgment, many people will legitimately disagree with his starting premise.

Wilsonian Idealism in America. BY DAVID STEIGERWALD. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994, 296 pp. $35.00.
Unlike many books on Wilsonianism that deal narrowly with Woodrow Wilson's foreign policy legacy, this study looks at Wilson, Raymond Fosdick, Walter Lippmann, and others as exemplars of an American liberalism that took seriously the Enlightenment hope that societies could be built on universalist, rational principles. The twentieth century was hard on this group; they were attacked first from the realist right as naive internationalists who did not understand the cruelty of modern politics and then from the post-Nietzschean left that denied the possibility of universalism and the rule of reason. Particularly against the latter group, the author does not believe that more recent liberals like Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan have done a terribly successful job in protecting the Wilsonian commitment to universalism. He is strangely insistent on the incompatibility of political and economic liberalism, which have been mutually supportive in practice.

Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad. BY MICHAEL WALZER. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994, 108 pp. $16.95.
This volume by one of America's foremost moralists makes the case for distinguishing between "minimalist" moral principles, which can be applied between

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cultures and across national boundaries, and "maximalist" principles, which can only apply within a given culture. Walzer argues that a scheme for a just social distribution of goods is a "thick" argument that can only be made within a single culture; opposition to genocide and tyranny are more universal moral rules. The distinction between thick and thin is particularly important in wrestling with the rights and wrongs of national, ethnic, or tribalist assertions of cultural rights such as in the former communist world. As in previous works, the rules he suggests are very useful. However, his compartmentalization of "maximalist" critiques may be an unnecessary concession to relativism given the degree of cultural homogenization that is going on in the world alongside cultural differentiation.

Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990. BY TED HOPF. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994, 306 pp. $49.50.

In an exhaustive analysis of Soviet documents, the author argues that the deterrence theory that underlay American policy in the Third World and led to involvements in Korea, Vietnam, and elsewhere during the Cold War was not borne out by changes in Soviet thinking. That is, U.S. military intervention and other tough policies did not deter the Soviets, while other instruments such as diplomacy were more effective in provoking cooperative behavior. Excessive attention to Soviet words rather than deeds flaws the author's major conclusions. Collapse of the American position in Indochina was in fact followed by an upsurge in support for radical Third World clients, while the Reagan doctrine brought about a retrenchment of Soviet Third World commitments. However, the author raises an important issue: deterrence is much more complicated than simple models suggest. Failure to meet a commitment in a peripheral area does not necessarily undermine deterrence with respect to core interests, while reputations for softness and the reverse may be more easily won and lost than leaders think. All of this suggests the need for a more segmented view of how deterrence actually works.

Democracy and American Foreign Policy: Reflections on the Legacy of Alexis de Tocqueville. BY ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPÉ. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1995, 183 pp. $32.95.

The only word that comes to mind in describing this series of musings by one of America's inveterate diplomats and scholars is "unexceptionable." The author, drawing on themes from de Tocqueville, worries about growth of the welfare state, the impact of interest group politics on foreign policy, the deficit, nationalism, isolationism, the future of NATO, and whether democracies can run consistent foreign policies. He favors an American foreign policy based on the solidarity of democracies and multilateralism based on shared democratic ideals as preferable to the universalist United Nations. The moderately conservative views expressed here are neither foolish,

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outlandish, trivial, nor misguided. Most are sensible and argued with a refreshing directness and force. On the other hand, they are also not very surprising and do not provide much by way of a new insight on the world after the Cold War.

Referendums around the World: The Growing Use of Direct Democracy. EDITED BY DAVID BUTLER AND AUSTIN RANNEY. Washington: AEI Press, 1994, 304 pp. $19.95 (paper).

This volume suggests that referenda are not the threat to representative democracy and stability they are sometimes made out to be. Looking at the record of votes in Western Europe (including Switzerland, which has staged half the known referenda in history), Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Eastern Europe and the former U.S.S.R., and certain American states, this study concludes that referenda have seldom led to impulsive, irresponsible outcomes, and in several cases (for example, Chile and South Africa) have been positive forces for change.

U.S. Intervention Policy for the Post-Cold War World: New Challenges and New Responses. EDITED BY ARNOLD KANTER AND LINTON F. BROOKS. New York: W.W. Norton, 1995, 256 pp. $25.00.

The end of the Cold War has made the world more disorderly and so has multiplied the opportunities for American military intervention abroad. The end of the global rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union has also, however, reduced what the American public is willing to pay, in lives and treasure, to support such interventions. That is the lesson of Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti. It is also the basis for one of the themes of this interesting collection of essays, most of them by authors who have served in the American government: the need for less costly, and therefore politically acceptable, instruments of intervention. Among the instruments discussed are economic sanctions, interference with information networks, and—a new entry in the dictionary of military oxymorons that already includes "peace enforcement" and "friendly fire"—nonlethal weapons.

The essays on how the United States might intervene are supplemented by two concerning when and whether it should do so. Coit D. Blacker suggests what he terms "extremely demanding conditions" for intervention. Fareed Zakaria argues that American intervention is warranted only to secure interests in the world's "core": Western Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. Their conclusions are the basis for the book's second theme: the many post–Cold War opportunities for the United States to intervene abroad are likely to become occasions for American *non*intervention.

MICHAEL MANDELBAUM

Economic, Social, and Environmental

RICHARD N. COOPER

The Market Meets Its Match: Restructuring the Economies of Eastern Europe. BY ALICE H. AMSDEN, JACEK KOCHANOWICZ, AND LANCE TAYLOR. Cambridge: Harvard

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University Press, 1995, 250 pp. $35.00.

Lost Opportunity: Why Economic Reforms in Russia Have Not Worked. BY MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN. New York: W. W. Norton, 1994, 290 pp. $22.50.

These two books deal critically with the economic reforms of the early 1990s in formerly communist countries, although from quite different angles. Goldman's book is a lively and highly readable account of the evolution of economic reform in Russia, offering brief contrasts with economic reform and recovery in Germany and Japan after the Second World War and with Poland, Hungary, and China in recent years. He lauds Gorbachev for his political opening but is highly critical of him for equivocating on economic reform, missing the opportunity for gradualism and in effect forcing the Yeltsin-Gaidar team into their "shock treatment" of 1992, although in fact they did not introduce a full set of reforms then. He is also critical of the reformers for failing to reform the currency and for favoring privatization of state enterprises over creation of new enterprises, such as in China. But his basic message is that deep-seated Russian attitudes and institutions would have made reform difficult and prolonged even in the best of circumstances.

Amsden, Kochanowicz, and Taylor offer a detailed and scathing attack on what they take to be the uncritical application of market fundamentalism to the complex problems of transforming centrally planned economies into market-oriented economies, which they agree was necessary in both Russia and Eastern Europe. They emphasize the need for maintaining adequate aggregate domestic demand, arguing that exports could not plausibly provide adequate demand in the short to medium run; regret the effort at what they call "pseudoprivatization" on the grounds that it cannot provide the investment necessary for modernization and transformation; and argue that if there are appropriate models elsewhere in the world, they are to be found in the export-oriented dirigiste economies of East Asia, especially Japan and South Korea, with their strong government guidance, financial support, and even protection of selected activities, rather than the relatively laissez-faire British-American model.

Both these books presume that economic reforms in Russia have not worked. That judgment is premature. To be sure, they have not worked smoothly, and many Russians are materially worse off today than five years ago. But the Russian economy was deteriorating steadily before Yeltsin arrived, with little prospect of improvement without major change. That economy has been reformed dramatically, many Russians are better off, many problems remain, and the returns are not yet in.

Currencies and Politics in the United States, Germany, and Japan. BY C. RANDALL HENNING. Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1994, 406 pp. $25.00 (paper).

Henning, a political scientist, addresses the formulation and execution of monetary policy, with emphasis on its international aspects, in Germany, Japan, and the United States. He touches on earlier peri-

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ods but focuses on the 1980s and early 1990s, providing a fascinating review of such major events affecting monetary policy as the Plaza Accord of 1985, the stock market crash of October 1987, German unification in 1990, the stall of the Japanese economy in the 1990s, and the European exchange rate crises of 1992-93. Henning is interested in the dynamics of policymaking, especially the role of interested private parties such as banks and industrial firms and the influence of the institutional arrangements on exchange rate policy. There are important differences in these regards among the three countries, such as the subordination of the Bank of Japan to the Ministry of Finance (in sharp contrast to the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve) and the greater influence on policy and receptivity to the interests of industrialists in Germany and Japan than in the United States.

The author makes some bold recommendations, such as that the Bank of Japan should be independent of the MOF on the (doubtful) grounds that it would encourage more active use of fiscal policy for macroeconomic stabilization; and that the Federal Reserve Act should be amended to make clear that the Fed can intervene in foreign exchange markets on its own account. However, to draw firm conclusions about political dynamics and desirable institutional structure from the study of only three important but highly complex societies is not possible.

Straitjacket Society: An Insider's Irreverent View of Bureaucratic Japan. BY MASAO MIYAMOTO. New York: Kodansha International, 1994, 197 pp. $22.00.

This short book is both funny and saddening. It documents one man's struggle with Japanese bureaucracy as a member of it. The author is a psychiatrist with ten years' residence in the United States who returned to accept a mid-level management position in Japan's Ministry of Health and Welfare. The book draws on his frustrating experience there, supplemented by a stint at the Defense Agency. He describes the difficulty of taking a paid holiday, to which he was entitled; the pressure to stay at the office, even when there was nothing to do, for the sake of social cohesion; to go to after-office drinking sessions with the same objective; the routine verbal bullying. Efficiency, measured in hours spent per unit of useful output, was exceedingly low. Loyalty to the office and job are all important, totally subordinating personal life, which is stinted as a result. "Family" has high cultural value, but it means taking a spouse and having children, not otherwise interacting with them. Precedent is all-important in framing policy. Innovation is frowned upon unless it originates from overwhelming pressure from "outside," for example, irresistible domestic political or foreign pressure.

No doubt some of these characteristics can be found in all bureaucracies, private as well as public. Recall the pressures for conformity in dress and thought in American firms three decades ago. But Japan seems to carry pressures for group conformity and groupthink to an extreme. The author characterizes his country as totalitarian without a Big Brother.

The publication of this material in Japan contradicts so severe a judgment. It first appeared as a series of articles in a Japanese monthly, then as a book that

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became a best seller. The author's reward within the ministry, after repeated warnings about breaking a taboo on telling stories out of school, was to be transferred out of Tokyo headquarters to the port of Tokyo as quarantine officer, then to Yokohama, thence, after the book, even further away to Kobe. Destination Okinawa?

The Road to Monetary Union in Europe: The Emperor, the Kings, and the Genies. BY TOMMASO PADOA-SCHIOPPA. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, 286 pp. $49.95.

Padoa-Schioppa is deputy director general of the Bank of Italy, that most cerebral branch of the government that has provided Italy with two technocratic prime ministers during the last five years. This book collects essays on European monetary developments that were written between 1982 and 1992, capped with an introduction that provides a superb overview of European monetary integration. The author was an important insider during the past decade and identified early what he calls the "inconsistent quartet" of free trade, free capital movements, fixed exchange rates, and autonomous national monetary policies, which cannot coexist in the long run. He foresaw that Europe would either have to go forward to eliminate autonomous national monetary policies through a monetary union, or else the other three elements would inevitably be eroded over time, leading Europe to drift away from a single market. He thus early became a thoughtful advocate of a single European monetary authority, although not necessarily from above, through a treaty. Once the Maastricht treaty emerged, he not surprisingly supported it vigorously, while not being unmindful of its flaws, particularly its substantial enlargement of the democratic gap in Europe.

Military, Scientific and Technological

ELIOT A. COHEN

The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World. EDITED BY MICHAEL HOWARD, GEORGE J. ANDREOPOULOS, AND MARK R. SHULMAN. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994, 303 pp. $30.00.

War and Law Since 1945. BY GEOFFREY BEST. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, 434 pp. $39.95.

Two different, complementary, and important books. Howard, Andreopoulos, and Shulman have edited a fine collection of essays that are organized chronologically and are generally clear, concise, and informative. Particularly notable are Josiah Ober's summary of restraints in Greek warfare, which he argues generally served the interests of the hoplite class, and Gunther Rothenberg's intriguing contention that ancien régime standards of restraint survived the Napoleonic revolution in warfare. Adam Roberts is blunt on the paradox of the progression of a formal international law of war and the horrors that accompanied its bloody conduct during the first half of this century. The

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volume's only flaw is its scant attention to limitations on war in Asian societies, most notably Japan and China.

Geoffrey Best focuses more on international humanitarian law per se and, as his title suggests, the contemporary period. A hard-headed (and somewhat disillusioned) idealist, he discusses politics and institutions as well as formal law. His description of the post–World War II reconstruction of international law on humanitarian conduct is particularly interesting. Neither volume suggests a grand conclusion, save that humanitarian restraint in war most certainly does occur, but not without favorable preconditions and considerable effort by the combatants. Nor would any of these authors contend that war is becoming more restrained, except, perhaps, when waged by the most developed states.

Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflicts. BY GUY GOODWIN-GILL AND ILENE COHN. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, 228 pp. $39.95 (paper, $17.95).

This study for the Henry Dunant Institute in Geneva documents and suggests remedies for the pervasive use of children as soldiers. The spread of insurrectionary war and simple chaos in various parts of the world is conducive to the use of children—as American soldiers recently learned in Somalia. The photographs of child combatants herein are wrenching.

Peace Operations: Field Manual 100-23. BY THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY. Washington: Department of the Army, 1994, 131 pp.

A valiant attempt to reduce the messiness of peacemaking, peace enforcement, and various other muddy missions of the U.S. Army in the Somalias, Kurdistans, Haitis, and Macedonias. The authors begin, warily, with a remark attributed to former U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld: "Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it." The manual holds that the basic tenets of army operations, as outlined in the operations manual for all-out conflict, apply to peacekeeping operations as well, a debatable proposition. In a conscientious effort to adapt the army to these uncomfortable (but hardly unprecedented) missions, the writers search for clarifying assumptions. But some of their assertions—a clearly defined mission is the key to the successful planning and execution of a peace operation, for example—lead one to ask how likely reality is to fit doctrine.

Information Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway. BY WINN SCHWARTAU. New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1994, 432 pp. $22.95.

Alarmist and shrill, this is nonetheless a useful book about the dark side of the information age. The author insists that all are vulnerable to electronic snooping and sabotage by individuals, organizations, and governments, and that the public drastically underestimates the extent of this activity. The assertions are overheated and often poorly substantiated, but Schwartau, a prolific cyberjournalist, makes enough telling points to be worth reading. If nothing else, his catalogue of cyberwar incidents (usually striking episodes of computer hacking or minor physical glitches in information systems that have caused large-scale con-

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fusion) is a reminder of the widespread dependence on digital communications and information. Like many other writers on this subject, he has less to say about defensive measures that can reduce society's collective vulnerability to information warfare attacks. A vital subject, but one still awaiting rigorous depiction.

The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate. BY SCOTT D. SAGAN AND KENNETH N. WALTZ. New York: W. W. Norton, 1995, 170 pp. $16.95.

Sagan and Waltz have taken two recent, divergent articles and added a pair of rebuttals. The result is a short and worthwhile but inconclusive debate about whether the spread of nuclear weapons is a good thing. Waltz, one of the most influential theorists of international relations, expresses a degree of equanimity about the consequences of nuclear proliferation that most members of the foreign policy establishment will find horrifyingly complacent. Sagan, considerably more junior but widely published on the organization of nuclear strategy, powerfully argues the dangers of preventive war, accident, and miscalculation. Although both fall back on historical examples, one is struck by the degree to which history may not provide a very clear guide about the risks (or, if one agrees with Waltz, the rewards) to an international political order arising from nuclear proliferation.

Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War. BY JAMES KITFIELD. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995, 477 pp. $25.00.

The acknowledgments here are suggestive: the author thanks generals and admirals for their interviews and guidance. A good book, but an inside story told to a sympathetic journalist by top brass. More detached, comprehensive, and possibly skeptical studies will surely come, but in the meantime this tells a large part of the story and provides insight into the mentality of the American high command.

Implementing the Comprehensive Test Ban: New Aspects of Definition, Organization, and Verification. EDITED BY ERIC ARNETT. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, 128 pp. $39.95 (paper, $26.00).

Largely a technical study. The authors are firm proponents of a comprehensive nuclear test ban (American reservations prior to the Clinton administration being defined as stonewalling). A brief but competent survey of issues pertaining to the monitoring of such a treaty, the monograph is silent on the kinds and consequences of cheating. The appendices include the Swedish and Australian drafts of a treaty, which the essays compare.

Trial by Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive, America's Last Vietnam Battle. BY DALE ANDRADÉ. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1995, 600 pp. $24.95.

A solid and well-recounted narrative of the penultimate communist Vietnamese attempt to end the conflict, this book fills an important gap in the history of the Vietnam War. Drawing on archival sources as well as interviews, the author

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takes the perspective of the small band of American advisers who helped South Vietnamese forces stalemate the North Vietnamese assault. Particularly interesting is his contention that General Vo Nguyen Giap's strategy for the Easter offensive was flawed, and its implementation, often inept. It was, nonetheless, a brutal and bloody struggle decided, in the author's view, by the valor and skill of American advisers, a torrent of American air power, and the determination of some parts of the South Vietnamese military. This book does better than most in attempting to portray the Vietnamese perspective, South and North, but it remains, nonetheless, resolutely focused on the United States. Perhaps America's last Vietnam battle, but not, alas, Vietnam's.

The United States

DAVID C. HENDRICKSON

Temptations of a Superpower. BY RONALD STEEL. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995, 144 pp. $18.95.

This short volume, based on the inaugural Goldman lecture at the Library of Congress, is an eloquent meditation on the role of the United States in the world. Steel, a professor at the University of Southern California, believes that the foreign policy elite has lost touch with the interests of the nation and that its globalist vision—increasingly archaic with the end of the Cold War—stands as a profound obstacle to the reformation of domestic society. Steel is particularly effective as a critic of neo-Wilsonianism, and he gives a cogent account of the moral and practical hazards attending the indiscriminate support of national self-determination, the pursuit of collective security, and the coercive promotion of democracy. In a book filled with severe strictures against intervention, he carves out, somewhat surprisingly, a substantial exception for humanitarian interventions to end genocide, arguing that the failure of the United States to intervene in Rwanda and Cambodia was "shameful." (Even critics of imperial temptations, one must conclude, are not entirely free of the syndromes they normally lambaste.) As in his first book, *The End of Alliance,* published over 30 years ago, Steel consigns NATO to the dustbin of history. Though one must concede that these obituaries appear more and more plausible, Steel makes no attempt to confront the peculiar obstacles that the European Union, with Germany inevitably in the vanguard, would face in maintaining order in Europe without the pacifying presence of American power.

Security and Sacrifice: Isolation, Intervention, and American Foreign Policy. BY ELLIOTT ABRAMS. Indianapolis: Hudson Institute, 1995, 150 pp. $19.95 (paper, $12.95).

This compact and readable volume by a neoconservative who served in the Reagan administration articulates a post–Cold War foreign policy that attempts to strike a balance between Americans' "hopes for democracy and peace, and their fear of foreign commitments." Both the hopes and the fears, Abrams argues, are deeply rooted in America's historic experience, which he examines thoughtfully in the middle part

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of the book. The public, disdainful of realpolitik, demands a strong human rights policy but will support the sacrifice of American lives only if core security interests are at stake. Neither Bosnia nor Somalia qualifies under this standard, though in the former case Abrams believes, quite implausibly, that lifting the arms embargo would have brought about a settlement satisfactory to the Muslims without U.S. intervention. Abrams is skeptical of multilateralism, hostile to the United Nations and humanitarian intervention, and hawkish on proliferation, terrorism, and strategic defenses. Whatever one thinks of these stances, which run closely parallel to the outlook of the new Republican majority in Congress, aspects of Abrams' argument do not add up to a coherent whole. His call for a "hemispheric strategy" and his belief that outside the Western hemisphere "military intervention by the United States would in most circumstances be a grave mistake" seems difficult to square, in particular, with his sharp criticism of President Clinton for failing to fund adequately the defense budget, which rests, after all, on a "two war" strategy keyed to regional contingencies outside this hemisphere.

Beyond NATO: Staying Out of Europe's Wars. BY TED GALEN CARPENTER. Washington: Cato Institute, 1994, 172 pp. $18.95 (paper, $9.95)

This policy brief begins by presenting a battery of arguments against NATO expansion and ends by questioning whether the Atlantic alliance should continue to exist at all. Carpenter, the head of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and a long-time skeptic of entangling alliances, is a zestful polemicist and entertaining writer, though he tends to wield a pickax when a stiletto would do nicely. He is most effective in highlighting the dangers attending the more extravagant versions of NATO expansion (those, for example, that would bring in the Baltics and Ukraine) and is refreshingly iconoclastic on all Balkan miseries. Least persuasive is his scorn for the "alleged" community of interest that links the United States to Western Europe and continues to justify a critical role for the alliance. In a book notable for its profound skepticism of utopian assumptions, his optimistic view of the security arrangements Western Europe would adopt in the absence of American power seems, well, utopian.

Hard Bargain: How F.D.R. Twisted Churchill's Arm, Evaded the Law, and Changed the Role of the American Presidency. BY ROBERT SHOGAN. New York: Scribner, 1995, 310 pp. $24.00.

An absorbing account of the destroyers-for-bases deal between Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill in early September 1940. Despite Churchill's urgent pleas, culminating in his famous dispatch of July 31, 1940—"Mr. President, with great respect, I must tell you that in the long history of the world, this is a thing to do now"—Roosevelt delayed acting until he had devised the stratagem of trading the destroyers for bases, which gave him political cover and provided the

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legal loophole ("the comma that saved a kingdom") through which his administration could jump. Shogan sees Roosevelt's maneuvers as giant steps on the road to the imperial presidency; he charges F.D.R. with twisting the law, violating neutral obligations, flouting the Constitution, hoodwinking the public, and distorting the political process. Though some of these judgments are hyperbolic, even those inclined to grant Roosevelt the benefit of the doubt can read Shogan's account with profit. The work sustains a fine narrative pace and includes a wide range of well-drawn biographical sketches.

Cold War Illusions: America, Europe, and Soviet Power: 1969–1989. BY DANA H. ALLIN. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, 260 pp. $39.95.

"Who won the Cold War?" is a question that continues to attract a cottage industry of books and essays. Allin, deputy director of the Aspen Institute in Berlin, is intent on denying the trophy to neoconservatives, whose analysis of Soviet power in the 1970s and 1980s, he argues, badly misread the significance of the Soviet buildup in nuclear forces, grossly overestimated West European temptations toward neutrality, and in general combined bad advice with distorted analysis during the concluding phase of the Cold War. Allin's basic contention—that containment and deterrence provided a workable shield behind which the flourishing societies of the West might highlight the internal rot of the Soviet system—is persuasive. The fact remains, however, that the Reagan-Bush Republicans, strongly influenced by more alarmist depictions of the Cold War struggle, presided over its end. Allin contends that Republican policy delayed rather than hastened this victory, a provocative hypothesis that will be sharply contested.

Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies. BY JOHN HERD THOMPSON AND STEPHEN J. RANDALL. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1994, 387 pp. $45.00 (paper, $18.95).

The ninth volume in a distinguished series, edited by Lester Langley, on the United States and the Americas. Thompson and Randall, professors at Duke and Calgary, provide a judicious overview of the "asymmetrical" and "essentially one-sided" relationship between the United States and Canada. While Americans, as a Canadian columnist once complained, "know and care the square root of squat" about their northern neighbor, Canadian identities have been deeply shaped by an ambivalent and normally obsessive relationship with the American behemoth. Given the range of years and topics covered (the authors begin with the revolutionary collapse of the first British Empire in 1776 and devote considerable attention to social and cultural factors along the way), the book tends to proceed by way of summary judgment and witty anecdote but is nevertheless impartial and authoritative. The authors see the alignment of policies from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, under the Tories and Republicans, as a deviation from the norm and believe that the weight of history will set strict limits on the emergence of "a new consensus and convergence" between the two countries.

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Western Europe

FRITZ STERN

The Hollow Years: France in the 1930s. BY EUGEN WEBER. New York: W. W. Norton, 1994, 352 pp. $25.00.

An authority on French history has written a brilliant survey of the key aspects of French life in the decade before the debacle. A pointillist approach—full of individual anecdotes—that gives a portrait of confusion and conflict, of cultural creativity and political dithering. The author's admirable erudition—and the stunning command of sources, published and unpublished, ingeniously assembled—is rendered in lighthearted, witty, but unfailingly perceptive commentary. Incisive judgments abound: "Catholicism was the Right at prayer," especially at the time of the Popular Front. A pithy summary of French ambivalence about America's growing presence: "Americans were young, rich, generous, physically seductive, mentally deficient, culturally detrimental." Weber writes with affection and stringent regret, and he does much to explain France's decline and defeat. He makes one ponder how in the postwar decades France regained resilience and in essential ways transformed itself.

Ambassador Frederic Sackett and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic, 1930-1933: The United States and Hitler's Rise to Power. BY BERNARD V. BURKE. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, 330 pp. $44.95.

In 1930, President Hoover dispatched Sackett, a Kentucky senator with strong mining interests and fervent anticommunism, to Berlin. Sackett established the closest relations with Chancellor Brüning at the beginning of the end of Weimar. He went native—came to represent German interests—and regretted that he had no leverage with American bankers who conducted their own important financial policies. Sackett's reports record his boundless admiration of Brüning and his hopes of helping him achieve far-reaching revisions of the Versailles Treaty by negotiations. Washington was passive, and Burke criticizes Sackett for appealing to American anticommunism rather than focusing on the Nazi danger. After Brüning's dismissal in May 1932, Sackett lost all hope; he saw the enfeebled Social Democrats as virtually the only democratic hope and rightly called them "a most effective bulwark against Communism." The book is based on the author's doctoral dissertation of 1966, with an impressive array of archival sources; it incorporates some of the subsequent scholarship but is undistinguished in style and analysis. At an exorbitant price!

Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain, 1942-1945. BY DAVID REYNOLDS. New York: Random House, 1995, 555 pp. $30.00.

A brilliant study of what the massive presence of G.I.s in wartime Britain meant to the English and to American troops—of which there were 1.5 million just before D-Day and a total of 3 million over the entire war years. An account of official policies, of Allied cooperation and wrangling, of

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actual lives lived and, in many cases, subsequently and often faultily remembered. A generous work, from which, inter alia, Eisenhower emerges as an inspired and caring commander for whom harmonious relations with the English was a high priority. The author, an English historian married to an American architect, is particularly sensitive to the fate of black G.I.s, segregated by prejudice and often policy, who experienced official British racism and also a country that was far freer of the color line than the country from which they came and to which, often wiser, they returned. This emphatic work, widely researched, lucidly written, with its sensitive and imaginative analyses, focuses on neglected aspects of what—for all the difficulties and dark sides—was surely the gentlest "occupation" of the entire war.

The Secret State: British Internal Security In the Twentieth Century. BY RICHARD THURLOW. Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994, 458 pp. $44.95.

A British historian tackles the elusive story of official surveillance, security arrangements, and counterintelligence in the context of the great challenges to British interests, beginning with the harsh and sometimes ludicrous measures of the First World War and continued with the "red threat" as represented by the Soviet tie to the British Communist Party (the British had decoded Soviet intercepts in the early years of the Soviet regime), the Second World War, Northern Ireland, and the Cold War. After the defeat of France, the British government yielded to the demands of MI5 and other agencies and interned native fascists and enemy aliens, many of them refugees from Hitler's Germany, thereby expanding the infringements of rights beyond what had been done in the Great War. British security fastened on and infiltrated the communist party, largely unsuspecting that the real Soviet espionage was carried out by traitors within the establishment. The author relates that most of the time British authorities tried to strike a balance between the assumed needs of the state and the historical rights of the citizen. A sketchy if suggestive book, based on declassified material and on earlier extensive works such as Christopher M. Andrew's *Her Majesty's Secret Service.* Thurlow complains of Britain's "cult of secrecy," fiercer, he argues, than that of the United States.

The End of an Era? Europe, 1945-1990s. EDITED BY ANTONIO VARSORI. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, 449 pp. $59.95.

A collection of papers written for a 1991 Florence conference. There are 21 studies of various aspects of European politics and security from the end of the Second World War to the mid-1950s and then 10 articles on 1989-91. A melange, with some important contributions.

France, Germany, and the Western Alliance. BY PHILIP H. GORDON. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, 127 pp. $39.95 (paper, $14.95).

A succinct analysis of Franco-German relations in matters of defense and foreign policy. The author, a British student of French and strategic affairs, gives a brief account of the historic reconciliation between the two countries after 1949 and argues that in the new post–Cold War era,

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French-German collaboration will have a harder time—without the Soviet threat as a raison d'être. Germans have a stronger interest in Eastern Europe; the French have an anxious concern with North Africa: their policies in the former Yugoslavia already diverged. The French have become uneasy about their newly unified neighbor, and still the Franco-German alliance within the NATO alliance is likely to remain fundamental to a Europe that has once again become more skeptical about American leadership.

Western Hemisphere

KENNETH MAXWELL

The Politics of the Possible: The Brazilian Rural Workers' Trade Union Movement, 1964-1985. BY BIORN MAYBURY-LEWIS. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994, 297 pp. $19.95 (paper).

Few foreigners have so intimate an engagement with Brazil as Maybury-Lewis, currently a professor at the University of Amazonas. Living as a child with the Shavante along the Rio das Mortes in Mato Grosso in the late 1950s and returning many times for travel, research, and long sojourns, he has used his extraordinary access to produce a profoundly important work on the emergence of the Brazilian rural labor movement, which came to comprise some 2,800 trade unions representing 8 million rural workers. Against all odds, rural workers were able to carve out for themselves a vital political space during the repressive military dictatorship that ruled Latin America's largest country between 1964 and 1985, and they did so in the face of the murder of local leaders, kidnapping, rape, illegal arrest, and other human rights violations. Although his book bears the marks, in places, of the Columbia University political science dissertation it came from, at its core are a series of closely observed and reported case studies of union organization and grassroots community struggles for justice that are small classics.

With the end of a revolutionary option and in the face of the vast powers of co-optation held by the modern state, yet with deepening poverty facing an ever-increasing number of the world's people, Maybury-Lewis argues that his study demonstrates that "even under the most repressive circumstances, and at times when economic and political conditions appear to benefit the few while leaving out the many, social movements still find ways to organize, educate, and advance themselves. Such movements are conquering what is possible to conquer today, and preparing for tomorrow by the creative use of available political space." For anyone who worries about what happens in Latin America beyond the macroeconomic statistics, this is as good a place as any to begin.

Identities in North America: The Search for Community. EDITED BY ROBERT L. EARLE AND JOHN D. WIRTH. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995, 256 pp. $45.00 (paper, $14.95).

With or without NAFTA, powerful economic and social forces are bringing the

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United States, Mexico, Canada, and their peoples closer together. In the longer term, trade and investment may be some of the least profound elements in this new equation. This rich and accessible book argues that ongoing changes within North America will stimulate an examination of each nation's sense of identity and provide fresh opportunities for cooperation. Based on several years of trinational discussion, John Wirth, of Stanford and the North American Institute of Santa Fe, New Mexico, and Robert Earle, who is former minister counselor for public affairs at the U.S. embassy in Mexico, have brought together 13 scholars from Mexico, Canada, and the United States in an attempt to assess some of the key elements that make up this emerging dynamic. They assess group identities, group interaction, and regional perspectives, including Quebec and the new binationalism of western Canada and the U.S. Pacific Northwest, the Gulf of Mexico as North America's maritime frontier, and the U.S.-Mexican border.

Unlike many of the writers on these potentially divisive questions, the authors of this volume are generally positive in their assessments. Yet the editors are not naive, pointing out in their thoughtful introduction that "the need to focus on the validity of values other than their own may catch Americans unprepared to grasp the new realities of interdependence." In his contribution on American identity, Marc Pacher concludes that America "will find, in the end, that being North American is not the same as being American." These are not issues that impact on elites or policymakers exclusively, of course, and the authors may be too modest in their assessments of the political fallout and its unpredictability. This fascinating book shows the outlines of those forces that are inexorably making the 21st century.

Rethinking Protestantism in Latin America. EDITED BY VIRGINIA GARRARD-BURNETT AND DAVID STOLL. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993, 234 pp. $18.95 (paper).

Edited by two leading specialists on Latin American Protestantism, Virginia Gerrard-Burnet of the University of Texas at Austin and David Stoll, author of several books on the topic, this important volume upsets much conventional wisdom. Elizabeth Brusco argues that born-again religion helps Latin American women resocialize their men away from destructive machismo more effectively than secular feminism. Lesley Gill and Linda Green, who examine Guatemala and Bolivia, show how indigenous women use evangelical social organization as a survival vehicle. And John Burdick, in an excellent chapter on Brazil, a nation that represents 40 percent of the Latin American and half the evangelical population, argues forcefully against the orthodox view that evangelical populations are politically passive and inherently conservative. Based on a close case study of evangelical communities in one of the worst areas of Rio de Janeiro, he shows how a commitment to living correctly and to cleanliness can quickly translate into a concern about bad drinking water, dangerous buses and roads, unstable tenure of homes and plots, and lack of electricity—in short, into community activism. It remains to be seen, as

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Garrard-Burnett concludes, whether "Protestantism in Latin America may ultimately be as the Pentecostals like to say a 'consuming fire' that forges and purifies—or burns and destroys. In either case it is clear that this Protestant movement is a reformation in the most literal sense of the word: a re-forming of the religious, social, and political contours of contemporary Latin America."

Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Republics

ROBERT LEGVOLD

Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West. BY DAVID RIEFF. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995, 240 pp. $22.00.

Rieff is twice different from other commentators on the Balkans. First, for him, the issue is settled; the disaster is complete; Bosnia is destroyed, with nothing to be saved. The ongoing struggle to control the carnage and find some basis for ending the war—at a minimum to prevent its escalation or spread—has no meaning for him when set alongside what the West has lost of its soul, the integrity of its most cherished values, and, not least, its capacity to act in still more fateful circumstances. Second, where other writers start from an analysis of the Bosnian tragedy, its causes, and the reasons for its course and only from the side smuggle in sentiment and indictment, Rieff's aim is different, and on that he is up front. He intends his book to be a skewering of Western governments and the U.N. agencies whose skirts they hid behind for letting the tragedy happen. Analysis and the recounting of what he saw serve simply as skewers.

So this is an angry, indignant writer—a journalist who frankly admits to the bias many have accused the Western press of having on the Bosnian war—freely lambasting U.S. administrations, European politicians, and even the U.N. Protection Force. Why then read the book? First, because his is one of the first serious attempts to deal systematically with the responsibility of those on the outside, including the United Nations, for what has happened, as opposed to the many other books assigning responsibility among those on the inside. Second because, with the potency of a very talented writer, he carries the reader beyond the wrenching facts of the war to the deep, twisted meaning they have come to have for the people there and, no less, for those of us far away. This last he does by asking as insistently as anyone could what it signifies to have permitted genocide to destroy a country. The great powers could have prevented it, he believes, though only at very great cost to themselves. What, is his ultimate question, are the implications for their future of refusing to pay great costs for great principles?

Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed. BY ROBERT J. DONIA AND JOHN V. A. FINE, JR. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, 318 pp. $24.95.

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In a quiet, detached way the authors of this study make the tragedy of Bosnia seem all the more monstrous. They are two historians: Fine, a medieval specialist on Bosnia, recounts the history from the Middle Ages through the Ottoman conquest in 1463 to its collapse in 1878; Donia, a historian of the Habsburg era, takes over from there, reconstructing the story from the arrival of Austro-Hungarian forces to the destruction of the country in the present period. With the calm authority of their craft, they firmly crush the silliness of popular conception. Not only, they make plain, has Bosnia existed as a separate, identifiable entity over all these years, with borders more intact than either Croatia or Serbia, but, until the present century, it has never known ethnic conflict. Its history, they insist, has through the centuries been one of tolerated diversity and practical compromises. Violence has occurred and much of it, but not among the three major groups constituting the country, let alone over ethnic identity or even very much over religion.

The book is only 270 pages of small-paged text, simply written, with something of the character of a skilled high-school text. That is appropriate. Given what the warring parties in the region are doing to their history, for others to be saving and preserving it for future generations is a modestly noble act.

Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today. BY J. MICHAEL WALLER. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, 390 pp. $57.00 (paper, $19.95).

This is a valuable book. Set aside Waller's breathless discovery that Gorbachev was a committed communist, who sought to preserve the system while reforming it, making him no enemy of the old KGB; his book explores in great detail the failed effort to remake the massive bureaucracies of the security police in both the Gorbachev and Yeltsin eras. Not that some brave souls did not try. One of the most useful aspects of the book is Waller's careful examination of Vadim Bakatin's serious attempts to reform the KGB in the last months of the Soviet Union after the botched August 1991 putsch. (He was its last Soviet director.) They failed generously, and Waller shows why.

Under Yeltsin, as Waller well demonstrates, the new KGB and its now separated foreign intelligence arm are not new at all. Far from transformed or restaffed, they remain essentially as before and available to a strong-arm leader. The problem is not merely the incredible powers of regeneration within these agencies, but, as Waller acknowledges, without much exploring the point, the lack of will and resources on the outside. One would have to be a little naive to expect the police to have undergone cleansing and reshaping when no other structures of power have. (That the party, one of these structures, is but a shadow of its former self owes nothing to reform—only to its collapse.) Even less should the recasting of the KGB be expected, when leading politicians are no longer so sure they want it to happen.

The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia. BY NINA TUMARKIN. New York: Basic Books, 1994, 242 pp. $25.00.

As a historian, Tumarkin is an iconographer—an intensely involved student of two of the Soviet Union's three great

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cults: the cult of Lenin and the cult of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet name for World War II. In both cases, her interest entwines with a personal quest to come to terms with frequent and early death in her family. Her first book was on the Lenin cult. Here she attempts to understand the meaning of the war for the Soviet people and the use made of it by the regime, particularly in Brezhnev's time, when not much else existed by which to inspire workers and citizens.

Because she puts so much of herself into the book, because she lets the history echo through the moving stories of individuals, and because her writing carries the reader along, the book is engaging and emotionally satisfying. From the moments she spends with a volunteer group along the Volga river, unearthing the bones of unburied soldiers, cleaning them, and reburying them through her conversations with the sculptors who carved the war's monuments, one comes away from these pages with a much deeper and richer understanding of what the awful exactions of World War II have done to the people of this country. Analytically, however, Tumarkin does not try seriously to fathom the complex relationship of the regime to the war or the war's place in the leadership's mentality. Opposite her portrait of an immensely human people, she creates a cardboard government, too vacuous and vulgar.

A Long Walk to Church: A Contemporary History of Russian Orthodoxy. BY NATHANIEL DAVIS. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, 381 pp. $75.00 (paper, $27.50).

For the general reader interested in religion in Russia—and, considering the important role of Russian Orthodoxy in the country, many should be—this is now the best book. Davis takes the church from its initial battles with Bolshevism after the 1917 revolution, through the near-fatal years of Stalin and the repressions of Khrushchev, to the at times traumatic rebirth during the collapse of Soviet power. The story is laid out in a clear, uncluttered fashion, built from the most fundamental kinds of questions such as whether there is "something intrinsic in the natural order that prevents the triumph of antireligion."

Most of the book focuses on the contemporary period. The history, about a third of the book, is there genuinely as background and is very helpful. For the rest, Davis systematically explores the reconstitution of the Russian Orthodox Church in Gorbachev's last years and the explosion of possibility with the collapse of the Soviet Union. So, too, however, does he address the explosion of schisms within the church and conflicts with sister faiths in Ukraine, a crucial base of Russian Orthodoxy. And he takes on the question of the church hierarchy's collaboration with the KGB, a painful but, as he sees it, complex issue. There are also informative chapters on the clergy, convents, theological training, publications, and heirs of the illegal or underground church. As for the laity, Davis seems to conclude that, while the effort to create a "society against God" failed, its residual, a "society without God," has more staying power.

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Middle East

WILLIAM B. QUANDT

Israel and the Peace Process, 1977–1982: In Search of Legitimacy for Peace. BY YAACOV BAR-SIMAN-TOV. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994, 338 pp. $21.95 (paper).

Major foreign policy shifts come not just from war and conflict, but also from serious moves toward peace. Bar-Siman-Tov shows in convincing detail that peacemaking, as seen by Israeli leaders in the late 1970s, can be difficult and require immense political skills, not only in dealing with one's ostensible adversary, but also on the home front. Indeed, in the domestic arena the peace may well be won or lost. Menachem Begin, the author shows, was particularly successful in convincing the Israeli establishment that his deal with Egypt was in Israel's long-term interest. He often faced criticism along the way for giving up too much, for misreading the intentions of President Sadat, and for breaking fundamental taboos of Israeli foreign policy. But Begin skillfully warded off the challenges to his leadership and reoriented Israeli foreign policy toward peace with Egypt. The author holds out cautious hope that the peace process will continue, but most of this case study deals with the breakthrough with Egypt. The empirical account contains few surprises, although the author has made good use of published materials and has interviewed many of the Israeli actors.

The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-Determination, 1969–1994. BY EDWARD W. SAID. New York: Pantheon Books, 1994, 450 pp. $27.50.

Few interested in the contemporary Middle East will not be familiar with Edward Said. An articulate, passionate, and often angry voice on behalf of Palestinian rights, Said has been a major critic of the policies of the United States, Israel, the corrupt Arab regimes, and most recently the PLO itself. This collection of his previously published essays brings together a wide range of provocative pieces. Many focus on the Palestinians themselves, but others deal with American policy, the role of intellectuals, the failures of Arab political regimes, and the roots of Islamist activism. Few are spared the sharpness of his pen. Throughout, he displays little taste for politics as often practiced—the games of maneuver, the prevalence of short-term thinking and personal aggrandizement, the search for halfway measures. His preference for politics as principle makes him intolerant, to say the least, of most politicians, pundits, and political analysts. Despite his moments of irritating self-righteousness, no one can read these essays without being moved—sometimes to anger, more often to greater empathy with the Palestinians. The greatest tribute to Said as a thinker and writer is that he forces one to think and to question, even when disagreeing. The introduction is of special interest.

The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955–1967. BY FAWAZ A. GERGES. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, 274 pp. $60.00 (paper, $18.95).

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This is an excellent first book by a young Lebanese scholar. He brings analytical sophistication and detailed knowledge of a wide variety of sources to bear on a crucial period when the Cold War was being fought out in the Middle East. He is quick to note that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was particularly successful in exerting its influence in the region. In addition, the local powers quickly learned to exploit the superpower rivalry. He also vividly conveys how the Israeli challenge exacerbated inter-Arab relations. Finally, relying on Arabic sources, he gives a glimpse into the internal decision-making of Egypt and other Arab states, noting that they often overestimated their importance to outside powers. This well-researched and objective study is a welcome addition to serious history written by Middle East scholars from the region.

Small Media, Big Revolution: Communication, Culture, and the Iranian Revolution. BY ANNABELLE SREBERNY-MOHAMMADI AND ALI MOHAMMADI. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994, 225 pp. $44.95 (paper, $17.95).

The authors make no secret of their political sympathies: they opposed the shah's regime and hoped to see a progressive, populist revolution emerge from the Islamic revolution. Instead, shortly after the revolution they left Iran, disillusioned by the Islamic theocracy that Ayatollah Khomeini imposed. Along the way they collected a great deal of fascinating material about how the various currents that made up the Iranian Revolution used communications technology to advance their goals. Much has been said about the role of cassette recordings of Khomeini's sermons in creating a mass following for the Islamists. But this is the first serious study of how informal networks of "small" media emerged, undermining the shah's best efforts to control the "big" media. Cassettes could reach a preliterate audience in a way that print never could, and thus the role of intellectuals in the Iranian Revolution differed from those in other cases, and political discourse had a different tone. The Iranian Revolution succeeded in providing "authenticity" and "identity" to its followers, but at the expense of reason and democracy. The authors wistfully conclude that on balance the Iranian Revolution has been an enormous failure, precisely because it did little to advance freedom and tolerance.

Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad. BY ZIAD ABU-AMR. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994, 169 pp. $29.95 (paper, $10.95).

As Yasir Arafat struggles to make something out of the flawed agreement that he signed with Israel on the White House lawn, his most vigorous opponents in the Palestinian camp are the Islamists. For many years, however, the Islamist trend in Palestinian politics was hardly visible. As Abu-Amr argues, it took the intifada of 1987 to shake up the bureaucratic structures and authority of the PLO and to mobilize new activists in the West Bank

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and Gaza. Many found the mosque an appealing arena for politics, and preexisting organizations, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, were ready to give shape to the movements that soon became known as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. This short monograph supplies much relevant background, but the author has not done much to update the earlier Arabic version, so it casts little light on recent years. As for the future, Abu-Amr contents himself with a few general observations. As many as 40 percent of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza may support the Islamic trend (recent polls put the figure closer to 20 percent). If the PLO fails to deliver on its promises of an independent Palestinian state, the Islamic trend will gain ground. Social conservatism will grow hand in hand with Islamism. Despite some limitations in scope, this is the best book for gaining an insight into the convoluted relationship of the Palestinian nationalist mainstream and the Islamic tendency.

The Twilight of British Ascendancy in the Middle East: A Case Study of Iraq, 1941–1950. BY DANIEL SILVERFARB. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, 306 pp. $49.95.

As British and American archives become available to historians of the modern Middle East, a number of good case studies of the 1940s and 1950s are being written. This well-researched monograph focuses on the reassertion of British control in Iraq during World War II, followed by a difficult period of shoring up Iraqi political elites. They had to assert their independence from Britain to win support from nationalists while needing the British connection to sustain its prerogatives. Few surprises here, but the author does suggest that Britain would have protected its imperial interests in the region just as well without air bases in Iraq.

Western Dominance and Political Islam: Challenge and Response. BY KHALED BIN SAYEED. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994, 197 pp. $19.95 (paper).

For those whose view of Islamic political movements has been excessively skewed by the media portrayal of Islamic fundamentalism, the author offers a serious effort to reconcile Islamic beliefs with the modern world. A number of important Islamic modernists are discussed. Missing, however, is a political analysis of why these enlightened views seem to have such a modest popular following.

The Other Side of Deception: A Rogue Agent Exposes the Mossad's Secret Agenda. BY VICTOR OSTROVSKY. New York: HarperCollins, 1994, 315 pp. $24.00.

In 1990, Victor Ostrovsky wrote *By Way of Deception*, which contained convincing tidbits about Mossad recruitment methods and operations. How much was true could not easily be determined, but some Israelis close to Mossad were very unhappy that it had been published. Now the author says that the present book is part of an effort to discredit a right-wing faction within Mossad and was done in cooperation with a moderate Mossad faction with whom he was in touch since his supposed departure from the spy agency in 1986. Why should anyone believe that this book is any more genuine than the

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previous one? It suffers from some of the same flaws: extensive quotations of conversations based on memory and, supposedly, notes. It attributes enormous power to Mossad, along with a total lack of moral scruples and political control. And there is almost no way of checking the truth of his assertions, some of which are very dramatic, including a plan to assassinate President Bush. No doubt some of this book is true, but to sort out fact from deception is extremely difficult. A common thread in the two books is the author's high opinion of himself.

Contemporary Syria: Liberalization Between Cold War and Cold Peace. EDITED BY EBERHARD KIENLE. London: British Academic Press, 1994, 187 pp. $59.95.

A conference volume based on two-year-old papers by leading Syria specialists. The common concern of most authors is economic liberalization. Will Syria find that opening its economy, as it is now doing, entails political liberalization as well, or will the Chinese model of economic liberalization without a political opening hold? On balance, the authors do not see any necessary evolution on the political front, although some see that change is inevitable over the longer term, especially once President Assad has left the scene. On balance, a very solid collection.

The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization, Revised and Updated. BY JACOB M. LANDAU. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, 438 pp. $19.95 (paper).

Originally published in 1990, this distinguished history has been revised and updated, especially to take into account the new Islamic republics of the former Soviet Union. Pan-Islam, of course, has failed to integrate the many diverse Muslim states, and Landau foresees nothing to change this prospect. He offers the thought, however, that Islam might yet provide some loose confederacy of Islamic states. But proponents of the clash of civilizations will find little grist for their mill in this careful historical overview.

Asia and the Pacific

DONALD ZAGORIA

Democracy in Japan: The Emerging Global Concern. BY FRANK MCNEIL. New York: Crown Publishers, 1994, 280 pp. $25.00.

Although the American media remains myopically focused on trade issues with Japan, the current crisis in Japan's democratic institutions raises more fundamental questions: How deep are the roots of democracy in Japan? Will much-needed democratic reforms prosper? Is a return to militarism possible? Can this self-absorbed country shed its insularity? What are the prospects for revitalizing the U.S.-Japan alliance?

All of these issues are addressed in this lively and readable book by a former U.S. Foreign Service officer who spent ten years in Japan during the course of a diplomatic career and has recently contributed to projects on Japan for

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several American think tanks.

The author is very much aware of what could go wrong, but he is cautiously optimistic. The reform process in Japan, he says, is irreversible because public and elite attitudes have changed and because the new electoral system will require politicians to become more responsive to the electorate. Prospects for deregulation of the economy are good because there is considerable support for it among business and the media and even in some sectors of the bureaucracy. Within Japan the ground of debate has shifted from how to deal with U.S. pressure to whether Japan, in its own interests, should open its economy.

Still, there is a worst-case scenario: a withering of Japan's democratic institutions in a climate of public apathy and degradation of Japan-U.S. ties, each reinforcing the other. The author concludes with a plea for "modernizing" the U.S.-Japan alliance—a job that will require a new jointly devised agenda and a substantial increase in Japan's contribution to aid to developing countries, support for the global environment, and assistance to the U.N. system.

India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and Its Resolution. BY ROBERT G. WIRSING. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, 337 pp. $45.00.

This is one of the most thoroughly researched, thoughtful, and balanced accounts of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan in many years. It concludes with a number of recommendations for breaking the stalemate that has now lasted for almost half a century. The author urges both India and Pakistan to reduce their military threat in Kashmir. And he notes, on the positive side, that in 1992 there was a partial cease-fire because of mutual fears of the possibility of escalating conflict. The more pessimistic scenario, however, is that India will seek to crush the separatist movement in Kashmir while ending all talk of negotiation while Pakistan continues to play the spoiler.

The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations. BY XUECHENG LIU. New York: University Press of America, 1994, 221 pp. $46.50.

This volume by a young Chinese scholar who is now associated with the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences is valuable for several reasons. Initially, it is the first analysis of the Chinese-Indian border dispute by a Chinese scholar, and it is remarkably balanced and free of polemics. Second, it seeks to place the Chinese-Indian relationship in the larger geopolitical context of the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union and demonstrates how the end of the Cold War has led to new opportunities to improve Chinese-Indian relations. In September 1993, the Indian prime minister visited China and signed a "landmark" agreement that recognized the current line of actual control on the border. This agreement has been followed by talk about troop reductions and confidence-building measures. The author sees this accord as the first step toward a comprehensive border agreement that could have wider ramifications for peace in the region.

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The Central Asian Republics: Fragments of Empire, Magnets of Wealth. BY CHARLES UNDELAND AND NICHOLAS PLATT. New York: The Asia Society, 1994, 143 pp. $9.95 (paper).

A brief but valuable introduction to developments in the five Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, the Kirghiz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan since they gained their independence following the breakup of the former Soviet Union in late 1991. The authors see three major challenges to these countries: national identity, economic viability, and relations with Russia and the nine million Russians living in the region.

As the authors point out, Central Asia's future hinges on Russia and the Russians in Central Asia. Since 1993, all politicians in Moscow, from the liberal Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev to the ultranationalists, have agreed that Russia must retain political preeminence. These sentiments are especially strong with regard to Kazakhstan, the country with which Russia shares a 4,000-mile border. For the next few years, the authors conclude, Russia will be in a position to control events in Central Asia. But over the longer run, roads, railroads, and pipelines through China, Iran, and Pakistan will give the Central Asian countries more leverage with Russia.

Bridging the Strait: Taiwan, China, and the Prospects for Reunification. BY HSIN-HSING WU. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, 346 pp. $75.00.

The relationship between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China is one of the most critical bilateral relationships in East Asia. China refuses to give up the right to use force if Taiwan declares independence and a pro-independence political party is gaining strength in Taiwan. An insightful book on this relationship, particularly from a Taiwanese scholar, would be very useful. Unfortunately, this book is not it. It is virtually devoid of analysis or practical policy recommendations.

A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s. BY ADAM SCHWARZ. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, 371 pp. $55.00 (paper, $19.95).

The author of this admirable volume is a correspondent with the *Far Eastern Economic Review* who lived and worked in Indonesia from 1988 to 1992. As thoughtful an account of the Suharto era in Indonesian politics as one could hope for.

On the one hand, as the author points out, Suharto's authoritarian rule combined with pragmatic economic policies over the past 30 years have dramatically reduced poverty in Indonesia while substantially increasing education, literacy, and health. The nation's industrial sector has grown rapidly, and so too has the private sector. Manufacturing exports now make up a fifth of gross domestic product. Meanwhile, social changes have also been profound. A middle class of professionals and white collar employees is forming.

But more and more educated Indonesians see Suharto's brand of leadership as excessively paternalistic and a hindrance to national development. The general unresponsiveness of the political process,

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the weakness of the legislative and judicial branches of government, the prevalence of officially sustained corruption, and the unpredictability of succession are now seen as a brake on Indonesia's development. What Suharto's critics want, however, is not Western democracy but a more responsive system with checks and balances. The author concludes that Suharto must start preparing for a smooth transition, or Indonesia could be plunged into turmoil.

To Catch a Tartar: A Dissident in Lee Kuan Yew's Prison. BY FRANCIS T. SEOW. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1944, 293 pp. $22.00 (paper).

Francis T. Seow recounts his experiences as a government official and dissenter under the autocratic government of Lee Kuan Yew. Since the mid-1970s, Lee's regime has cracked down on dissent, meting out harsh sentences for relatively minor offenses (as Michael Fay painfully discovered last year).

After several run-ins with the government, Seow was arrested in 1988 and imprisoned. His crimes: talking to an American diplomat about running for office and representing some alleged Marxists in court. Much of the book details abuse Seow suffered, including long interrogations, sleep deprivation, and being forced to stand naked in cold drafts. After 72 days, Seow was released. He now lives in exile in Boston.

Seow's story is compelling but one-sided. His understandably vitriolic account does not distinguish Singapore from similarly authoritarian countries with much less dramatic economic growth. Moreover, most government officials and many citizens believe that the use of draconian emergency powers, which date back to the communist insurgency of the 1950s, account for Singapore's success in combating crime. For these supporters, Confucian obedience is a small price to pay for economic and political stability.

PATRICIA LEE DORFF

Africa

GAIL GERHART

Dealing with the Past: Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa. EDITED BY ALEX BORAINE, JANET LEVY, AND RONEL SCHEFFER. Cape Town: Institute for Democracy in South Africa, 1994, 175 pp. $15.75.

When a transition from minority rule to democracy takes place through negotiation rather than outright victory for the new rulers, dealing with the political crimes committed under the old order becomes a delicate exercise. Members of the old security forces try to indemnify themselves against prosecution for acts of torture, murder, and assault, while the new democratic legitimate government must seek justice for victims.

This book is a highly focused discussion of the ethical and political decisions that face South Africa's government of national unity in establishing a long overdue truth commission, due to begin its work in 1995. Is it enough for the perpetrators of past crimes to acknowledge wrongdoing, or should they be

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prosecuted and punished? How far up or down the power hierarchies of the old order are individuals responsible? If perpetrators of past abuses acknowledge their wrongdoing, should their names be made public, or only their deeds and the names of their victims? Object lessons from Latin America, Eastern Europe, and the former Yugoslavia abound and are well scrutinized here. According to Boraine, who organized a February 1994 meeting on which the book is based, the message for South Africa is sobering: acknowledgment of past crimes is essential, but full justice for apartheid's victims is politically impossible.

Landmines in Mozambique. BY HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AFRICA AND HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ARMS PROJECT. New York: Human Rights Watch, March 1994, 119 pp. $10.00 (paper).

Easy Prey: Child Soldiers in Liberia. BY HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AFRICA AND HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH CHILDREN'S RIGHTS PROJECT. New York: Human Rights Watch, September 1994, 80 pp. $7.00 (paper).

Documenting and publicizing the human costs of wars is of enormous importance, even though it might seem that the damage cannot be undone. These reports from Human Rights Watch leave no doubt, however, that the physical and social consequences of war can be perpetuated long after the guns fall silent. In Mozambique, tens of thousands of land mines remain a gruesome threat to civilian safety and rural economic recovery. Liberia faces the heart-rending task of trying to rehabilitate thousands of young children traumatized by their forced participation as combatants in a nightmarish civil war. These challenges can be tackled quickly and vigorously, or they can be left to fester and compound the destruction of war. With its customary thoroughness, Human Rights Watch goes beyond describing these critical problems to pinpoint where the responsibility should lie for their solution and how national and international law could be reformed to prevent abuses of human rights.

African Refugees: Development Aid and Repatriation. EDITED BY HOWARD ADELMAN AND JOHN SORENSON. Boulder: Westview Press/North York: York Lanes Press, 1994, 264 pp. $49.95.

Every refugee crisis is unique, but the cumulative experiences of host governments, relief and development agencies, and refugees in Africa's post-independence years have generated many broad lessons to guide the management of future crises. The authors in this valuable collection bring impressive expertise to their review of major policy alternatives such as spontaneous versus organized settlement, integration versus repatriation, development versus relief, top-down versus participatory crisis management. There are some truisms along the way, for example that humanitarian aid is never nonpolitical and that the capacity of the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees has become inadequate. But generally the analysis is enlightening and closely tied to contemporary cases. Two

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chapters draw an especially timely comparison between Rwandans' long-term successful integration in western Tanzania and failed resettlement in southern Uganda, leading in the early 1990s to their "voluntary repatriation" by force with all its horrendous consequences. The most important thing the rest of the world can do to solve refugee crises in Africa, the editors argue, is to foster democratic governments to replace the autocratic regimes that create refugees in the first place.

Education in the Development of Tanzania, 1919–1990. BY LENE BUCHERT. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1994, 192 pp. $39.95 (paper, $19.95).

A detailed retrospective of education in Tanzania, highlighting parallels and continuities between the colonial and independence periods and analyzing the frequently wide discrepancies between theory and implementation of government policies. Britain, in the early years of its rule, emphasized gradual development at the base of the educational pyramid with a view toward raising rural productivity and forestalling the inconvenient growth of a politicized elite. Given the rising costs of empire after World War II, however, Britain replaced this mass-oriented approach with a new priority on elite and urban educational development to facilitate eventual political withdrawal. In a new political and economic context, Tanzania's initial postindependence leadership turned again to a rural, bottom-up emphasis in education to effect social transformation. Then, faced with harsh economic realities and its inability to implement the envisaged model, Tanzania again turned to a more quality-oriented, elite-focused approach, even though that meant sacrificing hard-won advances in mass literacy. A solid study for policy specialists, enhanced with an extensive bibliography and statistical tables.

Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique. BY WILLIAM MINTER. Atlantic Highlands: Zed Books, 1994, 308 pp. $69.95 (paper, $29.95).

Two decades of carnage followed bloody but successful nationalist wars of independence in Mozambique and Angola. What caused these tragic and destructive postindependence conflicts, and, once they were underway, what sustained them for so long? No previous attempts, either by academics or journalists, to answer these questions come near Minter's treatment in its exhaustive consideration of the complex evidence. Not only does he sift through practically everything that is publicly known plus the best informed speculation, but he also takes his readers through a series of counterfactuals in order to test some prevailing, but too simple, theories about the causes of the wars. Important gaps might someday be filled by the still-secret (or, more likely, already shredded) files of Pretoria's pre-1994 security forces, or from diplomatic memoirs yet to be written (which might cast more light, for example, on the Soviet and Cuban roles or offset the self-serving version of events put forward by former Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Chester Crocker). But there will not be as comprehensive or meticulous a book on this ghastly chapter of Africa's history for a long time to come.

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Response

The Propaganda Way

Christopher Lingle

A great deal has been made of the World Bank's announcement that the high rates of economic growth in the East Asian miracle economies stem from getting the fundamentals right. While that observation emphasized astute macroeconomics, various commentators have asserted that these fundamentals relate to unique Asian values. Kishore Mahbubani ("The Pacific Way," January/February 1995) implies that a fusion of Western and Asian cultures defines what he terms the "Pacific way."

Despite this presumed fusion, Mahbubani's essay points almost exclusively to the beneficial consequences of these Asian values. Beyond satisfying the self-serving political considerations of apologists for ruling regimes, this one-sided approach reflects an important trait arising out of Asian customs. The values said to promote prosperity stifle self-critical introspection. Wondering aloud about the cultural and political order is too often treated as an unacceptable sign of weakness in leaders. In others, it is an unacceptable heresy.

Commentary not unconditionally full of praise for the Asian political status quo provokes a strong response from the powers that be. Authoritarian East Asian regimes take a variety of steps against ordinary citizens, academics, journalists, opposition politicians, and even outsiders. The treatment might involve a mild rebuke, citation for criminal defamation or libel, and perhaps detention without trial.

In light of severe restrictions on freedom of speech, citizens have few opportunities to communicate with leaders. Similarly, for critics to air their views is difficult. The rules governing civic discourse in East Asia limit discussions of the Pacific way to its promoters and foreign critics. Communication between rulers and ruled tends to be a one-way, top-down procedure. And rather than the glue that holds Asian societies together, Asian values may be an illusion concealing the iron grip of petty despots.

Meanwhile the failures and problems in Europe and other parts of the West are

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discussed ad nauseam in a remarkably free atmosphere. Little in Mahbubani's observations about Western culture is novel or insightful. By joining the chorus of Western self-criticism, he and other outsiders might imagine that Western institutions involve only a self-destructive cycle. However, civic discourse and communication in the West involve a free-for-all of individual opinions expressed as a matter of constitutional right and cultural conviction.

A paternalist approach to political rule often gives way to authoritarianism, leading many Asian regimes strongly to resent direct criticism. However, while Asian cultures generally rely on an indirect method of dealing with problems, their approach does not work with thin-skinned government officials. Dialogue with Asian regimes has strict limits, and resentment is not limited to outside critics. Criticism from the citizens of Myanmar, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, or Singapore is no more welcome. Despite remarkable advances under some Asian regimes, the rigid intolerance of these authoritarian capitalist states bears a troubling similarity to fascism.

Singapore's rulers have provided a recent example of intolerance. In a celebrated case, I was tried in the High Court of Singapore for my remarks in the *International Herald Tribune*.[1] I was responding to Mahbubani's views in the same newspaper, which were similar to his *Foreign Affairs* article. He suggested that European leaders follow the success stories of East Asia. I responded that certain repressive tactics may have made the model unacceptable for Europe.

Specifically, I said that some East Asian governments relied on a "compliant judiciary to bankrupt opposition politicians." While I did not identify a particular country, in attempting to link my remarks to his country Singapore's prosecutor may have confessed the guilt of his regime. He admitted that members of the ruling People's Action Party of Singapore and its founding father, Lee Kuan Yew, had an established track record of suing opposition politicians for defamation. He insisted that "there is no such other country" where this has happened and identified 11 major political opposition figures whom legal actions, initiated by members of the ruling party, had financially ruined. I was found guilty of statements contemptuous of the Singaporean judiciary. The court assessed stiff fines and all court costs to the defendants, and the editor, publisher, printer, and distributor of the *Herald Tribune* were convicted for publicizing my words.

Meanwhile, the Western media openly air the views of Singaporean officials, who demand a right of unedited reply from publications that circulate in Singapore. For example, when it abbreviated a wordy statement from the Singaporean government, *The Economist* found its circulation severely curtailed.

Mahbubani relies on a dubious cause-and-effect connection between the material success of Asian economies and the authoritarian repression that may have accompanied that success. His arguments insist that restraints on individual freedom

[1] "Smoke over Parts of Asia Obscures Some Profound Concerns," *International Herald Tribune*, Oct. 7, 1994.

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are necessary for economic progress. Meanwhile the West, having lost its moral compass due to an irrepressible fixation on individual rights, suffers low economic performance. This viewpoint implies the unimaginative assumption that material gratification is the only or most worthy goal of humankind. In any event, his arguments overlook how the economic life cycle partly explains the weak growth in the West. That the United States and Europe compare unfavorably with the vibrancy of nascent East Asian economies is unsurprising. Eventually the tiger economies too shall be tamed.



Contrary to Mahbubani's claims that Asian values contribute to political stability and deter open aggression, East Asia has just as many unsettled border disputes, outrages against humanity, and conflicting geopolitical claims as Europe. Perceptions to the contrary are an outgrowth of the muted press of East Asia and the openness of the media in most parts of Europe.

While the carnage in Chechnya is televised across the globe, there was little coverage of the Dili massacre in Indonesia and no on-site reporting of human rights outrages in Myanmar. In 1994, the lack of concerted action on or criticism of immense, smoke-spreading forest fires in Indonesia reflected another Asian value. So as not to embarrass the Indonesian authorities, neighboring governments were disinclined to offer aid or criticize the handling of the fires. Saving face was more important than saving lives or protecting the environment.

In contrasting the exclusion of East and Central European nations from the institutions of Western Europe versus the inclusiveness of Asian economic relations, Mahbubani is comparing apples and oranges. While establishing free trade between all countries of Europe is desirable, the EU involves a different set of commitments than, for example, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The European Union requires acceptance of shared values, political commitments, and pressure from other members. If fires in the Black Forest were causing regional pollution, France would certainly have assisted Germany or insisted on German action. Moreover, in purely economic matters, members of the EU allow trade with Eastern and Central Europe with few more restrictions than ASEAN members impose on Vietnam or Myanmar.

At present, promoters and antagonists of an Asian model are engaged in a dialogue of the deaf. While much about

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Asian values should be emulated, much should be challenged. An appropriate method of communication between East and West needs to be discovered, and outlining the differences is a first step.

In collectivist Asian regimes, those wielding political power set rules that the polity must unquestioningly accept. Individualist Western regimes attempt to apply reason to resolve private and social interests. Consequently, cultures based on individualism tend to have an outspoken citizenry, while collectivist cultures rely on reserved understatement.

While the great Western political contribution is democracy, the great contribution of the East is bureaucracy. Whereas liberalism and individual freedom found fertile ground in the West, Asian institutions grew along conservative and collectivist lines. So the West evolved liberal capitalism, and Asia has tilted toward authoritarian capitalism. That the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, and Taiwan are moving toward multiparty politics is encouraging. However, Myanmar, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam practice authoritarian capitalism that keeps ruling parties in power by preserving economic growth. The cynical suggestion that exclusively Asian values explain economic success and politically opportunistic assertions that individual freedom and pluralistic democracy are alien concepts deflect liberalizing institutions that might weaken the authoritarian rulers' grip on power. Those rulers benefit from praising respect for authority as a component of Confucianism or other so-called Asian values.

These individualist and collectivist tendencies also affect business activity. Individualist cultures encourage and reward innovation by free-spirited entrepreneurs who are as likely to challenge the political status quo as to upset market arrangements. Most Asian economies, however, have either attempted autarky or have relied upon imitation, requiring access to open markets of more advanced economies. But the considerable success of many so-called miracle economies may not last. Unless they produce homegrown entrepreneurs and technological change, the technological gap will widen as innovators seek greater political and economic freedom outside the region.

East Asian authoritarian capitalist regimes cannot last forever. Individual choice will sweep aside archaic institutions. Despots, autocrats, and their dynastic heirs are mortal, and modernization stemming from economic prosperity will undermine their authority.

Global economic progress depends on free trade. Similarly, cultural progress requires an open competition among political and cultural institutions. Asian authoritarian regimes are attempting to impose cultural protectionism to isolate their communities from infectious liberalizing Western influences. By restricting information, cultural protectionism deals a double blow to emerging economies. Just as trade protection inhibits economic growth, so cultural protection inhibits cultural progress. But cultural protectionism will also retard the formation of an information-based economy and curtail economic growth. Unless rulers of Asian regimes take note of this process, the notion of the much-heralded Pacific century may be a stillborn myth.

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Letters to the Editor

Raymond L. Garthoff & Richard Pipes on the Cold War, Kevin Drummond on Quebec Separatism

To the Editor:

In his review of my book, *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War* (and to some extent its predecessor, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*), Richard Pipes seeks to prove that "the hard-liners had it right." To this end, he distorts the content of my studies ("Misinterpreting the Cold War," January/February 1995).

Pipes contends that *The Great Transition* offers a "persistent justification of Soviet aggression in terms that echo the official [Soviet] line of the time." That is simply not true. In the first place, in explaining Soviet motivations I do not justify them. Moreover, to note but one example, which Pipes himself cites, my explanation of the Soviet motivation for military intervention in Afghanistan was not the official justification at all, as was made very clear in *Détente and Confrontation.* Pipes' allegation that I "find no room in my narrative" for evidence from the Soviet archives is flat wrong. He is vague on what "revelations" he has in mind, but the new revised edition of *Détente and Confrontation* and *The Great Transition* include more such data than any other study published to date. They confirm, incidentally, my interpretation of the Afghanistan intervention.

Pipes indulges his passion for zealous polemic by arguing that because Russian President Boris Yeltsin denounces communism and "makes common cause with Western cold warriors," while some Russian communists and fascists defend the aggressive Soviet past, I now paradoxically find myself in "the camp" of the latter. I have never defended communism or Soviet aggression, nor failed to see a crucial difference between the sides in the Cold War, and I am obviously not in the same camp as Russian communists or fascists. I resent the unjustified charge.

Pipes objects to my "methodology" of observing interactions of the two sides. It is true that I find an "interactionist" pattern more explanatory of the relationship than one that merely stresses the aims or actions of one side. But the interactionist model is not, as he presents it, reducible to an assumption of "tit for tat," that is, be good and your adversary will be good. It is rather a recognition that each side is influenced by what the other says and does, and that there is an important dynamic of interactive influences—not all intended, not all benign.

Pipes seeks to refute my argument that the principal role in winding down the Cold War was played by Soviet President

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Mikhail Gorbachev and not by the Reagan administration. He argues that a "fundamental weakness" in my case is what he alleges to be a "failure to account for the emergence of a Soviet soft-liner in the midst of the most hard-line of all American administrations." He argues that according to the interactionist model, the Soviet leadership would respond to belligerence with belligerence. Yet it is his straw man interactionist theoretical model, not my interactionist explanation of what actually occurred, that faces such a dilemma.

Pipes belabors me for saying that no one in the early and mid-1980s expected that the Cold War, communist rule, and the Soviet Union itself would come to an end within the decade. That, he says, was true of me and my "colleagues in the Sovietological community." In his 1984 book *Survival Is Not Enough,* Pipes wrote that communism could not forever muddle through—but also that "the Soviet government is in no danger of imminent collapse." And in *Foreign Affairs* in 1984, Pipes wrote that the Soviet leadership "will always find the pursuit of an aggressive foreign policy preferable to coping with internal problems," and that there was "no likelihood that the Soviet government will voluntarily dissolve the Soviet Union into its constituent republics." I repeat, no one in the first half of the 1980s expected that outcome.

Pipes contends that "the grand strategy of the Reagan administration with regard to the U.S.S.R. was to exploit this crisis by every available means in order to push Moscow toward reform," spelled out in National Security Decision Directive 75 in December 1982. In time-honored insider fashion, he notes that this keystone evidence, which would clinch his case, is "still classified." (Peter Schweizer, whose book *Victory* Pipes cites, similarly referred to NSDD 75 as calling for the United States "not just to coexist with the Soviet system but to change it fundamentally," citing an interview with Pipes as his source.)

Pipes was, however, evidently unaware that some months earlier NSDD 75, in its entirety, had been declassified (at the request of former National Security Adviser Bud McFarlane; the text is appended to his book, *Special Trust*). I would note, first, that NSDD 75 explicitly was said to be designed "for the long haul," not based on the expectation of an early Soviet collapse. Moreover, it did not spell out a strategy for "exploiting the crisis by every available means," but rather a centrist three-part policy: first, "to contain and over time to reverse Soviet expansionism"; second, "to promote, *within the narrow limits available to us,* the process of change in the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic political and economic system" (italics mine); and third, "to engage the Soviet Union in negotiations to attempt to reach agreements which protect and enhance U.S. interests and which are consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity and mutual interest." As for a decisive economic offensive, NSDD 75 sought "to avoid subsidizing the Soviet economy or unduly easing the burden of Soviet allocation decisions" while permitting "mutual beneficial trade." Not a bad policy, but not a strategy to bring the Soviet system to its knees in the near future.

Pipes states that, "as someone involved in the formulation of Soviet policy in the

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first two years of the Reagan administration," he can attest "that it was vigorously implemented over the objection of several more dovish secretaries" (evidently meaning Secretaries of State Alexander Haig and George Shultz). For the two years he was in Washington, perhaps; those were not the years of engagement and success of the Reagan administration. In his memoir *Turmoil and Triumph,* Shultz dismisses Pipes for having held the pernicious view that "after the Soviets have changed, then maybe we can do something with them." He makes clear that, with President Reagan's support, he implemented a policy of strength *and* engagement in dialogue and negotiation.

As for Gorbachev's role, I conclude that "only a Soviet leader could have ended the Cold War because it rested on the Marxist-Leninist assumption of a struggle to the end of two social-economic-political systems, the capitalist world and the socialist (communist) world." (So much for Pipes' contention that I am barely "willing to concede" a role for communist ideology; it was at the heart of the Cold War confrontation.) The critical factor was:

> Gorbachev's determination to change the whole Soviet relationship with the world, to enter into the interdependent real world rather than continue a conflict between "two worlds" ... Gorbachev did not merely want to reduce tensions; he set out to end the Cold War, to create a "common European home," to turn down decisively the arms race and demilitarize the East-West relationship, and to disengage from Soviet involvement in a geopolitical-ideological struggle in the Third World.... To do this he was prepared to sacrifice Soviet political hegemony and military preponderance in Eastern Europe, to make disproportionate concessions in arms control (INF, START, and CFE), to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan and Soviet support for Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia and Vietnamese troops in Cambodia ... and to make "socialist" regimes everywhere stand or fall on the basis of accomplishment and popular mandate.

While Pipes acknowledges that "the effect of the hard-line Reagan policies on the collapse of the U.S.S.R." is not known, he nonetheless asserts that "one can say with confidence that U.S. policies played an important role in compelling reforms ... [that] unraveled the system." In the first instance, the role of Reagan's hard-line policies has to be distinguished from his policies of engagement beginning in 1984. What can, however, be said with confidence is that American policies of containment from President Harry Truman through Reagan did play a role, as foreshadowed by George Kennan. Yet Pipes does not mention the fundamental U.S. policy of containment even once. That is no doubt due to his view, expressed in his 1984 article, that containment was both "impracticable" and insufficient. Although a reader of Pipes' review would not suspect it, what I wrote in *The Great Transition* is that containment "successfully preclude[d] any temptations by Moscow to advance Soviet hegemony by military means." Containment and deterrence "for over four decades performed the historic function of holding Soviet power in check, or being prepared to do so, until the internal seeds of destruction in the Soviet Union

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and its empire could mature. At that point, however, Mikhail Gorbachev and the transformation of Soviet policy brought the Cold War to an end."

Pipes may disagree, but those are not the words of an "apologist" for Soviet policy, of one who cannot see any differences between the two sides in the Cold War, or of one who is in "the camp" of Russian communists and fascists today. Read the book to see what it really says.

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF
Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution

REAGAN WAS RIGHT

Richard Pipes replies:

I regret that Raymond L. Garthoff found my review of *The Great Transition* unfair. His letter, however, evades the central issue. In the early 1980s, Cold War doves like Mr. Garthoff argued against the Reagan administration's policy because they said it would cause the Soviets to become more intransigent. In fact, the opposite occurred. Mr. Garthoff reaffirms that Gorbachev was the "critical factor" that ended the Cold War. But neither in the book nor in his letter does he explain what induced Gorbachev to let go of the Soviet empire and allow communist regimes to "stand or fall" on their own merits.

Space limitations prevent my answering all of Mr. Garthoff's counterarguments, but I would like to make four brief points.

First, he explains and thus implicitly justifies the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a reluctant move to protect "vital" security interests from diverse threats, including the United States. If only Mr. Garthoff showed as much understanding for U.S. policies as he does for Soviet ones!

Second, although I did not explicitly predict in the early 1980s the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union, I portrayed it as a country in the grips of a "revolutionary situation"—a concept that implies instability and the potential for disintegration. There is no hint of a Soviet crisis in any of Mr. Garthoff's writings of that time.

Third, in his eagerness to prove that NSDD 75 was really not a major departure from traditional U.S. policy, Mr. Garthoff overlooks its revolutionary central thesis: "The United States recognizes that Soviet aggressiveness has deep roots in the internal system," and hence America should promote political and economic pluralism in the U.S.S.R. (obviously, within, not beyond, our means). In practice, subversion considerably exceeded the language of NSDD 75. Indeed, at the December 1982 National Security Council meeting that reviewed NSDD 75, President Reagan insisted on the deletion from the document of certain points dealing with economic warfare lest they leak to the press and embarrass him.

Fourth, I fully appreciate the accomplishments of containment—in their day. In 1984, with Soviet outposts scattered all over the globe—Cuba, Nicaragua, Angola, Vietnam, and so on—it seemed to me that a policy devised four decades earlier had become impracticable. The altered geopolitical situation required an assault on the Soviet system itself.

I do join Mr. Garthoff in referring readers to his book. His apologetic tone and inability to satisfactorily explain the

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course of events will quickly become apparent.

RICHARD PIPES
Baird Professor of History, Harvard University

NO CANADA

To the Editor:

It is unfortunate that *Foreign Affairs* handled the issue of Canada's future by printing Conrad Black's Manichean polemic, which presents the complex issue of Quebec sovereignty as a tiresome debate between Canada—a paragon of virtue and tolerance—and a quarrelsome, intractable Quebec ("Canada's Continuing Identity Crisis," March/April 1995).

Black's article ignores the central question of why many Quebeckers still want to separate. The answer is simple. The current Canadian constitution was adopted in 1982 by the nine English-speaking provinces and the federal government. The constitution was rejected by all the political parties in Quebec's National Assembly—federalist and sovereigntist alike—because it radically changed the original country that Quebec helped found in 1867. Furthermore, Canada's constitution makes any future constitutional reform virtually impossible, as seen in the consecutive failures of the 1990 Meech Lake accord and the 1992 Charlottetown accord.

As in 1982, the heart of today's problem lies in Canada's failure to address Quebec's desire for autonomy. For over 30 years, successive governments of Quebec have tried to make Canada accommodate Quebec's identity within the Canadian framework. "Give us some space" was the message. Over the years, that message has been called "special status," "two nations," the "distinct society," or "asymmetrical federalism." To this day, Canada does not recognize the existence of Quebec as a nation, a people, a distinct society, or even a somewhat asymmetrical province—at a time when 70 percent of Quebeckers tell pollsters that they think of themselves as Quebeckers first.

A growing number of well-informed Americans view the debate on Quebec's sovereignty with great interest. With a per capita GDP similar to that of Austria or Denmark, Quebec is the United States' eighth-largest trading partner, with exchanges between the two totaling $40 billion annually and amounting to 40 percent of U.S.-Mexico trade. Such exchanges are two and a half times the United States' trade with Brazil and eight times its commerce with Chile. Such figures explain Quebeckers' ardent support for open trade. Quebec's enthusiastic support for the 1988 U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement was crucial to the treaty's adoption, as well as for the North American Free Trade Agreement four years later.

While U.S. officials say they would prefer a united Canada, the U.S. position has always respected all options. "Canada's political future," we are told, "is for Canadians to decide." In a referendum later this year, Quebeckers will indeed be asked to decide. Whatever the outcome, Quebec's quest for a new status should be treated with the same fairness.

KEVIN DRUMMOND
Delegate General, Government of Quebec, New York

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